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ARTICLE
THE DYNAMIC CYCLE OF LEGAL CHANGE
Professor John Martinez'
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience....
The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with as if
axioms and corollaries
of a book of mathematics.2
it contained only the
I Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah. This article was funded in part by the University of Utah
College of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund. I would
like to thank my wife, Karen Martinez, for her encouragement and
support in the writing of this article.
2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881).
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Introduction
Justice Holmes's observation that the law is a
product of empirical experience, not a problem of
mathematics, leaves us with the task of figuring out how
the legal system actually works. Although Holmes made
his statement over 130 years ago, there is still no
universally accepted analytical approach for describing
how the American legal system creates and changes the
law. This article proposes a "Dynamic Cycle of Legal
Change" as a model for understanding the structure and
operation of the American legal system.
Part I first posits that we should consider the legal
system from an "information systems" perspective. Part II
then describes the proposed "Dynamic Cycle of Legal
Change" (DCLC) as an information system model of the
legal system. Part III illustrates the operation of the DCLC
in three settings: common law, legislation, and direct
democracy. Illustrations include settings of gender
equality, fame as a property asset, palimony claims, crime
victims' bills of rights, same-sex marriage statutes, solar
acts, and the California coastal protection initiative and
subsequent statute.
I. An Information Systems Approach to the
American Legal System
Systems theory conceives of modern societies as
comprised of systems of communication for processing
information. 3 Examples of such systems include private
3 Benjamin J. Richardson, Financing Environmental Change: A New
Role for Canadian Environmental Law, 49 McGILL L.J. 145, 170
(2004). See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
(Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff
& Rosamund Ziegert eds., 2009).
11
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entities - such as corporations or partnerships - and
public entities - such as cities or state highway
departments.
Information systems engage in dynamic, continuous
processes of inputs, reactions, and feedback.4 A
corporation, for example, obtains inputs of information
regarding how its products or services are received by the
market, reacts to that information by adjusting its
production or marketing, and then repeats the cycle.
Similarly, a city obtains inputs of information regarding its
operations from the citizenry, reacts to that information by
adjusting the manner in which it provides public services,
and then repeats the cycle.
Herbert Simon, in his path breaking work, The
Sciences of the Artificial, emphasized that the structure and
operation of society's information systems is the result of
human design.5  Thus, he suggested that we can design
information systems, or "artifacts," on a societal scale.6
Only until comparatively recently, however, has the
American legal system been viewed as an information
system.7 Henry Smith has studied specific fields of law -
such as contract, tort, or intellectual property - using an
information systems approach. 8  Other scholars have
4 Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the
Constitution is a "Suicide Pact," 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287,
332 n.244 (2011); see also FREDERICK L. BATES, SOCIOPOLITICAL
ECOLOGY: HUMAN SYSTEMS AND ECOLOGICAL FIELDS 80 (1997).
5 HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 111 (3rd ed.
1996) ("Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at
changing existing situations into preferred ones.").
6 Id. at 141.
7 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a
Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 727, 739
(1989) ("The law autonomously processes information, creates worlds
of meaning, sets goals and purposes, produces reality constructions,
and defines normative expectations . . ).
8 Particularly significant in this regard is Henry Smith's work: Henry
E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691
12
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applied variants of complex adaptive systems theory -
such as game theory and chaos theory - to the study of the
legal system, but such efforts have foundered on the shoals
of indeterminacy that such variants produce.9
There is no universally accepted analytical approach
for describing how the American legal system creates and
changes law.' 0 Systems theory can inform understanding
of the American legal system, but we need a model for
understanding its structure and operation." This article
proposes a "Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change" as such a
model.
(2012); Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts,
4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in
Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009); Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175 (2006).
9 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 885 (2008). On the problems of indeterminacy, which such
variants produce, see Jeffrey D. Rudd, JB. Ruhl's A Law and Society
System: Burying Norms and Democracy under Complexity Theory's
Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 551 (2005)
(critically analyzing J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: Wake-Up Call for Legal
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849,
861 (1996), which concludes that "[Y]ou can't ever reach absolute
system predictability for a nonlinear dynamical system. . . . [Just]
blame it on chaos, emergence, and catastrophe.").
1o See generally David T. Richie, Using John Dewey's Pragmatism
Epistemology to Teach Legal Analysis and Communication, 5 CRIT:
CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 1 (2012) (discussing various approaches for
describing the American legal system).
" Niklas Luhmann suggested that the legal system could be understood
by examining its underlying structure, but he did not formulate an
explanation of how the legal system actually works. NIKLAS
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 140 (Klaus A. Ziegert trans.,
Fatima Kastner et al. eds. (1993) (2004)) ("This does not mean, as one,
might suspect at first glance, that the legal system and the political
system form one system together. But they do resort to special forms
of structural coupling and are linked to each other through that
coupling.").
13
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II. The American Legal System as a "Dynamic
Cycle of Legal Change"
A. Creation of Law
The following diagram depicts the "Dynamic Cycle
of Legal Change."l 2
Courts/Legislatures/Populace
Legal Doctrine/Rules of Law (Means) Social Values/Norms (Ends)
Social Reality
The DCLC is a graphic representation' 3 of how the
legal system makes and remakes the law over time. It is
composed of four major interrelated structures: (1) the
Institutions of Law Creation and Change, in the form of
courts, 14 legislatures,'" and the populace' 6 acting through
12 I have set out a slightly modified version of this diagram, which is
included in DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY LAW 9 (Lexis-Nexis 2011).
13 Graphic representations illustrate the operation of dynamic systems.
These representations serve to explain the acquisition, processing, and
use of information to achieve meaning. See generally Jay M. Feinman,
The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989);
Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); John
Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights
in Body Parts, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 290 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Missing
Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989).
See also Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of
Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental Normative
Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288 (1984) (application of cognitive
principles to explain legal reasoning by means of graphic
representations, such as lines, planes, and cubes).
14 Courts "make" law. The now outdated "declaratory" or
"Blackstonian" theory of judicial decision making posits that courts
merely "fmd" the law rather than "make" it. For discussions of the
declaratory theory, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-29
14
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 16
(1964); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65
(1932); J. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 218-27 (1921). In
contrast, the modern Legal Realist position is that courts indeed "make"
law. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2, 6 (1960) (judges as much as legislators exercise an
ineluctable law-creating function). See generally Gilmore, Legal
Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
In an earlier article, I suggested that both approaches can be
mapped onto an analytical framework that considers judicial decision
making as involving three decisions: (1) the substantive decision to
change the law; (2) the temporal decision to identify the transactions to
which the change applies; and (3) the remedial decision to determine
whether a remedy should be provided to those who have reasonably
relied on the prior law to their detriment. See John Martinez, Taking
Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from
"Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 297,
299-300 (1988).
Both theories therefore entail the threshold decision whether
to change the substantive law. The difference comes in the second,
temporal, decision identifying the transactions to which the change will
apply and in the third, remedial, decision whether to provide a remedy
to those who reasonably relied on the prior law. Under the
"declaratory" theory, all substantive changes are by definition
retroactive, since the change in the law already "existed." And since it
therefore was not a "change" at all, because everyone is presumed to
know the law, no remedy is required.
In contrast, as set out in my earlier article, the Legal Realist
conception that courts indeed "make" law requires serious
consideration of the second two decisions. See John Martinez, Taking
Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from
"Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 297,
346 (1988) (suggesting that either compensation, or a reasonable period
of time to amortize their investments, should be provided to those who
reasonably rely on common law property rules that are subsequently
overruled by state courts).
15 "Legislatures" includes Congress at the federal level, state
legislatures, and local government legislative bodies, such as city
councils.
16 There is no national "power of initiative." The only way for the
general public to impose a rational legislating requirement on Congress
would be through the cumbersome constitutional amendment process.
David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide: An Assessment of the
15
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initiatives or referenda;17 (2) Social Reality, as perceived by
the institutions of legal change; (3) Social Values (or
"Norms "), inferred as "should" statements, from social
reality as perceived by the institutions of legal creation and
change; and (4) Legal Doctrine (or "rules of law"),
whereby the institutions of legal creation and change seek
to implement the derived social values or norms.
The components and operation of the DCLC
confirm that "every legal decision is a moral decision."' 8
Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 42 (1995)
("The United States is one of only five democracies which has never
held a national referendum . . . ."). However, about half the states do
have the initiative mechanism in place whereby citizens may enact
statutory or constitutional amendments through popular vote. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is vested
in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and
Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum."); OR. CONST. art. IV, § I ("The legislative power of
the state, except for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly, consisting of a Senate
and a House of Representatives."). David B. Magleby, Let the Voters
Decide: An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 13, 15 (1995) ("Only six states west of the Mississippi
River do not have some form of initiative . . . while only eight states
east of the Mississippi have the process."). See generally K.K.
DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185
(1995) (discussing history of initiatives).
1 Executives, such as the President, governors, and mayors also
"make" law but usually through authority delegated by legislative
bodies. When they do have independent authority to make law, the
mechanism and constraints applicable to legislatures, the other elected
institutions of legal change, apply to executives as well. Accordingly,
executives are not treated as separate institutions of legal change in the
DCLC.
18 My good friend and mentor, John J. Flynn, late Hugh B. Brown
Professor at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah,
used to tell me this all the time. This article is the fruition of my
understanding of that phrase and is dedicated to his memory.
16
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The entire DCLC is a design of the legal system. The
institutions of law creation and change (courts, legislatures,
or the people acting through direct democracy in the form
of initiatives and referenda) comprise the "modules" or
"subsystems," which are the engines of the DCLC.19
Social Reality is the object "data" used by the institutions
of law creation and change. The Norms derived from
social reality and the Legal Doctrine to implement those
norms are the "output" of the institutions of legal change.20
The operation of the DCLC consists of a dynamic
process: From a perceived social reality, social values or
norms ("should" statements) are inferred by the institutions
of law creation and change. 21 Those institutions then
transform the inferred "should" into enforceable legal
doctrine, which is then applied to society.22 Legal doctrine
is thus the means whereby social values or norms, as ends,
Cf Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas
Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1652 (1989) ("The norm is the
application of the norm. It is not prior to application.").
19 HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 184 (3rd ed.
1996) (noting that systems may be composed of interrelated
subsystems - which in turn may be composed of sub-subsystems and
so on - "until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem").
20 Id. at 146-47 (society is the "data" used by institutions in the legal
system).
21 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an
Iterative Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2006). See also Guido
Westkamp, Code, Copying, Competition: The Subversive Force of
Para-copyright and the Need for an Unfair Competition Based
Reassessment of DRM Laws after INFOPAQ, 58 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 665, 724-25 (2011) ("Normativity depends on recognizing
structural changes between the legal and social sub-systems to which
the law is to apply . . .").
22 See Thomas 0. Beebee, Can Law-and-Humanities Survive Systems
Theory?, 22 L. & LITERATURE 244, 263 (2010) (describing this process
as "formalization," which can also be termed "channeling" or
"translation," whereby legal institutions elicit norms from social reality
and "formalize," "channel," or "translate" such norms into legal
doctrine).
17
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 19
are implemented.23 The cycle then begins again: The
institutions of legal creation and change use the feedback
from social reality to infer new norms ("should") and/or to
modify legal doctrine.24
B. Change of Law
The operation of the DCLC shows how a change of
law may occur at the level of legal doctrine or, more
fundamentally, at the level of social values or norms.
1. Change in Legal Doctrine
Legal doctrine is adjusted from time to time to
ensure that the "fit" between the inferred social values or
norms and their implementation is appropriately "close."
In this form of legal change, the social values or norms are
23 Gunther Teubner similarly describes the operation of the legal
system as a "hypercycle": "Law . .. distinguishes itself from society . .
. by constituting components in a self-referential way and linking them
together in a hypercycle." GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 25 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans.,
Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
24 This has been described as a "positive institutional feedback loop."
Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 373, 376-
77 (2008). See also Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor:
Why the Constitution is a "Suicide Pact," 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 287, 332 n.244 (2011):
A "system" that promotes interplay or interaction is
always ongoing and active, never static or inert. A
system is a dynamic, continuous process of actions
and reflection based on inputs, reactions and
feedback to assess the inputs and reactions which, in
turn, inspire successive sets of inputs, reactions and
feedback. Under systems theory, unlike pure
structural-functional analysis, things and events,
because they move in time, cannot be understood
simply by scrutinizing them at any given moment.
18
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not questioned, but the efficacy with which the legal
doctrine implements those social values or norms is
examined and, if necessary, modified.
For example, in examining social reality, a
legislature may find that vehicle manufacturers have
installed additional or more effective safety devices.
Accordingly, the legislature may increase speed limits
because vehicles have become safer. The underlying norm
that people should be protected from driving faster than is
safe remains the same.25
2. Change in Social Values or Norms
More fundamentally, legal doctrine may be adjusted
because the underlying social norms or values derived from
social reality have changed. In this form of legal change,
when social reality changes - or at least when the
institutions of legal creation and change perceive that
reality has changed significantly - the social norms or
values inferred by the institutions may be modified as
well.26
For example, in examining social reality, Congress
and the state legislatures perceived that society had
changed such that human beings should not be owned as
25 Of course, competing norms, such as environmental protection from
vehicle pollution or fuel conservation, may make increasing the speed
limit inadvisable.
26 Niklas Luhmann describes this as the "temporalization of the validity
of norms." NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 469 (Klaus
A. Ziegert trans., Fatima Kastner et al. eds., 2009) ("Norms, and the
validity that supports them, are no longer based on the constants of
religion or nature or an unchallenged social structure, but are now
experienced and dealt with as time projections. They are valid 'until
further notice'. This not only makes them felt as contingent but also as
cognitively sensitized. . . . What is meant is only that norms are
equipped with assumptions of reality . . .").
19
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objects of property rights and implemented that norm
through the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.27
III. Illustrations of the Operation of the
Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change
A. Common Law - Courts as Institutions of
Legal Change
1. Gender Equality
In Kirchberg v. Feenstra,28 the United States
Supreme Court held that a mortgage on the home of a
married couple, signed only by the husband without the
notice or consent of the wife, violated the federal Equal
Protection Clause. The mortgagee had obtained the
mortgage pursuant to the Louisiana "Head and Master"
statute, which authorized the husband to alienate the
property of the marriage without his wife's prior notice or
consent. 29
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
Court's decision viewed women as incapable of managing
their own property once married. 30 The Norm (or "should"
27 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."). That change, of course, occurred
only after the trauma of the Civil War.
28 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
29 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971). The statute was repealed
effective on January 1, 1980. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325-76
(West 1979). The Feenstra mortgage had been signed in 1974.
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 457 (1981).
30 For a discussion of the Napoleonic Code and Spanish law as the
sources of the Head and Master statute, see Louis F. Del Duca & Alain
A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the
Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 25-29
(2010). Married women "owned" equally with their husbands, but only
20
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statement) from that perceived reality was that a man
should be the "head and master" insofar as property of the
marriage was concerned. The Louisiana Legislature, as the
instrument of implementation of that Norm, enacted the
Head and Master statute, which embodied the following
Legal Doctrine: If a husband signs a mortgage on marital
property without the notice or consent of the wife, such
mortgage is enforceable.
Mrs. Feenstra got the Court to acknowledge the
existence of a different Social Reality: Married women can
manage their own property affairs. The Court derived a
new social norm: Women should have an equal voice in
how marital property is alienated. Accordingly, as the
instrument of legal change, the Court modified the Legal
Doctrine: If a husband signs a mortgage on marital
property without the notice or consent of the wife, such
mortgage is not enforceable.
2. Fame
In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 3 1 the court held that fame was protectable as a
property asset called the "right of publicity." 32 Thus, the
court held, a first transferee of the right of publicity of
the husband was empowered to act in regard to assets of the marriage.
Nina Nichols Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803:
Sociedad De Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1969) ("Whereas the
wife owned equally with her husband, he, as "business manager," of
the partnership, actually administered the community of gains.... He
was described as 'in actu' (in control) as well as 'in habitu' (in present
interest). The wife was only 'in habitu' or 'in habitu et in creditu' (in
present interest as creditor) in regard to the bienes gananciales, but no
less a co-owner.").
31 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
32 Id. at 868. See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY-
THE HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 130-61 (2011)
(discussing the evolution of "owning fame").
21
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certain baseball players could enforce such right against a
subsequent transferee. 33
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
court's decision did not acknowledge "fame" as a proper
object of property rights. The Norm (or "should"
statement) from that perceived reality was that people
should not be able to exercise any of the sticks in the
bundle of rights - transfer, use, or exclusion - against
others in regard to fame. Previous courts had not
conceived of such a property right. Thus, the operative
legal doctrine was as follows: If a person contracts to
allow another to use his or her photographs, and also
subsequently contracts with a third party to also use his or
her photographs, then the first contracting party has no
claim against the third party.34
The first contracting party in the Haelan case got
the court to acknowledge the existence of a different Social
Reality: Fame has pecuniary value.35 The court derived a
new social norm: People should be able to treat their
"fame" as an object of property rights.36 Thus, the
13 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869
(2d Cir. 1953).
34 Indeed, that is what the defendants in the Haelan case asserted. Id. at
868.
3 For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements and popularizing their countenances, as displayed in
newspapers, magazines, buses, trains, and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made
the subject of an exclusive grant that barred any other advertiser from
using their pictures. Id. at 868.
36 But plaintiff, in its capacity as exclusive grantee of player's right of
publicity, has a valid claim against defendant if defendant used that
player's photograph during the term of plaintiffs grant and with
knowledge of it. It is no defense to such a claim that defendant is the
assignee of a subsequent contract between that player and Russell,
purporting to make a grant to Russell or its assignees. For the prior
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operative legal doctrine became as follows: If a person
contracts to allow another to use his or her photographs,
and also subsequently contracts with a third party to also
use his or her photographs, then the first contracting party
has a property claim against the third party.
3. Palimony
In Marvin v. Marvin,37 the California Supreme
Court held that unmarried cohabitants could enforce rights
against each other as to assets acquired during the duration
of the cohabitation.
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
court's decision refused to acknowledge the existence of
unmarried cohabitation. The Norm (or "should" statement)
from that perceived reality was that people should not
cohabit other than in the status of marriage. The courts, as
the instruments of implementation of that Norm, followed
the Legal Doctrine that, if property had been acquired only
in the name of one of the parties to such relationships
(typically the man in a heterosexual relationship), then all
such property belonged to that party. 38
grant to plaintiff renders that subsequent grant invalid during the period
of the grant (including an exercised option) to plaintiff but not
thereafter. Id. at 869.
n Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
38 This was the ruling of the lower court in Marvin v. Marvin:
In the instant case plaintiff and defendant lived
together for seven years without marrying; all
property acquired during this period was taken in
defendant's name. When plaintiff sued to enforce a
contract under which she was entitled to half the
property and to support payments, the trial court
granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant,
thus leaving him with all property accumulated by
the couple during their relationship.
Id. at 110.
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Michelle Marvin persuaded the California Supreme
Court to acknowledge the existence of a different Social
Reality: "The 1970 census figures indicate that today
perhaps eight times as many couples are living together
without being married as cohabited ten years ago." 39 The
court derived a new social norm: "The courts should
enforce express contracts between non-marital partners
except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded
on the consideration of meretricious sexual services."40
Accordingly, as the instrument of legal change, the court
modified the Legal Doctrine:
In the absence of an express contract, the
courts should inquire into the conduct of the
parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates an implied contract, agreement
of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. The
courts may also employ the doctrine of
quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such
as constructive or resulting trusts, when
warranted by the facts of the case.4'
B. Legislation - Legislatures as Institutions of
Legal Change
1. Crime Victims' Bills of Rights
In 1994 the Utah Legislature proposed for
adoption 42 what subsequently became the Victims' Rights
39 Id. at 110 n.1.
40 Id. at 110.
41 Id.
42 S.J. Res. 6, 1994 Utah Laws 1610, 1610-11.
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Amendment to the state constitution. 43 The Amendment
and the subsequent implementing legislation gave crime
victims numerous substantive and procedural rights that
they did not have before, including the right to be informed
of, be present at, and be heard at important criminal justice
proceedings and to have the judge consider victims'
statements as relevant information in sentencing."
In terms of the DCLC, Social Reality prior to the
Amendment did not view crime victims as proper
participants in criminal justice proceedings involving the
crimes committed against them. The derived Norm was
that crime victims should not be allowed to participate in
criminal proceedings. Legislatures and common law
courts, as the instruments of implementation of that Norm,
followed criminal procedure rules that excluded evidence
from such crime victims as well.
My colleague, Professor Paul Cassel, was extremely
instrumental in getting the Utah Legislature to
acknowledge a different Social Reality: Victims of crime
are deeply affected and are often anxious to participate in
subsequent criminal proceedings involving defendants
charged with the crimes against them. The new derived
Norm became as follows: A crime victim should have a
right to participate in criminal proceedings involving
his/her victimization. Accordingly, both the Utah
43 Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and
the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1373. Professor Cassell was also instrumental in the subsequent
enactment of The Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") in 2004. Pub.
L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-65 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)). Paul G. Cassell & Steven
Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System of Public
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims' Rights
Act, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2011).
4 Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and
the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1373, 1386-1416.
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Legislature and the populace enacted a new legal doctrine:
A crime victim has the right to offer evidence in subsequent
criminal proceedings involving his/her victimization.
2. Same-Sex Marriage Statutes
Same-sex marriage statutes are increasingly
proliferating across the United States.45 In terms of the
DCLC, Social Reality prior to the statutes viewed the status
of marriage as reserved for couples comprised of a man and
a woman. The derived Norm was that same-sex couples
should not be able to marry. Accordingly, marriage
licenses were issued only to heterosexual couples.
The gay and lesbian community and their
supporters, in an ongoing struggle, have been able to
convince state legislatures to acknowledge a different
Social Reality: Same-sex couples are "couples" in the
same sense as heterosexual couples. The newly derived
Norm, still in the process of development, is that same-sex
couples should be able to acquire the status of marriage.
Thus, at least some states have enacted a new legal
doctrine: Marriage licenses may be issued to same-sex
couples.
3. Solar Acts
The rejection of the "right to light" doctrine at
common law meant that landowners with solar collectors
could not prevent their neighbors from shading the
collectors.46 In terms of the DCLC, this reflected a Social
45 See generally Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the
Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 913 (2011);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471 (2012).
46 See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (discussing evolution of
"right to light" doctrine at common law).
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Reality whereby access to sunlight was viewed as merely
for aesthetic purposes. The derived Norm was that solar
collectors, whether in the form of trees, swimming pools, or
solar arrays, should not be allowed to prevent development
of adjacent lands. Thus, landowners could develop their
land regardless whether such development shaded adjacent
parcels.47
Environmentalists have persuaded state legislatures
to acknowledge a different Social Reality: Solar collectors
aid in reducing dependency on other forms of energy. 48
The newly derived Norm is that solar collectors -
variously defined among the different statutes - should be
protected against shading by neighboring landowners. 49
Solar acts embody a new legal doctrine: Landowners with
solar collectors have rights against neighboring landowners
who would shade the solar collectors.
C. Direct Democracy - The Populace as the
Institution of Legal Change
California voters passed Proposition 20 in 1972
because of concerns that cities and counties along
California's coastline were allowing overdevelopment of
coastal lands.50 The initiative measure enacted substantive
" See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,
114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla.
1960) (hotel owner may shade adjacent hotel's swimming pool).
48 See generally Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and
Regulatory Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041 (2010).
49 For an analysis of the different definitions of solar collectors in solar
acts, see Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws
in a Different Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851 (2010). See generally
Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881 (2009).
so Codified originally at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27000 as a temporary
measure and subsequently replaced by the Coastal Act of 1976, CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900. See Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the
Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Development, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 50-51 (2007) (popular concern about
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and procedural constraints on such development and
provided that those restrictions would be administered by a
state coastal commission and regional coastal
commissions.5 1
In terms of the DCLC, land use regulation along
California's coastline prior to the coastal initiative reflected
a Social Reality whereby city and county governments
were responsible for such regulation. The derived Norm
was that coastal landowners should only be concerned
about what such local governments demanded - or did not
demand - in regard to coastal land development. Thus,
the operative land-use regulation rules were contained only
in the land-use codes of the coastal cities and counties.
Environmentalists seeking to prevent
overdevelopment of coastal lands, as well as inland
residents who could not influence the land-use codes
enacted by coastal cities and counties, mobilized on a
statewide basis and passed the coastal initiative. The
initiative reflected a different Social Reality: Development
of the coastline was a concern not only of coastal
landowners and coastal cities and counties but of all of
California's population. The newly derived Norm was that
coastal landowners should be accountable to a statewide
agency, not just to local cities and counties. The initiative
thus enacted a new legal doctrine: Coastal landowners
became subject to the statewide initiative and the
regulations promulgated by the state coastal commission,
pursuant to the initiative and subsequent statute.
overdevelopment of the coast led to passing of California Coastal
Initiative).
1 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Reg'I Comm'n, 553
P.2d 546 (1976) (discussing coastal initiative and subsequent statute).
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Conclusion
The Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change primarily
seeks to describe how the legal system operates. It may
also have a prescriptive dimension if it helps understanding
of how the processes of legal creation and change should
work.52 However, I will leave that task for a future article.
52 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 138-39 (2009)
(descriptive norms merely purport to represent reality; prescriptive
norms seek to mandate that certain actions be performed).
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SUMMERS-WYATT SYMPOSIUM
"NAVIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF OUR MELTING
POT: How IMMIGRATION AFFECTS LEGAL
REPRESENTATION" 5 3
FRIDAY, APRIL 12,2013
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
COLLEGE OF LAW
5 EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers, please be aware that this transcript has
been only lightly edited. The reasoning behind its light editing is so
that the transcript reflects the actual words used by the presenters, as
captured by the transcriptionists, and the actual punctuation marks
chosen by the transcriptionists. Therefore, words have not been added
in or taken out, except for filler words, such as "I mean," "like,"
"right," and "you know," and punctuation marks have largely been left
unchanged, expect in limited circumstances. The editor's assumption is
that all readers understand that this transcript reflects spoken words and
thus will not follow the flow of written form and will mostly likely be
able to piece together the statements of the presenters into coherent
sentences where the transcriptionists may not have been able to be
exact.
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DOUGLAS A. BLAZE: It looks like it's going to be an
exceptional program. The turnout continues to come in, and
I'm sure it will get more full. I know that it was great
because it was crummy weather it looked like when we
started. I just looked out, it's actually going to be beautiful
today. So when you have a chance, get out and enjoy the
weather of Knoxville as well for those of you from out of
town.
I want to welcome you to the College of Law. I
think we are justifiably proud of our program, our faculty,
and our staff. You'll see a little bit of that today. We're also
very, very proud of our building, although we do have
feelers out to try and find our maintenance guy so we can
get it a little bit cooler in here. Hopefully, we can take care
of that for you.
Thanks to all the presenters for coming in. We
appreciate it very, very much. It makes a big difference.
The Journal of Law and Policy; our newest journal, the
Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice; and the Center
for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution are all sponsoring,
along with the College of Law, this program.
I want to thank a couple of people: John Craig
Howell, who is now getting ready to sit down, from the
Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice; the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy, Amy Williams is the editor in
chief. But in particular, the person who has really put this
whole thing together is Katie Doran, and Katie,
congratulations and thank you. It looks like it's going to be
a great day. And then I just have to mention for the Center
for Advocacy, the incomparable Penny White, who does so
much for the law school, our profession, and our State.
32
Summer 2013 Volume 9 | Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 34
The program looks impressive. We're already five
minutes behind. And I need to make sure that I get my CLE
credit since our rules have been changed in the State of
Tennessee. At any rate, I look forward to the program and
being with you off and on during the day. Thank you. And
I turn it over to Amy Williams.
AMY WILLIAMS: Just for a second, I promise. Thank
you. I'm Amy Williams, I'm editor in chief for about thirty-
six more hours, I think, for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy. And on behalf of our journal and Race, Gender,
and Social Justice, we just want to welcome you to the
symposium. If you haven't figured it out already, the
bathrooms are down the hall, as soon as you leave this
room, you just take a right. And the bathrooms will be on
your left not very far down the hallway. We've got, as I'm
sure you saw, doughnuts and coffee outside. There's a
commons area where there's also a little snack shop and
vending machines. If you just keep going past the
bathrooms and then turn left, you'll see it.
Also, those of us who have the volunteer tags on,
there's several members of both journals here to help you, so
if you need anything, just find somebody with one of these
badges and we'll help you out. If we can't figure it out, we'll
find somebody who can. And we want to thank you for
coming.
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MORNING KEYNOTE ADDRESS 1:
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
CHANGED THE RULE OF COMPETENCY IN LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
William Robert Long, Jr.
KATIE DORAN: Good morning, everybody. It is my
pleasure to introduce to you our first keynote speaker today,
Mr. Robert Long. A brief introduction, Mr. Long is a
graduate of Kentucky University of both undergrad and law
school. He is currently the manager of the Capital Litigation
Branch at the Kentucky Attorney General's Office. And as
part of his job with the Kentucky Attorney General's Office,
he is the attorney who argued the Padilla v. Kentucky case
in front of the Supreme Court, and that is what he is here to
talk to you about today. Mr. Long.
WILLIAM ROBERT LONG, JR.: I want to get started by
first thanking the University of Tennessee and the different
journals for inviting me. I was a little surprised by the
invitation initially. It's been quite a while since I've been
asked to speak about the Padilla case, and quite frankly, I'm
a little bit intimidated by it. I'm used to having the crowd to
my back and addressing my comments to judges and in a
more conversational manner. And so this is a little different
for me, but I think I'll manage.
Before I get started, I don't want to mislead
anybody. I am in no way an expert or have any real
working knowledge of immigration law. So probably you're
asking, Why am I here? I kept asking myself that over and
over, trying to figure out how to frame my comments for
this event. And I figured the best thing I can offer is some
background into how I got involved in the case and really
the prosecution's take on it. And since I'm no longer having
to be an advocate, perhaps provide a little more of a candid
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inside look as to what the prosecutorial side or the State's
side of the Padilla case really looked like and what we
really thought of the case and what we fear and what we see
the effect may be as the case has evolved.
So first of all, it was really odd for me to be involved
with Padilla to begin with. As Katie mentioned, I'm the
manager of the Capital Litigation Branch, which means I
oversee all the death penalty cases in Kentucky. I had
assumed that position just in September of 2008 and was
taking over for the man who essentially had created that
position who retired at the end of '08. I had never heard of
Jose Padilla and never worked on any of his cases in the
state court. And then I came back from the holiday break to
find Jose Padilla's cert petition laying on my desk with a
note from my predecessor saying, "This looks interesting. It
has potential." And so I did not know anything about Mr.
Padilla until I was attempting to draft a brief in opposition to
his cert petition, which admittedly was extremely difficult to
do because it did, in fact, have great potential, and this
looked as if it might be my best and perhaps the only chance
in my career to get to argue a case before the United States
Supreme Court. And also, it was ultimately kind of
daunting because, while the opportunity to argue was
alluring, the position that I kind of was forced to take was
not the greatest position in the world.
I guess we should start off basically by making sure
everyone is a little bit basically aware of what Padilla was
charged with, how he got to the United States Supreme
Court, and explaining the law and how Kentucky's ruling
departed from the general rule and thus justified the cert
petition.
Padilla was traveling through Kentucky, and he was
doing so on a semi-tractor/trailer and was found to be in
possession of about half a ton, a little over a thousand
pounds, of marijuana, a relatively large amount of
marijuana. And from a prosecutor's side, these are great
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facts. He waives his right voluntarily, he gives statements
that seem incriminating, and he's in possession of the drugs.
And so from a prosecutor's standpoint, this is a great case.
However, he is appointed counsel, his appointed counsel
allegedly tells him during the plea negotiation process that
"if you accept this plea," "that I've looked into it, and that I
really wouldn't worry about the chance of removal." You've
been in the country for so long, and given your military
service, I feel pretty good about it. Needless to say, that was
not the best advice in the world. Now, it was good advice in
the sense that Padilla was sympathetic. He had come to
America, I believe, in the late '60s or early '70s as a young
man, had served in the military in Vietnam, was honorably
discharged, and he didn't have a long laundry list of criminal
convictions. I'm only aware of one other prior conviction, I
believe I recall, for receiving stolen property. Mr. Arnold
comes next, he'll be filling you in on all the background.
But the state of the law at the time Padilla entered
his guilty plea was such that - it was universally accepted
that, in order to enter a voluntary guilty plea, knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entering a guilty plea, the
defendant needed to understand the direct consequences of
that plea and that generally a misunderstanding with regard
to something that was collateral would not have any impact
on the voluntary basis of the plea. And in fact, there was no
duty for an appointed counsel or any criminal defense
counsel, for that matter, to advise his client with regard to a
collateral matter. Importantly, we need to identify the
differences between a direct and a collateral matter. Direct
matters are those things such as your right to trial by the
jury, the right to confront witnesses, your right to appeal, all
those kind of things you're going to waive as a result of your
plea. Your attorney has the obligation to inform you of the
offense, its potential punishments, any defenses that there
may be, and to give you accurate advice so that you can
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weigh the determinations of guilt and innocence and enter
an intelligent plea.
But again, at the time Padilla entered his plea, it was
well settled amongst all the circuits and in Kentucky that it
did not need, there was no obligation for that counsel to go
further and inquire about something that was collateral. And
immigration consequences had always been deemed to be,
in fact, collateral. Collateral not because they don't always
apply but because they do not stem directly from the
criminal convictions themselves. The state courts have no
power over any of the immigration laws, they cannot deport
anybody or remove anybody, and so it is something that
happens collateral to and separate and apart from the
conviction. Just like a citizen who loses his right to vote or
loses his right to carry a weapon under the Second
Amendment, those are also considered collateral
consequences for which there is no obligation to advise.
However, that led to some negative results.
Consequentially, criminal defendants are going to be
concerned potentially about these collateral consequences.
In Kentucky, one of the most collateral consequences that
we see affected most often is parole eligibility. Parole
eligibility does seem to be closely tied to the criminal
proceeding, but it is enforced by the executive branch, not
the judiciary. It is a gift of legislative grace that that's even
available, and that is ultimately given to you at the
discretion of the executive. So it has always been deemed to
be collateral.
But you have a series of cases that would start
coming up in Kentucky and throughout the circuits in which
criminal defendants would ask their criminal attorneys,
"Well, what about my parole eligibility, what about my
immigration consequences," and they would ask about these
collateral matters. If the attorney undertook - or attempted
to answer those questions, a rule of law developed which we
call in Kentucky, at least, the Sparks rule, it was the Sparks
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case in the Sixth Circuit that said, if you mis-advise that
defendant with regard to collateral consequences, even
though you had no affirmative duty under the Sixth
Amendment to even answer the question, if you chose to do
it, you must be accurate. Failing to be, you gave mis-advice
that would be - or you would risk being ineffective under
Strickland v. Washington.
So now what we have here is Padilla alleging after
entering his guilty plea that his counsel was ineffective for
having failed to accurately tell him that he would be
deported as a result of his conviction. After his conviction,
a federal detainer or an immigration detainer was filed
against him, and he was going to at least be put on track of
being removed from the United States.
Initially, the state trial courts that reviewed that said,
"No, it's a collateral matter, there's no ineffective assistance
of counsel here," and affirmed the conviction. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals said, well, no, under the Sparks
rule, he's at least alleged mis-advice, he at least gets a full-
blown hearing to determine whether or not this advice was
really inaccurate and whether it impacted his decision. And
if it was, then counsel was ineffective. All keeping with the
precedent that existed throughout the nation. However, the
Kentucky Supreme Court went kind of astray. And they did
so for a logically consistent reason, but it left a bad taste,
believe me, in just about everyone's mouth.
Essentially, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned,
Well, if there is no affirmative duty to advise on a collateral
matter and it's well settled that it is not a constitutional
violation to not advise, to fail to advise on those matters,
then really, what is the difference between failure to advise
and mis-advice? And there is no real relevant distinction
there. If you don't have a right to that advice, whether you
got zero advice or bad advice, if they're equally as bad,
which is very logically consistent, but essentially it boils
down to the Kentucky Supreme Court saying, "We think it's
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okay for criminal defense attorneys to give bad advice."
When I ultimately was handed off the case, no matter how
we tried to argue it or tried to come up with a way of
defending the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision, you're
still left with that what they're really practically saying is
that bad advice is okay.
So it became a more and more daunting task, and I
quickly realized just how daunting a task when I got
summoned to Washington, D.C., by the Solicitor General's
Office asking me to convince them not to file a brief on
behalf of Padilla. Their initial inclination was to file a brief
in support of Padilla saying Kentucky got it totally wrong,
and I was left with my hat in hand at the Solicitor General's
Office begging them not to, in fact, do that and trying to
convince them that there was a rational basis for Kentucky's
decision.
And really what that rational basis consisted of is
that, under the existing precedent, it was logical to say that
you have no right to be advising really does not impact
waiver of your constitutional rights and the scope of
representation under the Sixth Amendment need not extend
into collateral matters, and we were able to basically present
a kind of a parade-of-horrors type case. That if you start
opening the door or requiring advice with regard to
collateral matters, you make the criminal defense job
extraordinarily difficult. You make criminal defense
attorneys obligated to be expert in any number of areas of
law where they don't have any expertise. The number of
collateral consequences that affect someone that's been
convicted of a felony is extraordinarily long. I think at some
point, our list just in Kentucky was well over four hundred
different types of consequences that are statutorily enforced
in some way, and they go from losing your right to vote, to
losing your right to bear arms, to immigration consequences,
to being denied the ability to serve in the military, denied
federal student loans for education. Chances are it's going to
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affect your child custody situation. It's going to affect
potentially everything because those felonies, especially in a
state like Kentucky, exist on your record forever.
So the real fear of the Commonwealth was that if
Padilla, who wasn't simply just asking, his was an
alternative position that immigration be made kind of a
special exception, but he was essentially asking that the
Sparks rule was a bad rule, that there should be, in fact, an
affirmative duty to inform criminal defendants about
collateral consequences. I think to some degree they try to
limit it to say, well, it was the duty of the attorney in a
criminal defense situation to basically interview this client to
try to determine specifically what was important to that
client and then research and determine what collateral
consequences were most likely to impact his decision to
choose to go to trial or choose to accept a plea and then
educate the client with regard to that. From a prosecutorial
perspective, that was scary. The plea bargaining process is
an extraordinarily useful tool to manage caseloads and to
assure some sort of finality to convictions, and the main
reason to engage in plea negotiations is to get that finality
and to know that we have extinguished the case and we are
not going to suffer years and years of further litigation.
However, by introducing an obligation of counsel to advise
on a collateral consequence, we open ourselves to a lot of
uncertainty potentially. Kentucky has a three-year window
in which you may raise collateral consequence claims or
collateral claims relating to your criminal conviction. So for
three years the criminal defendant, who may or may not or
most likely is not going to be satisfied with his plea
agreement and he's actually sitting in prison now, has three
years and a lot of time to discern whether or not, what, "my
attorney really should have advised me about one of these
myriad of collateral consequences that is now particularly
important to me" and bring it via a criminal rule 1142 claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel. And if there is a duty
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to advise, then we're stuck on the prosecutionary side some
three, maybe four or five years later by the time the motion
is filed, counsel is appointed, having to have a hearing to
determine whether or not mis-advice or no advice was given
on a collateral matter. And it creates this huge element of
uncertainty in due process that scared the states to death.
And so we feared very much that if you open the
door to - so our primary focus was trying to make the
Court understand that kind of parade of horrors and suggest
that adopting Padilla's position would be detrimental to the
criminal justice system. It would, in fact, encourage
prosecutors to avoid or, if you would, be reluctant to enter
into the plea process. And people who deservedly so,
perhaps, or could have benefited from the plea may lose out
because of the uncertainty that would now be attached to
those pleas.
And to some degree I believe we were successful.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court chose once
again not to weigh in on this direct collateral consequence
component of the effective assistance of counsel. They
made a point of saying that the fact that the prior rule, this
rule that said you had to advise with regard to direct
consequences, that no advice was mandated with regard to
collateral consequences - they made a point to notice that
that was not the United States Supreme Court's rule, it was a
rule that persisted in the circuits, and that the Supreme Court
had never really weighed in on that topic, and they once
again had sidestepped it and did not choose to weigh in on it
once again. Instead, opting to elevate immigration
consequences or removal because of its kind of punitive,
potentially punitive nature, and severity of that consequence,
basically making a special exception. And from our
perspective carving out a new right under the Sixth
Amendment that didn't prior exist. And to some degree,
we've been affirmed in that belief because now the United
States Supreme Court in Chaidez, which I'm probably
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mispronouncing it, just recently, I think in February, entered
the opinion finding that the Padilla case was not retroactive,
that it was, in fact, a new rule of law. So it only applied
prospectively.
In some ways the State is somewhat pleased with the
decision. It's not so much that we don't want immigrants or
non-citizens to be informed of their negative consequences,
we just wanted it limited in a manageable way not to open
the door to every possible collateral consequence. And to
that effect, prior to Padilla actually reaching the United
States Supreme Court, Kentucky had already amended its
standard plea form to include a statement indicating that, if
you are a non-citizen and pleading guilty, you understand
that you may be risking deportation or removal as a result of
that guilty plea. Whether or not that waiver will truly carry
the day waits to be seen. I've not yet had the case where
someone signed that particular waiver form but then has
alleged that their counsel was ineffective for giving them
mis-advice with regard to immigration consequences. So
that would be an interesting thing to happen when that does
happen.
But what the Commonwealth does fear or does have
a potential concern, and what we expressed at the United
States Supreme Court, is that elevating immigration to this
special place of being protected under the Sixth Amendment
essentially grants citizens or non-citizens greater protections
than citizens that we would likely see if they made that kind
of choice in resolving this situation, we would likely see
citizens making claims that will for me, my right to vote or
my right to bear arms or whatever collateral consequence is
particularly important to me, is just as important, is just as
automatic, is just as crucial to my decision to plead guilty
and thus should be also elevated and given special status just
like immigration consequences. And while we have not
seen that widespread throughout the nation, we have seen it
quite a bit in Kentucky, and in fact, there is a Kentucky
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decision right now that's not yet final, it's on a petition for
rehearing, waiting to become final. But that says that, at
least in Kentucky, Kentucky is going to use the Padilla logic
or the logic employed by the United States Supreme Court
to elevate the parole consequences. Which again, it's not
that we're going to necessarily deny a criminal defendant his
right to accurate information with regard to parole
information or parole consequences to make it a
constitutional right, and then to create further exceptions to
this distinction between direct and collateral starts to whittle
away again that certainty with regard to plea deals.
To some degree the State then advocated that what
the United States Supreme Court should really do is criticize
the court, criticize the Kentucky Supreme Court in its
decision. But it ultimately acknowledged that it was a
reasonable distinction and, under the existing body of law,
that this is a collateral matter and that ultimately that this is
a matter that should be addressed by the court rule-making,
state legislatures, or even Congress, that, if this is a real
problem that we want to protect, it can be addressed that
way. In fact, at the time that we argued Padilla, I think
there was somewhere between twenty-two and twenty-
seven, I forget the exact number, states that had in some
way or another addressed this problem with regard to
immigration through changing their own court rules,
adopting some sort of statutory scheme that required
explanation of immigration consequences, and so forth.
That would have been kind of the perfect world for
the Commonwealth because we're now not only elevating it
to a constitutional issue, it is a statutory right that is
specifically given to a specific situation. By elevating it to a
constitutional right, again, we feared this onslaught of
additional litigation and feared that courts will slowly but
surely expand the number of collateral consequences in
which there's an obligation to advise and that at some point
the numbers become too unwieldy and too difficult for
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criminal defendants and, again, that certainty will disappear.
And in fact, it's already happened to some degree. I think
our prosecutors, and to some degree our judges, are hesitant
to really believe that the criminal defense bar with the fact
that they do have too many clients, that they are over-
worked, that they're not really prepared to give accurate
immigration advice or advice on any number of collateral
consequences - And I've seen prosecutors demand that, if
you're going to take a plea, especially a non-citizen, that we
do want to use our waiver form, that we want it to be put on
the record. And we want the judge to instruct that, "I don't
care what your attorney has told you," "I don't care what
advice he's given you with regard to immigration
consequences," "You understand that by pleading guilty you
risk being deported, and if that's not a risk you're willing to
accept, I won't accept the plea." And in effect, kind of get
around Padilla and ensure that that plea will have some sort
of absolute certainty.
The Court did not necessarily have to go with the
Sixth Amendment, elevating this to a Sixth Amendment
claim, and could have gone through criticizing the court and
encouraging courts to address it statutorily through the court
rule-making procedure, it also could have looked at it
through a due process angle. A due process angle means
that it is ultimately the obligation of the State or of the judge
to determine whether or not the person entering the plea is
doing so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. And put
it upon the judge to make some sort of affirmative inquiry. I
think ultimately they were hesitant to do that because, first
of all, it was not the key issue of the case and it would have
been departing from what the parties had argued. But it was
also going to put additional obligations on judges, who are
equally unprepared to advise someone on immigration
consequences. What was a judge to do other than to just
say, Well, you're always risking this, and you're really not
entitled to this information? If the person is asking for - I
44
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 46
want to know my immigration consequences with regard
before entering this plea - I think there is an impetus or a
good reason to try to give them that information. In the long
run, it aids the prosecution in making them have a better
decision. But how you go about ensuring that that right is
given to them is problematic.
And so ultimately, I think the State is ultimately
satisfied with the result. We harbor still some sort of fear
that this constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment
will be further expanded and that we will have citizens
claiming that they are somehow being treated differently
than non-citizens, and to some degree they are. It's just the
fact of the matter. Citizens possess a constitutional right to
bear arms, a constitutional right to vote, and under the
current state of the law, there is absolutely no obligation for
a defense attorney to inform those citizens that a guilty plea
will rob them of those rights. And for that matter, the
Sparks rule that says if I give you mis-advice, if I
misinformed you, thus making me now ineffective, it's
essentially kind of out the window as well. While the
United States Supreme Court chose to raise immigration,
they ultimately agreed with the Kentucky Supreme Court
that this distinction between no advice and mis-advice was
really arbitrary, and they ultimately found that there was no
relevant distinction between an act of commission versus an
act of omission in the reviewing of the Padilla case. So I
take a little pat on the back there that we actually managed
to get the United States Supreme Court to agree with the
logic of the Kentucky Supreme Court but ultimately could
not get around the fact that, even applying that logic, you're
still left with a decision that says it's okay to give bad advice
to criminal defendants. And how is that ever going to be
palatable? And so I think the Court was faced with this
daunting task of trying to eliminate the risk of opening the
door to the parade of horrors that I spoke of before and
undermining the certainty of the plea process but at the same
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time trying to protect a group of individuals who in many
cases are not very well versed in their rights. In fact, some
don't really have rights because they're not citizens, who are
typically poor and are scared and are just trying to get
through the process as quickly and as easily as they can and
don't know exactly what to do.
That being said, to suggest that immigration
consequences, something like removal, is always a terrible
thing is a little bit of an overstatement too. It would
obviously have been for Jose Padilla. Jose Padilla at the
point of his conviction had been in the United States for
more than half his life. He had established an entire life
here. Just to ship him back to Honduras at that point would
have been a real, true hardship. But the college student who
is here to study who gets in trouble at a party on campus and
is going to be sent back to London or to Paris or somewhere,
it's not really a terrible hardship that they would be removed
because of some behavior that he had. So immigration
consequences are not necessarily harsh, but they can be
extraordinarily harsh. And so it does make sense that the
Court would want to address it, and it does make sense that
the Court would ultimately want to get rid of this idea that
bad advice is never okay.
But again, we've only done that with regard to
immigration. If an attorney gives bad advice with regard to
any of the other collateral consequences, until they've said
something otherwise, they've eliminated that distinction
between no advice and mis-advice, or at least called it into
serious question with their comments at the end, and have
made it now that, I think, if you want to be an effective
advocate for your client, at least effective in the sense of the
Sixth Amendment, you should restrain or absolutely refuse
to ever answer questions with regard to collateral
consequences. If you undertake - well, for that matter, I
guess they've eliminated that too. You can feel free to do it
and do it with impunity because they're collateral, there is no
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right to have that advice, and whether you give bad advice
or no advice doesn't matter, it won't impact the validity of
the plea or at least arguably won't.
Well, I have not used quite all my time, but I think I
pretty much hit the high points that I wanted to address. I
know this is kind of an odd setting, but is there any kind of
question you might have for me? Yes, ma'am.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question, not related
to Padilla specifically, that might be interesting for students
to hear about, but how did you prepare for your Supreme
Court argument? And then tell us a little bit about the
experience of actually arguing this case.
WILLIAM ROBERT LONG, JR.: Well, it was an amazing
experience, to be honest. It dominated the better part of my
life for 2009. It was very unique. Answering the phone to
have the solicitor generals on the other line say, "We need
you to come to Washington, like tomorrow," and trying to
get that arranged, again, provided all sorts of weird
opportunities that I never would have expected. But the
preparation is basically the National Association of Attorney
Generals operates in Washington, and they have a great
contact person named Dan Switzer, who provides some
support to the Attorney Generals' offices. And so I
contacted him to give me kind of the basic playbook of how
this process works. He offered his services to review our
brief and to offer suggestions, and then ultimately they set
up a moot court in Washington the week before oral
arguments.
But in preparation back in Kentucky, I just wrote
and wrote and rewrote and rewrote. It was much different
than the normal process. In most of the cases I handled -
you're expected to handle a numerous number of cases, so
you write it, if you're lucky, you get a chance to really edit it
and re-read it multiple times. And you're trying to get it out
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and filed just to meet your deadline. But with this case,
everything kind of got put off on the side. I think we went
through at least seven drafts of the brief before we finally
settled on something we liked. It was a new experience for
me. In every other instance that I've ever had with the
United States Supreme Court trying to create these cute,
little booklets, Kentucky is such a penny-pincher, that unless
cert is actually granted, we attempted to create these things
in-house. And my past experience has been that we don't
always get it right. And I got some really bad versions of
this from our print shop and was stuck in one instance
literally in a brief in opposition in the Padilla case hand-
cutting the paper to make it fit.
I did one in-house moot with the Attorney General's
Office. It did not prove particularly helpful. A bunch of
like-minded people trying to convince me that I had a
reasonable case and despite the fact knowing that I have a
position that's going to ultimately be not very palatable to
most people. I contacted the University of Kentucky and
got a panel of three - I think it was four law professors -
that would agree to sit in judgment over me and allowed me
to have a moot court there. They found a three and zero to
argue Padilla's position, and we went through a full kind of
moot court there. It proved more helpful but also
disconcerting. As you might imagine, the faculty and staff
there was also very skeptical of the State's position, proved
to be much more so than even the United States Supreme
Court itself, and they beat up on me quite well for about an
hour or so. And then finally I had a video-taped moot court
at the National Association of Attorneys General, and Dan
Switzer had arranged to have several Washington attorneys
who had all had some level of Supreme Court experience
come read the materials and put me through a moot. And
they were actually paid participants. They got some sort of
stipend pay, and so they were well prepared. There were no
time limits, and they drilled me for about an hour and forty-
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five minutes. Interestingly, that grilling also included
Michael Dreeben, the deputy solicitor general that ultimately
argued the case. I had this really weird relationship with the
Solicitor General's Office. Because they took a hybrid
position, they said ultimately Kentucky was wrong and the
mis-advice rule was good but that Padilla could never prove
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, they
nevertheless supported the State. They demanded, and I
somehow was intimidated and relented, in allowing them to
participate in my moot, but I was forbidden from
participating in their moot. It didn't seem quite fair. But
ultimately Mr. Dreeben, at the time I think he had argued
something like seventy cases before the United States
Supreme Court, was extraordinarily gracious and perhaps
the most helpful person as far as preparing me for oral
argument of anyone in the room. The other hired members
of the panel seemed somewhat just outright dismissive and
could not understand why the Court could not really
comprehend the concerns of the State or why the Court
would even grant cert. Michael Dreeben seemed to get it.
He seemed to kind of change the mood in the room. Before
he got there, the paid participants were really kind of rude to
me, to be honest. And then when Michael Dreeben came in,
they all said, Well, what's he doing here? He's not arguing
this case. This can't possibly be important enough for him
to be involved in. And the fact that he believed it to be of
some import kind of changed the mood and made the
experience of that moot more beneficial.
And then the United States Supreme Court itself,
what can I say? It is a neat place. The place is filled. You
get to walk in the side door, you walk into the attorneys'
bench down in the basement, and all the attorneys are lined
up trying to get their tickets to just come and watch. And
you walk up to the counter and say, "I'm arguing counsel,"
and then things suddenly change. And you are whisked
away to the attorneys' lounge, you are escorted by a marshal
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through the building, through the crowds. There's much less
security required. They make it a big point to say that you
can't take cell phones or anything else. And I said, Well, do
I need to run down to the locker? No, you leave them at the
clerk's office on the counter. I'm just supposed to leave my
cell phone? You're at the United States Supreme Court for
God's sakes. You just leave all your stuff just laying there.
I would have never in my life dreamed of doing it, but I did.
And then the courtroom was a unique courtroom. In
all the other courtrooms that I've ever argued in, in the
appellate court, the justices sit up high, kind of pushed back
away from you, and you're kind of at a podium. And it has
some distance, and they kind of lord over you. At the
United States Supreme Court, it's a curved bench, your
podium is pushed right up in between them to some degree,
and I really almost felt as though I could reach across the
bench and shake Chief Justice Roberts's hand if I wanted to.
There was a little more distance than that, but it doesn't
really feel that way. The room being so tall and so wide and
the way you're kind of pushed up - they also have the
acoustics so that the sound behind you kind of melts away,
and they do have a speaker system set up that tries to
pinpoint the sound to the podium. Another odd setup is that
that podium, attached to it are counsel desks. In every other
situation, counsel desks are several feet away, these big
tables here, it's a relatively small table that's literally
attached to it. So as my opponent Stephen Kinnaird or
Michael Dreeben are arguing, I'm literally right here, and
there's the podium. I'm literally standing right beside them
while they argue. And from the bench, it appears that the
Court can actually look down and see any of my notes that
I'm taking. And that's kind of a scary thought. I'm not just
on display or performing when I'm actually at the podium,
but I'm on display and performing the entire time that I'm
standing there.
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The way it ended up being set up, because the
solicitor general had taken this odd position, we agreed that
Padilla's counsel would go first, solicitor general - who at
the end his brief would typically go last - would actually
go in the middle, and then I would respond to both because I
was going to take issue with some of the solicitor general's
positions.
Once they called it to order, I was good, I was fine
through Mr. Kinnaird's arguments. I felt good, I felt like I
had confidence. And then Mr. Dreeben got started. And in
the last five minutes of Mr. Dreeben's arguments, I probably
did not hear a word he said. It became suddenly very real to
me that I was about to stand up, and I got really scared, to
be honest. Yes, sir.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you know what happened
to Padilla personally? Did he plead out later, or did you go
to trial -
WILLIAM ROBERT LONG, JR.: Well, I can give you a
little bit of an insight to that. I'll limit my comments a little
bit because Mr. Arnold, who represents Padilla, and he'll be
speaking next. But ultimately it came back to state court.
He was given a hearing to determine whether or not this
mis-advice was really given, whether it really did affect his
decision. The trial court ultimately said, he could not prove
the prejudice prong, he appealed to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, who said that he could. We chose not to take that
any further. And he's currently back in the circuit court. It's
still not quite resolved. And I'll let Mr. Arnold explain
further.
One last comment, just because it was so unique and
I still remember. As nervous as I was, when I stood up to
the podium and said, may it please the Court and that, and
Mr. Chief Justice - it's bizarre, but the look or the
comment that - I don't even remember exactly what he
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said - but that Chief Justice Roberts said, he just looked
like he was very encouraging. And suddenly I calmed down
quickly. And I found the Court as a whole, even though
Justice Stevens and Justice Sotomayor - and it was her first
week on the bench, by the way - gave me a little bit of
grief, for the most part, they were a much more friendly
court than, say, the Sixth Circuit, all right. I've had the Sixth
Circuit not be very kind to me at all. They've been
extraordinarily mean to me at times, in fact. Ultimately
having done it, I felt more comfortable there.
And then from that point, the biggest impact on my
practice is it changed things a lot. Seven or eight days later I
had an oral argument before the Kentucky Supreme Court,
and that felt like nothing. I mean no offense to the
Kentucky State Supreme Court, but it was a wonderful
feeling to walk into that courtroom now with an immense
amount of confidence and absolutely no fear. Now, some of
that has dissipated, but for the most part, I'm much more
comfortable now with the courts having done it because I
can always remind myself having done that, I've done
something unique. And if I can get through that without
passing out, I can get through about anything.
Unless there's other questions, I'll wrap up. Thank
you.
KATIE DORAN: Thank you, Mr. Long, for speaking, and
as a token of our appreciation, we want to give you this.
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MORNING KEYNOTE ADDRESS II:
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: DEFENDING AN IMMIGRANT'S
RIGHT TO COMPETENT REPRESENTATION
Timothy Arnold
MS. SWIFT: Good morning, everyone. We here at the
TJLP are delighted to have this next speaker. We are
delighted because this next speaker will be talking from
personal experience, his personal experience of representing
Mr. Padilla. This next speaker, Mr. Tim Arnold, has been
involved in Padilla v. Kentucky from nearly the beginning,
all the way from nearly the beginning to the United States
Supreme Court and back to the state on remand. So Mr.
Arnold has quite a bit to say, like the previous speaker,
about Padilla v. Kentucky.
Now, even though Mr. Arnold has been involved
with this case from nearly the beginning, he shared with me
that he didn't actually foresee himself becoming involved in
such a case, and that's because Mr. Arnold didn't start out
practicing immigration and criminal law. Rather, he started
out in the Juvenile Post Dispositional Branch of the
Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy, which is that
state's public defender system. A few years later he became
manager, and now he serves as the post-trial diversion
director. So Mr. Arnold has had quite a career, has received
quite a number of awards, including the Kentucky
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Juvenile Justice
Award, the In Re Gault Award for excellence in juvenile
representation, the Furman v. Georgia award for excellence
in death penalty representation, and most recently the
American Immigration Lawyers Association Jack
Wasserman Memorial Award for Excellence in Litigation in
the field of immigration law.
So once again, Mr. Arnold has some very valuable
information to share. Without further ado, Mr. Arnold.
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TIMOTHY ARNOLD: Thank you very much for that very
gracious introduction. I'm certain not to live up to the
expectations that have been created.
I want to thank the University of Tennessee for
inviting me and inviting Mr. Long as guests to speak to you
about this case. I want to be clear before we begin, in light
of some of the other questions, this was sort of mentioned in
the introduction, it would not be fair to say that the Padilla
v. Kentucky that all of us are here to talk about is somehow
my doing. The person who is responsible for this more than
anybody else would be Steve Kinnaird and then Stephanos
Bibas of Penn. We wrote the cert petition. I'm sure it was
okay. They got involved in the reply stage, wrote a reply
that was exceptional, and I think made it really possible for
the court to grant cert, and then they were responsible for
the briefing and for the argument. They allowed us to
participate, and I had a wonderful experience. And I'm
grateful for them everyday. But they - it's really their case
in terms of what happened there. And I wanted to make that
clear. As much as I would like to take credit for it, I really
can't.
So we're experiencing minor, technical difficulties.
Ninety seconds. Seriously, could you tell that? So I'll tell a
story. Could the court reporter stop for a second?
(COLLOQUY OFF THE RECORD)
I am a criminal defense lawyer first and foremost. I
learned some immigration law because of this case, but I am
not an immigration lawyer and didn't take immigration
courses in law school. To this day, I would not be probably
the first person you would turn to for immigration advice on
a criminal case. I probably could give some advice without
completely screwing it up but not a lot. So this has always
seemed to me like this sort of situation. This slide is
apropos for two reasons. First, Padilla is sort of a collision
of two different universes of law; you have the criminal law
on the one hand, which I'm familiar with, and the
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immigration law on the other hand, and those two things are
sort of colliding in this case in a big way. The other is,
people really did think the world was ending when the case
was decided in some circles because suddenly there was all
these additional obligations that were going to be expected.
For me, where I want to start is with criminal law
since that's the area I'm the most comfortable with. And my
journey with this starts with this guy. Does anybody know
who this is? Gideon, that's right. Clarence Earl Gideon,
who was alleged to have stolen fifty dollars in coins and
some - he was acquitted, so we could not say he did it.
Was alleged to have stolen fifty dollars in coins and some
liquor from a liquor shop in Florida, went to trial, didn't
have a lawyer, was convicted, sent a letter to the Supreme
Court of the United States, who took that as a cert.
Goodness knows that wouldn't happen today. An assigned
attorney argued the case, established Gideon v. Wainwright,
and of course, he comes back, tries the case. It turns out
that the taxi driver who sort of was seeming to give damning
evidence, for him to say he wanted to keep the ride a secret
also, could say - well, he said it was because he was in
trouble with his wife, that he didn't have liquor or anything
with him or any of the proceeds of the crime, and was able
to demonstrate that there was some possibility that the
person who was the principal eyewitness in the case was
actually a lookout for a gang of other people who might
have done the robbery. And as a result of that, he was
acquitted. I think at the time of Gideon, when Gideon was
decided, people really thought this was going to solve the
problem. Like we had a system where people were coming
to court, and they didn't have the advice and the assistance
of counsel. And we would be better off if now everybody
has a lawyer, so it's all going to be okay. And I think that
hasn't really proved to be the case.
I won't ask you what this is. This is the - why is it
yellow? Okay. The slide on my computer looks nice, this
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slide looks like it's radioactive. This is the Florida electric
chair. The reason that I'm putting this up is I couldn't find a
mug shot of the next person, which is David Leroy
Washington, who was really involved in three separate
murders in Florida. He pled guilty to those offenses. He
confessed to the crimes. His lawyer was sort of flummoxed
by the absence of any kind of factual defense of the crime.
And instead of - it was a miserable investigation. He
talked to his client's mother about his family history but did
not investigate that much further. Advised his client to
plead guilty, and believing that the judge had indicated at
some point in the past that she would be reluctant to impose
a death sentence on somebody who really expressed
remorse for the crime, told him to go in, express remorse for
the crime, and that was it. Did not conduct a sentencing
hearing at all, waived the sentencing hearing, relied on the
testimony of the (inaudible). He was, of course, sentenced
to death.
The United States Supreme Court heard this case
and for the first time sort of established what counsel's duty
toward the case was, what was the obligation that counsel
had in terms of representing a client. The Eleventh Circuit
had found that whatever that rule was, that his lawyer hadn't
met it. The United States Supreme Court found that the
obligation basically fell into two categories; deficient
performance, which is sort of acts or omissions that fall
below prevailing professional norms - to apply an
objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice, which is
that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability
the result would be different.
In doing that, in reaching that holding they, I think,
really - and this is my opinion - really substantially
impaired what the right to counsel represented because now
there was no real incentive for states to fund counsel
systems, there was no means to ensure that counsel was not
merely sort of the person with the law degree standing next
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to their lawyer but that they were actually performing the
essential functions of representation. Because most
convictions are going to be sustained under the standard.
Almost all convictions are going to be sustained under the
standard because it's very hard to prove that the result would
be different once - I get a counter-factual, Mr. Long gets a
counter-factual. His counter-factual is going to be, well, if
they had done this, then this would have happened or this
would have happened or this would have happened, and
those are all reasonable. And so it's very difficult to ever
say that there's a reasonable probability of a different result
under those circumstances. And the standard itself is not
judged by what counsel was doing in reference to his clients
so much as it is whether counsel had a notion that this was a
good idea that was reasonable. It was more about judging
the attorney than judging the effect of the attorney's
involvement on a case.
So what happened with Mr. Washington was that the
Supreme Court found that because his lawyer did have a
notion about what he was doing and he was doing this for a
reason that he could articulate and that that reason was not
insane, that he was - that that was sufficient. His case was
remanded, and Mr. Washington was the twenty-second
person executed after the reinstatement of the death
penalty. To me, the significance of - so I've been
practicing law, and I've been practicing doing post-
conviction cases for much of my career. That standard has
been a real impediment to dealing with cases where there
really does appear that the attorney's errors are significant in
terms of the outcome of the case. An attorney's function as
an attorney has been somehow - that the attorney has not
functioned in a manner that counsel really ought to be
working for their client.
You fixed it. It's like the magic of the internet or
something.
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So for those who can't see in the back, the caption is
"Here Are Your Choices," you can plead guilty. In the
system that we have these days, it's been commented that we
have such a thing as the incredible, disappearing American
jury trial. Courts have estimated, although there is no clear
data on this, that about ninety-five percent of cases end in a
plea. I think that actually that number may be a little
higher. However, this is for illustrative purposes only, I
don't know if that second bar is really truly accurate. The
Supreme Court in terms of its decisions regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel and its description of how
that is, was it ruling on that? If you look at the cases, they
were dealing with a variety of areas, but there was only one
case that dealt with guilty pleas specifically in regards to
counsel's involvement in the guilty plea. And in that case,
for the most part, they passed on the question. What they
said in Hill v. Lockhart is, in a guilty plea case, the test for
whether the result would be different is whether, but for
counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty
but would have insisted on going to trial, which is a little bit
of a different formulation than a different result. And that's
the only case where they were dealing with a guilty plea
specifically in terms of a guilty plea. Stricklands, they were
talking about the sentencing hearing. In Flores-Ortega, they
were talking about the right to appeal. Those were cases
that had guilty pleas, but there was no guilty plea
discussion.
So this is - the Supreme Court was talking a lot
about what the obligations of counsel were, and as time was
going on, they were raising the bar a little bit. I'm not sure
that Stricklands facts, were they to be presented today,
would be considered satisfactory under the Supreme Court
precedent that exists now. But they weren't dealing with
guilty pleas, and guilty pleas were most of what we were
doing. So that is some - if you're looking for context about
what this case was like, part of it is - this is part of the
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significance of Padilla, from a criminal law perspective is,
it's really the first time the Court has dug into what it means
for a lawyer to be involved in a guilty plea. That's the first
time that that happened.
So now we're talking about criminal law a little bit.
The other side of this equation is immigration law. For
those that can't read it, that is Sandy trying to climb over the
wall on immigration law. The little caption down there,
"Some of you yelled either higher or higher." The
immigration system that we have been focused - has
become increasingly a function of - it's increasingly
focused on criminal action as a basis for deportation. This is
a chart from the Immigration and Custody Enforcement,
Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security. This is the chart
of deportations based on criminal convictions. And as you
can see, this is 2010 that this case is decided. These cases
were probably in the process further back. As I understand
this chart, this is a chart showing when individuals were
actually deported. So, obviously, the deportation process
takes a second, and so there is - these charts have sort of
shifted. But as you can see, as Padilla is being decided,
there's a real growth in how deportation cases are being used
and how the law is being used now to affect a person's
status. And so this has become a more and more important
issue. I think that some of this can be explained by better
record keeping and better communication, interaction
between state and federal authorities. I think that there was
a long time when you could be convicted in a lot of
jurisdictions, and nobody would ever know about it. And so
there would not be an actual threat of deportation simply
because the relevant authority wouldn't know that you had
been convicted. As time has gone forward, I think that's
been largely eliminated, and so we're seeing that.
Which brings us to this handsome, young fellow.
This is Mr. Padilla's green card. I hope I've eliminated all
the relevant numbers. Yes, this is - his case, the facts of
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his case were fairly significant to how this case proceeded.
He came to this country - I think Mr. Long mentioned
some of this but just to flesh a few of them out - he came
to this country as a teenager, I think he was thirteen. He
joined the military. Upon graduation from high school,
served in combat; volunteered to serve in combat because,
as a non-citizen he could not be required to serve in combat,
but elected to stay with his platoon; served in combat in
Vietnam; was honorably discharged as a result of that; in
fact, was decorated. He then got married, lived a life in
California. During the hearing the circuit judge asked him,
"Why didn't you just become a citizen after this," and his
response was, "Well, this was the Vietnam War, and nobody
liked that I was involved in this," "And the government was
a pretty bad actor, and I just didn't want to have anything to
do with them." It wasn't important to me, I always thought I
was going to be here. I never thought I was going to go
anywhere else, but I just didn't want to have to go through
the process of having to interact with this government that I
was so frustrated with. And so he doesn't seek citizenship
upon his return. He continues to work and live in
California. He becomes a truck driver. He is carrying a
load. His testimony was and would be that he was carrying
a load of candy bars that he had been asked to carry. He
was not a long-haul truck driver in general, but a friend had
asked him to carry this load. The load was not sufficient to
fill his truck, so he asked the agent for a second load. He
picked up the second load. When he was apprehended, that
second load, which was packaged to resemble legitimate
freight, was, in fact, marijuana. Mr. Long mentioned that it
was about a thousand pounds of marijuana, which is what
we, being a defense attorney, the defense community, like to
call a modest quantity of marijuana. I think it's not really.
My view is, it's not even really a crime, he was bringing
happiness to college students across the Midwest.
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But the principal fact that I know was argued about
in the Supreme Court was, this was a lot of marijuana, and
so what would be the effect of this if he was to go to trial?
He made an agreement with the DA to deliver his load and
complete his delivery so they could apprehend the people to
whom it was going. The DA in return agreed he would not
be prosecuted federally. He was prosecuted in the state
court, and his lawyer advised him that he had looked into it.
And his lawyer had been specifically directed, in fact, to
look into immigration consequences because, as he was
prosecuted, it was being reported in the local paper that he
was an illegal immigrant, meaning that he was
undocumented, which was not true, he had his green card.
He was then - so they approached the attorney and asked,
"Can you research deportation?" Consequently, he had a
little note in his file saying - he then turns around and
advises his client - and this is disputed, what was the
attorney's advice was disputed. His family believed in his
claim that the advice was, "I'm sure you won't be deported
because you've been in the country so long." He says that
the advice was, "I thought you may have a problem, but you
have been in the country a long time." "Maybe you can
work that out because of your service or because you've
been in the country," which was well short of what the
actual truth was, which was that he was pleading guilty to
an aggravated felony, deportation was mandatory, nobody in
the Department of Justice really had the power to stop that
train once it started to roll, which is unlike other cases. If
you're familiar with immigration law, you know
immigration offenses fall into a number of different
categories, and the most severe of them, they are aggravated
felonies, which cannot be canceled. Some lesser offenses,
some lesser categories are sort of crimes involving moral
turpitude or other things where the Department of Justice
does have some authority to cancel deportation if they find
under the circumstances that the individual is not somebody
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for whom deportation is appropriate. That's not always an
easy thing to accomplish, but it is at least a possibility. And
his case would be a particularly strong case for it. He had
served in the military, he had lived in this country for a long
time, he was married, he had several children, some of
whom were disabled and would not be able to travel with
him. This was going to be an extremely big hardship for
him, and it was not going to be - he had demonstrated a
pretty strong commitment to being in the country, and he
had, in fact, served the country. So under the circumstances
we thought, if we can get it to that, that would significantly
improve his chances of remaining here.
How I ended up getting involved in the case is, he
was - it requires a little bit of understanding of where
Kentucky was at the time. In the case that preceded Padilla,
Fuartado, the chief judge of the court of appeals, who I
think was something of an advocate for - well, I don't think
it, I know she said it - something of an advocate for the
rights of immigrants in the criminal justice process, had
rendered a decision that suggested that counsel had a duty to
advise clients about immigration consequences. And the
Kentucky Supreme Court had accepted review of that case
and reversed it and said that there was no duty. And so this
opinion comes along a few weeks after the supreme court
opinion is final, and the court of appeals, again, same judge
from the court of appeals, writes this opinion. It says, "We
understand Fuartado, but this is different because this was
flagrant mis-advice." And there was a body of law within
the circuits and throughout the country that, while you didn't
have to advise of collateral consequences, if your advice
was flagrantly wrong, that that might be a basis for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. And so that was the
authority that they were relying on.
The Commonwealth sought discretionary review of
that case, and at that point I was not on it when the
discretionary review was being pled. I got on it - the
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attorney who had been on it in the court of appeals was Rick
Neal, who got back on the case for the cert and the Supreme
Court stuff, but he was joining a private practice. He gave it
to me, so far as I know, because I was a juvenile lawyer and
juvenile law is crazy and immigration law is crazy. And so
it kind of works, so I'm crazy, he's crazy, and we'll be okay.
The first order I get in the case is an order granting
discretionary review and in the order denying oral argument,
which I had never seen before in years of practice before the
Kentucky Supreme Court and which I could understand
completely as, "We believe Judge Combs has gone crazy
again," "You're welcome to have your brief, but we know
what we're doing with this case"- Like it was not -
whenever the Supreme Court is denying oral argument as
part of the order granting discretionary review, they are
communicating that at the very least they don't think this
was a hard issue and they have an opinion because, if they
didn't, they would have oral argument.
We briefed the case, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision. Ironically, about, I want to say about two weeks,
three weeks after the decision was rendered, before a
rehearing was even due, we had an appellate conference in
my office, and we had invited some judges to speak. And
among them were a couple of Justices from the Supreme
Court, who I will not name, and the chief judge of the court
of appeals who had written Padilla. So the chief judge
stands up and says, "So I'm here to talk to you about
whatever you want to talk about." Before we do, I've got
these Justices over here, what's up with this Padilla case?
And so the Justices - one Justice was in the dissent and
one Justice was in the majority - the dissenting Justice
said, "I was in the dissent," and sat down. Like I had
nothing to do with it, it's not me, and sat down. The other
Justice said, "Well, the reason we were concerned about this
case" - and I think you've heard Mr. Long express some of
that concern - "is because of you all." We're concerned
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that public defenders are not going to be able to do this, and
so we didn't want to put that on you. And that drove me
insane because my view is, What's the point of having a
lawyer if not to do this? Why have a lawyer except to deal
with the complexity of the law and to figure out the things
that are hard to figure out and to make it possible for the
person who is being accused, who is facing all of these
consequences, to make an intelligent and informed decision
about what to do in a court of law? What's the point of it?
So to me, that was, I think it was, a telling expression of
where people were at and what people - I don't want to
say, I don't want to imply that that Justice's comments were
not kindly expressed or that they were not meant kindly,
they were all that. The reality is, though, I think it speaks to
me that it is a failure of our system to achieve what we
thought we were going to achieve when Gideon was
decided, that we have to make that kind of decision that says
we are more comfortable with a person pleading guilty and
not being aware of significant adverse effects associated
with that plea than we are requiring attorneys to actually
advise on that. That is a failure. So they make this decision,
obviously. I think that we looked at that and thought it had
potential. Rick Neal and I filed a petition. Steve Kinnaird
then got involved, filed a reply, and the rest is history.
In terms of what the decision actually was, I'm not
sure if I completely share Mr. Long's interpretation of what
the Court was doing.
WILLIAM ROBERT LONG, JR.: I'm confident you don't.
TIMOTHY ARNOLD: Among the things that they said
was that they've never applied distinctions between direct
and collateral consequences. They concluded the advice
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambient of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
therefore Strickland applies. That the weight of prevailing
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professional norms supports the view that counsel must
advise their client regarding the risk of deportation. I think
what the Supreme Court was doing was saying that here we
have this basic Strickland standard, and as time has gone on,
as I said, they've sort of been raising what that means. And
now they're saying, there is no magic to its direct or it's
collateral. The magic is what would reasonable attorneys be
expected to do in this context, and did you get that? That's
the standard. And that's the only standard, and we don't
need to have any other funky tests than that. And that under
the circumstances this is - by that point, the Supreme Court
had said in St. Cyr, an immigration case, that any reasonably
competent defense attorney would, of course, advise their
clients of the immigration consequences. There was a
clearly established body of authority within the defense bar,
the NOAGA standards, the ABA standards, that had said
counsel's duty included the duty to advise on all
consequences, including immigration. And so that was
already a well-established principle that ought to be
accepted. Now, I think that a lot of people in the defense
community probably regarded that as a surprise. There was
not a lot of advice and a lot of words about immigration.
And in fact, immigration was one of these things that we all
sort of felt like we knew we had to be aware of, but getting
aware of it was difficult. And that was going to cause
problems. But I think that, in terms of what the duty ought
to be, they were darn right. The duty ought to be to make
sure that your client knows what they're doing when they
plead guilty. The reason we have attorneys in courts more
than anything else is because the law should not be a black
box to your client. I'm pleading guilty to a crime, and there
are many consequences that flow from that. Some of those
consequences are not going to be consequences that the state
imposes, and I can't as an attorney advise on every
possibility. But I can if the state is going to choose to do
something to you because you've pled guilty, you're entitled
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to know it before you plead guilty. That would be my
position. And while Padilla, I don't think, went as far as to
say that that is always going to be the case in every case, it
did take a step by saying it is the case some of the time
when the penalty is especially severe.
What it means for the non-citizen clients for today, I
think that, generally, in terms of your professional ethics,
you obviously have a duty of competence, you have a duty
to provide reasonable advice to your client about all matters
that they are concerned about. In terms of what the
Constitution is going to require and what will be sufficient
for a guilty plea to remain valid, it needs to be, either you
tell your client specifically what the consequence is or, if the
consequence is in some form or fashion unknown to you
because it is complicated, you need to give the complicated
answer. You need to say, "Deportation is a possibility," "I
have looked at the law," "It's not clear to me whether it's
there or not," and "Ifs complicated." I would say going
forward, now that that's the standard, that whether or not this
is going to result in a finding of deficient performance,
maybe it won't, but that as an ethical matter, I think it's our
obligation, now that a button has been placed on this
particular issue, to try to make sure that we're making
reasonable efforts to identify with the consequences
specifically. So that means that we need to become more
acquainted with the immigration bar and the people in the
immigration bar who can offer us assistance in trying to
figure this out. Because, honestly, my experience with the
Immigration Department is that they are generally a pretty
helpful group. There are various immigration organizations,
LL (inaudible) being one of them, where there are - most
of their practice is in immigration law and that - if they get
a call from somebody saying, "Can you help me figure this
out," they're generally willing to try to the extent that they
can do so and still have a practice. And that is something
that we as criminal defense lawyers need to be taking more
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advantage of. In our system we're trying to create that in-
house as well. We're trying to create a position of
somebody who is basically an immigration lawyer within
the public defender system so that they can receive those
calls and be able to answer those questions so that we can
give specific advice about what that means because we think
that's our obligation. In twenty years, the next Padilla may
be a case where somebody didn't do that. But for the
moment, I think it's a matter of our professional
responsibility to our clients in achieving the vision that
Padilla had for us, we need to be pursuing that.
What it means for other cases, there are a lot of
collateral consequences. And I think that one of the things
that is significant to me about this case that I learned from
practicing this case is that for people who are lawmakers
and for people who are policy makers and people who
advise on policy, you need to recognize that collateral
consequences are not free, there's not a free lunch to give
somebody collateral consequence, we tack on this thing and
"don't be convicted." And we don't do anything to make
that really work for the people that it will apply to. Like I
said at the beginning, there were some people who sort of
felt like the world was going to end because we had to
advise on this. My feeling is, the blame for all of that really
doesn't lie at the feet of me or Mr. Long or the
Commonwealth of Kentucky or Steve Kinnaird or the
Supreme Court of the United States but lies at the foot of
Congress, who created a law that was extraordinarily
difficult to manage and never asked the question about how
that would be managed. We need to be better as rule
makers in understanding what those are and finding ways to
make sure that that is something that can be communicated
to somebody who is facing it so that they understand what
they're doing, not - Mr. Long's point is a fair one. We
want the system to be final. We want decisions to be made
that are made, we don't want to be reopening convictions,
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we don't want to be reopening pleas, but I think it's
important that as part of that that we are doing everything
we can to make sure that the people who are entering those
pleas know what they're doing when they do it and are
making decisions that are intelligent and informed because
why would we expect anything else.
The only other points I wanted to make before I
conclude are these: First, I think it's important to keep in
mind as you're thinking about this case that this case very
much is a function of and controlled by its facts. Mr. Long
alluded to this when he was talking, and I agree with it. If
Mr. Padilla had been a college student from London, this
case would never have been granted anyway, no matter -
even if the consequences were about the same, it wouldn't
have been the same. The reason why this case was chosen
was in part because virtually everybody who looks at it
thinks, "I kind of feel uncomfortable about deporting that
guy because he served his country, because he served this
country, because this is his country, because his family is
here, because his children are here, because he's made a life
here." And in general, we give people a second chance in
this country when they've made mistakes, and we don't want
to do that here. But that ties into a second point, which is, if
you are looking to be in the business of representing
criminal defendants in general, but if you're looking to be in
the business of representing immigrants in particular, I think
it's important to keep in mind that the category of
immigrants is not a single homogenous group. It is not the
case that all of your immigrant clients speak Spanish. It's
not the case that all of your immigrant clients have a darker
skin tone or that all of them are from Mexico or some other
country. They are a group that is highly diverse. They are
diverse in a lot of ways. And they are diverse particularly in
how their story relates to what they're facing. So if you are
Mr. Padilla and you've been in this country a long time,
there is - this is a highly significant thing to you. Our laws
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right now don't recognize that, and I think that they should.
And I hope - they're talking about reforming immigration,
God help me. I hope they do something about that. I'm not
optimistic, but I hope for it. But it's also the case that when
you are representing them, you can't treat them as a
homogenous group. That's true in general for public
defender work, that's true in general for criminal defense
work. Your clients come from a variety of circumstances.
You should try to refrain from making assumptions about
any of them. But in particular with this category, I think the
tendency has been to talk about representing your immigrant
client, and that is not a group that is easily labeled or
described.
With that in mind, I think that concludes my
remarks. Does anybody have any questions?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. Long had indicated that
Kentucky's values in the written plea that has some brief
immigration and advisal in it, that that had not been
challenged. And I just wondered if you have any thoughts
about that, if it 's sufficient, do you see a challenge?
TIMOTHY ARNOLD: I don't know that any of the - the
advising form says that you are not a citizen, you understand
that the plea may carry consequences related to immigration.
It has not been challenged that I'm aware of in a particular
case. I'm not sure - I think there have been some cases
where there was some element of that advice in the form
where it was also not raised as a defense to the challenge
that was based on immigration advice, so it thus far hasn't
risen to be the issue.
In terms of its sufficiency, I think, again, it's going to
depend on the facts of the case. If this was a case that falls
into the sort of second category that Stevens was talking
about, a case where the immigration consequences are
unclear, the advice and the form is consistent with the
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advice that you would be expected to give as an attorney,
maybe in those cases it would be considered sufficient. If it
is, however, a case where immigration consequences were
reasonably easy to ascertain and were mandatory or
presumptively so, that isn't sufficient because now you
haven't told them that. So to me, it's going to be sort of a
fact question as to what you're looking at. I think it's one of
these things - I have a mixed feeling about that form. On
the one hand, I like that they're trying to make an effort to
be more inclusive. I do care that people are informed. More
than anything else, I think somebody should know what
they're doing if they're going to plead guilty, it's a serious
decision. At the same time, I worry about situations where I
give specific advice on something and the judge sort of
seems to be overruling my advice incorrectly. I don't mind
it if they're saying the same thing I'm saying, that's fine. But
if he's overruling my advice and saying something that I
think is wrong, that's now a difficult situation for the client
to work out because the judge is wearing the black robe and
presumably knows and I'm not, and that creates an issue.
But so far that issue hasn't presented itself.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you get a sense that
defense counsel is really engaging in the issue, or are they
relying on the form to -
TIMOTHY ARNOLD: Well, my agency is. We're the state
public defender system, we have created the whole chart of
immigration law. We're - charge related statutes to
immigration consequences for those particular convictions.
We identify the person to provide specific advice on
immigration issues. We are trying our best to make sure that
we are living up to everything that is expected of us. There
are other jurisdictions that are doing the same. There are
some jurisdictions that are not. Certainly, I think within the
private bar in Kentucky, I think that there is a recognition
70
Summer 2013 Volume 91 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 72
that there's some need to do something, but I don't think that
there's necessarily the same degree of concerted efforts
because the private bar itself is not as concerted in its
approach to that. So, I don't know if - you're going to find
private attorneys who do a very good job of it, and you're
going to find private attorneys who don't.
(Whereupon, a break was taken.)
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PANEL DIscUsSION I:
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION: SATISFYING PADILLA'S





MS. HARTILL: We have our panelists, Jennifer Chac6n,
Yolanda Vdzquez, Christopher Lasch. All of them have
researched in the area of immigration law and its connection
to criminal law.
Jennifer Chac6n received her J.D. from Yale Law
School and is now a professor at the University of
California, Irvine School of Law.
Yolanda Vizquez is a professor at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, and she helped on the Padilla v.
Kentucky case.
Christopher Lasch received his J.D. from Yale Law
School and now teaches at the University of Denver's Sturm
College of Law.
This morning we're pleased to announce Paula
Schaefer as the moderator. She's an esteemed professor here
at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
So without further ado, I'll introduce Jennifer
Chac6n.
JENNIFER CHACON: Good morning. It's a real privilege
to be here, and I wanted to take a moment to thank the
university for having us; the Dean, for his gracious
welcome; and also the many journals who are co-sponsoring
the event. I appreciate the support that they've given us, and
particularly a shout-out to Katie, who has been just a
tremendous guide to our experience and a never ending
stream of useful emails that got us where we were supposed
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to be and has just been great. So thanks to everybody for
making this so easy for me.
I am basically going to give a little bit of a general
overview about how we got to Padilla and what happens
now. And then my co-panelists are going to take it from
there and delve into some of the specific issues that Padilla
raises for practitioners. And then we're hoping to have a fair
amount of discussion and make sure that our comments are
responsive to your interest and your questions in the coming
hour. So I'll talk for about fifteen minutes just to provide a
little bit of overview about how we got where we are and
what we can expect I think in the near future, at least, with
regard to this merger of the criminal and the immigration
world. I really appreciated the world's colliding slide. That
was kind of emblematic I think of how particularly criminal
counsel saw the events leading up to it and its ramifications.
I've taught immigration law in the law school setting
now for nine years, and I also teach criminal law to first-
year students. And I routinely tell my first-year students
who are entering criminal law, "You're living in California,
if you're interested in criminal law, whether that be on the
defense side or the prosecution side, you really should take
an immigration class." I actually think it's really important.
It's become sufficiently important. You have a sufficient
number of non-citizens who are in the system, and the kind
of interwoven consequences are unavoidable. So it is
something that I tell my students. It's a little bit daunting, I
think in part, because, as we've been told, the immigration
code is ridiculously complex, unnecessarily complex, and
that in some ways raises challenges. And of course, it's
federal and doesn't completely map on what happens at the
level of state practice, creating additional complications.
And we'll talk about all of those things.
But I do think it's important to have an awareness of
what's happening in the immigration world, and hopefully,
we can kind of talk about some of those issues today.
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So I wanted to just start by talking a little bit about
the "how we got here." And in a way, the Padilla decision
navigates some of that for us. You see the discussion in the
majority's opinion about how the nature of the relationship
between immigration law and criminal law has changed
fairly gradually over the past few decades. In the past, kind
of certainly throughout the nineteenth century and into the
early twentieth century, there really weren't immigration
consequences to criminal violations. So you had this
immigration law on the books. You had at least some type
of prohibitions on entry. It started in 1875 really. But you
didn't have immigration consequences to criminal activity
that occurred within the United States really until 1917, and
even then, it was very, very limited. So only happening in a
few situations of crimes involving moral turpitude. There
were pretty strict limits on how long after somebody entered
those that the consequences could actually be applied. So
by and large, there really wasn't much overlap between the
way immigration law functioned and the criminal law. All
of this really started to change, and it changed radically, I
would say, beginning in the late '80s and proceeding through
the mid-'90s. At that time, you had a series of changes to
the law that really caused a merger between the immigration
law sphere and the criminal law sphere. Because in a series
of moves in revising immigration law, Congress attached all
manner of immigration consequences to a wide variety of
criminal convictions. And so they started out kind of in the
height of the war on drugs period by attaching immigration
consequences to drug crimes and extended that to a laundry
list of other offenses.
And probably most notably, and this was singled out
in the comments earlier this morning, developed a very
expansive definition of aggravated felony that had severe
consequences in the immigration world. So aggravated
felony sounds bad. It can be abstract, and many of them are.
But Congress has so expanded the list of crimes that
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constitute aggravated felonies that the old saying now goes
that they need be neither aggravated nor felonies to fit into
this category, so you have anything that - you have crimes
that in some cases could be state misdemeanors but that will
trigger the consequences of aggravated felonies. And the
consequences of aggravated felonies are severe. And I'll
talk a little bit more about kind of what that looks like in a
minute. But essentially the first point I want to emphasize is
that for a broad array of criminal convictions and a much
broader array of criminal convictions than you might think,
there are immigration consequences that follow. So that's
point one, which is almost any criminal conviction should
put you on alert that there may be criminal consequences.
And that's true whether you're talking about misdemeanors
or felonies, it's true whether you're talking about state
violations or federal.
The second major point that I think is important to
make is that, in those changes stemming from '88 to '96, and
particularly '96, the changes in the law really eliminated a
lot of discretion that immigration officials have to mediate
or moderate the impacts of the immigration consequences in
criminal convictions. So if you have an aggravated felony,
if you are charged with and convicted of something that
qualifies as an aggravated felony, there is really no room for
discretion no matter what the equities of the case might look
like otherwise. And this is different from what the law
looked like in the 1996 when there was a possibility for
cancellation of deportation in cases where there might be
sympathetic facts like the ones that Mr. Padilla presented
with. So a lot of the discretion is gone, which means that,
once that criminal conviction has attached, there's no going
back once somebody is in the immigration pipeline, and that
means that it's much more important to be aware and
cognizant on the front end of the immigration
consequences. Because no matter how sympathetic a person
might look, no matter how long they lived in the United
75
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 77
States, those kinds of equities aren't going to be taken into
account in the deportation proceedings.
I think the other thing that's important to flag is that
a lot of people have tended to assume that these
consequences apply and flow primarily to individuals who
are present without authorization. And this, I think it gets it
exactly backwards. Individuals who are present without
authorization are removable because they are present
without authorization, the criminal consequences may in
some ways be less significant to them although it raises a
host of issues about their possibility of return. But where
criminal consequences often surprise people, your thinking
is like Padilla's, where you have a long-time lawful
permanent resident or people who are otherwise authorized
to be here who seem to live here in all meaningful sense of
the term but who become permanently deportable and
permanently barred by virtue of criminal convictions.
So these are the ways in which I think the criminal
law has really merged with immigration over the past
twenty years or so, making it really important for individuals
to be aware of the possible immigration consequences of
any criminal conviction or any that the client undertakes.
I think the second point that should be made about
this is, if we were talking about a small number of people
kind of going into the deportation system, maybe that
wouldn't be that significant, but one other thing that's
changed, particularly over the past decade, is the degree of
enforcement of immigration law in the country. So this has
been kind of a theme of common observations, and I think
it's worth stressing, since 2003 with the reorganization of the
immigration bureaucracy and with the placement of the
immigration agencies under the umbrella of the Department
of Homeland Security, there has been a massive increase in
resources dedicated toward immigration enforcement to the
tune of fifteen to twenty billion dollars a year spent on
immigration enforcement issues at this time. And so what
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that means is you have large law enforcement agencies,
including the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency, that are dedicated to not only enforcement at the
borders but interior enforcement. And what this means, of
course, is that large numbers of people who are here who
have been present for long periods of time who might in the
past not have come to the attention of the immigration
bureaucracy have a much greater likelihood of actually
coming to the attention of the immigration bureaucracy.
And added to this is a point that was made earlier, increased
information shared between the federal government and
state governments and better databases, which means that
individuals with criminal convictions are more likely to be
identified in various proceedings. So for all of these
reasons, you have more immigration enforcement, a more
accurate understanding of the records of immigration
coming into the system, and once they're in the system,
decreased discretion to deal with the potential consequences
of this on both sides. And that decreased discretion applies
not just to immigration officers but also to judges. In the
past, in the early days of immigration law, looking at the
early twentieth century, judges had the discretion when they
sentenced people in criminal court to make a determination
that those individuals should not be subject to deportation.
So the judge who sat in judgment on the crime could make a
call about whether this should also have immigration
consequences, and that, of course, is not the case anymore
either. So all around, once you're in the system, the degree
of discretion is really limited.
So those are kind of all reasons in which I think
we're seeing more of this linkage between criminal and
immigration. And the final reason that I'll flag that I think is
important that a later panel will be talking more about is
because there's a great deal more state and local involvement
in the enforcement of immigration laws, both under formal
programs like the 287(g) program, which I think is the
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specific topic of the upcoming panel, but also informally-
led, individual law enforcement agencies, who decided for
whatever reason that immigration enforcement is a priority
with them and who accordingly select and profile potential
suspects when they think there's a likelihood that they might
also be immigration violators. So you have a lot more
enforcement on the ground, not just because there's a lot
more federal resources for the immigration enforcement but
also because states and localities in a variety of guises are
also taking a role in immigration enforcement. So
consequently, many more people have come into the
immigration pipeline by the initial point of entry of the
criminal justice or criminal law enforcement system.
So that's the crim-im merger that people talk about,
sometimes refer to it as crimmigration, and it's been a
phenomena of the past really fifteen years. A little bit more
than that but really kind of ramping up over the past fifteen
years.
Padilla is in some senses a response to this and also
a response to sort of the formalistic distinction that exists in
the law between deportation, which is viewed as civil, and
the criminal sphere. So Padilla comes against a background
of a long-standing line of case law that says that deportation
in itself is not a criminal consequence. This, obviously, has
huge implications for people in removal proceedings
because it means that the standard criminal procedural
protections that would apply in a criminal trial don't apply in
a removal proceeding. You're not entitled to counsel at the
government's expense, and things like detention, incident
removal is not viewed as incarceration with all of the
protections that that would entail. So you have this sphere
of removal and detention, incident to removal that exists in
the civil universe. And then you have the criminal world,
criminal convictions, which may and in many cases do
trigger immigration consequences in the civil sphere. And
so as the Padilla case makes clear and as the comments
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earlier made clear, the immigration consequences of the
criminal conviction are viewed as collateral or were viewed
as collateral as a collateral consequence of the initial
criminal conviction but not in and of themselves criminal
and, therefore, not necessarily covered by the same laws and
guidelines that provide for procedural protections in the
criminal sphere.
Padilla, in some senses, acknowledges the
fictitiousness of this boundary without totally dismantling
it. So it is, I think, a curious feature of the Padilla decision
that it doesn't say it is a requirement of defense counsel to
provide information on all collateral consequences. They
don't want to go down that road; they very clearly don't want
to go down that road. And so the road that they take is to
instead say that there's something peculiar about
immigration law. And the comments from both of the
earlier speakers highlight the kind of uncomfortableness of
that position. But it is true that, for some, immigration
consequences are probably more important than the criminal
conviction itself, but it might also be true for a sex offender,
who has to then go on the registry and can't live or work in
certain places, that those collateral consequences might also
be more consequential than the criminal conviction itself.
The right to vote might also be more consequential. If it
involves a professional license for somebody whose
profession is invocated by their criminal conviction, that
might also be more important. So there is something
uncomfortable in some ways about the distinction that the
Court carves between deportation and everything else. That
said, I think they were looking for a way to deal with the
severity of immigration consequences for criminal
convictions in the post-1996 world. You are dealing with a
situation where there is no opportunity for discretion. This
is in some ways an almost unique feature of immigration
law. And so if there is mis-advice, there's unfortunately no
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way to deal with that mis-advice once the ball gets rolling
on deportation.
And so you have this sort of a hybrid decision,
which basically says that it is true that there are limitations
on what counsel is required to do with regard to collateral
consequences. But these are not classic collateral
consequences, there's something different about
immigration, and it can consequentially misadvise in this
context. And even no advice in this context constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. And we'll elaborate I think
a little on that in the upcoming discussions.
What then is required by Padilla, well, obviously, I
leave that a little bit to be fleshed out by my co-panelist, but
I do think there are a couple of points that I want to make.
And point number one is it obviously becomes the
prerogative of everyone who is dealing with a criminal
defendant to identify what their citizenship and immigration
statuses are. So if it's not one of the first questions, it
certainly should be one of the questions, where-were-you-
born question that then leads to information about potential
citizenship status and potential immigration status. Just two
words on this that I want to stress; one is that citizenship
status is never ever as clear as we think it ought to be in
many of these cases. I've been astounded at the number of
people who find out that they are citizens in the course of
deportation proceedings, so never take citizenship as sort of
a given. It's not as transparent or easy as we might think,
particularly when we're talking about establishing a
citizenship, citizenship they have acquired by virtue of their
parents' citizenship status. So it's something to be taken not
at face value. And immigration history I think also is
something not to be taken at face value. People often don't
know their own status, and they certainly may not know
about the potential immigration options for them. A
criminal defense attorney may be the first lawyer that
they've really ever talked to about their immigration status
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and potential avenues of relief. So immigration status is
also not as clear or transparent as one might hope.
The immigration code is arcane, it looks a lot like
the tax code, it kind of requires that sort of approach. It's a
mess. And so I think it makes it rather daunting for some
people to think about advising on these consequences. That
said, and I heard this stressed, I think it's important to re-
stress the point that is made in a publication called Cultural
Issues in Criminal Defense. Immigration is not rocket
science. It's hard, it's complex, it's strange, it's bizarre, and
it's counterintuitive, but it's not rocket science. And it is
something that we can figure out, and I hope that part of our
discussion can be about the best practices and how to figure
it out.
Where I want to close today is really talking about
what's next. Someone talked about the possibility that there
might be some sort of comprehensive immigration reform,
or I'll just take comprehensive right out of it because it won't
be comprehensive whatever it is. There may be some kind
of immigration reform that happens in the next year or so,
and so we might ask the question of what the implications of
that are or would be for Padilla obligations going forward.
And I think the answer is that, even if you get immigration
reform, it won't be comprehensive in any meaningful sense,
and it won't eliminate these kinds of burdens and obligations
and professional requirements that Padilla lays in place.
And I'll tell you a few reasons why I think that's true.
Reason number one is the immigration code will not
be simplified. I don't think Congress has the stomach, the
heart, and maybe the head for actually revising the
immigration code such that it will read in a sensible way
that would be easily understandable to your average non-
citizen or even your average citizen attorney. So I think that
we can expect that the immigration code will continue to be
what it is, which is kind of an arcane statute that cross
references itself in confusing and sometimes contradictory
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ways. I don't think it will be cleaned up. So we'll still have
a very confusing body of immigration law after immigration
reform happens.
The other thing that we'll have after immigration
reform happens - well, two other things. One is, we'll
have a group of people who appear to be eligible on their
face for some kind of legalization, normalization, but they
actually have convictions or other criminal issues in the past
that are going to close that path for them. And the process
of the normalization or legalization will bring them to the
fore. So I think we'll see a group of people who may be
kind of flagged for possible removal as a consequence of
this, and that's just something that we should be aware will
happen.
The other thing that we'll see is individuals who just
are not eligible for legalization or normalization as a
consequence of this packet, no matter what this packet is.
There will be a substantial number of those people. And
those individuals I think will be subject to heightened
surveillance and increased enforcement in the wake of any
immigration reform package. In fact, Congress is very clear
about that border security is a prerogative, border security is
a trigger for legalization, and that means more enforcement
before you get any kind of legalization. So that means more
people in the pipeline potentially who have criminal
convictions and who are possibly removable for their
criminal convictions. So the takeaway from this is we can
expect to continue to see, even in the wake of immigration
reform, these issues to remain on the plate.
And I think the final point I want to make, there's
been brief mention of Chaidez made, and my co-panelists
will elaborate on the significance of Chaidez. One possible
way to read Chaidez, which says that Padilla is non-
retroactive, obvious to say, is that anyone whose plea kind
of is pre-March 2010 is sort of outside the Padilla universe,
you don't need to worry about arguments around
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effectiveness or mis-advice or lack of advice in the pre-
March 2010 world. And I don't think that's right either.
And I think in particular things like mis-advice probably
may still be viable claims even for individuals whose pleas
were entered into prior to the March 2010 universe, and
there may also be other avenues for successful challenges to
the advocacy of counsel in those pre-March 2010 days,
depending on what stage the ineffectiveness of counsel
claims can actually be made. So we can talk a little bit more
about that. But the bottom line is, I think Chaidez, although
it closes the door on some pre-March 2010 claims, it doesn't
entirely shut the door on evaluating the efficacy of those
particular pleas, and so it's important to recognize that 2010
doesn't quite stand as the staunch beginning period
necessarily of everything that might relate to effective
information about immigration consequences in the criminal
plea process.
I think I've probably just about used my time,
exceeded my time. I'm not sure. So I'll now turn it over to
Ms. Vizquez.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Just out of curiosity, how many
are students in the room? All right. And how many are in
the criminal defense attorneys, either defense or
prosecutors? Okay. Great. I actually am going to do my
talk more on where sort of I think the future of Padilla's
holding has led us and is leading us. One of the issues that
hasn't truly been discussed is the holding that Padilla had
was a split baby. And because of it, I think that it has
caused a lot of confusion, both with the courts, with defense
attorneys, and with prosecutors. I also am going to discuss
sort of the difference, and I know Mr. Long and Mr. Arnold
brought it up, the difference between sort of the Fifth
Amendment knowing and voluntary waiver of your rights
during the plea colloquy by the court versus the Sixth
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Amendment right to counsel and effective assistance of
counsel under Strickland.
One of the things that I thought was interesting this
morning was both Mr. Long and Mr. Arnold sort of
downplayed their role in Padilla. But I think as line
attorneys they - and appellate courts attorneys - that they
are probably really the front line of this issue. The Supreme
Court only handles about a hundred cases a year. The fact
that Padilla made it up to the Supreme Court was a fluke, a
miracle, whatever it was, but it's not the norm. The norm is
whether or not the line attorneys are there to be able to
represent their client in a way that gets them what their goal
is. Their duty is to provide assistance, that is the goal for
the client because these millions of cases aren't going to go
before the Supreme Court. And as Mr. Long said or Mr.
Arnold said, that Sixth Amendment cases were rarely going
up before the Supreme Court. This year marks the fiftieth
anniversary of Gideon, so there's been a lot of symposium
on whether or not Gideon is effective. Once we had Gideon,
it was decided there was a right to counsel. One of the
biggest complaints about Gideon was that it didn't establish
what that right meant. Was a warm body good enough? We
have Sixth Amendment case law where you can be drunk,
you can be on drugs. The attorney doesn't even have to be
there, he can go plug his meter while the trial is going, and
it's found to be perfectly okay. So again, I would hope that,
especially as students, that when you enter the world of
defense, as a defense attorney, that you aren't asleep, you
aren't on drugs, and you aren't clogged by alcohol while
you're representing your client because, while you may be
able to effectively represent your client under the Sixth
Amendment, that's not really what the goal is, I don't think,
of Gideon.
Again, Strickland created this two-pronged test, but
Strickland didn't occur until '84. So next year will be, what,
the thirtieth anniversary of Strickland, so we can decide
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whether or not that was a good decision or not. And then
we really didn't hear from the Supreme Court again until
about 2000. As you know, Strickland had established a two-
pronged test; the first was, Was the attorney's performance
deficient? And even if it was deficient, the client has to
decide whether or not he was prejudiced by that. Lockhart
established that, in the plea negotiation, it had to be
determined that, but for the ineffectiveness of counsel, they
would not have pled but would have insisted on going to
trial. Professional norms were used, but they only said it
was one, it was a guide. But it wasn't truly what the
ultimate or only goal was under Strickland. And so we saw
it wasn't until 2000 when the Supreme Court again stated
that professional norms were actually much more important
than the courts were giving credence to. These were death
penalty cases where the attorney failed to investigate or
mitigate for sentencing purposes, and so they said there was
a duty to investigate based on professional norms. And
again, when we see Padilla in 2010, they really stressed
professional norms. But hopefully, we're dealing with -
hopefully again - Jennifer talked about earlier, maybe in
the next twenty years, where we're going to go. But
hopefully, before the Supreme Court gets there, at least the
line attorneys and everyone else that really is doing this
groundbreaking work is already doing it.
One of the things with Gideon was they were saying
thirty-five states had already created a right to counsel, even
though the court hadn't gotten that far yet. So they were just
going ahead with what the states were already doing.
So anyway, and the other thing that they downplayed
is their sort of getting there by accident. I think, for many of
us, we get there by accident, so we should always be
prepared. My role in Padilla was with - Stephanos Bibas
was one of my colleagues. He was actually called by
Stephen Kinnaird. They had both gone to Yale together, and
they had clerked for Justice Kennedy. When Stephen got
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the case, he called up Stephanos and asked if he could do an
amicus. Because they believed that amicus briefs help the
Court decide whether or not to grant cert. And Stephanos
called me up because he knew my scholarship was in this
area. I was a public defender in Chicago in 1996. I was
assigned to a domestic violence courtroom. As Jennifer
said, in 1996 two of the harshest immigration bills - which
affected immigration - were created at that point. One of
the ramifications of those 1996 bills was deportation then
became possible for those convicted of domestic violence
offenses. And since I was one of the few Spanish-speaking
attorneys in Chicago, I was assigned to a primarily non-
English speaking courtroom where many of my clients were
non-citizens.
So again, I became an attorney in D.C. I just fell
into this, and I got the call from Stephanos as to whether or
not we were going to be able to go on to the amicus. We
were originally supposed to write this armicus for two of the
largest criminal defense organizations in the country. I
probably shouldn't be saying it while I'm being transcribed.
They actually said no. They said that they didn't want to
sign on to the amicus because there was no place in the
criminal justice system for immigration, and that, of course,
annoyed me to no end because as Jennifer said, since 1917
immigration has been into the criminal justice world. So
again, as you can see, in 2012, two hundred and twenty-five
thousand people were deported based on criminal
convictions. I unfortunately do believe that Padilla will
probably not decrease it, but it will actually help, I guess,
some individuals. But the three largest percentages of
people who are deported for crimes - based on drugs,
based on immigration violations, and based on traffic
offenses, whatever that definition is. That has to do with the
increased enforcement and drug crimes. As Jennifer said,
the war on drugs has been instrumental in sort of this
immigration-crimmigration connection.
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So all this was happening in the last thirty years.
You could tell in the Supreme Court cases they started to
take more of these immigration-crimmigration cases to be
able to distinguish whether or not some individuals would
be deported based on their crimes, especially in the terms of
aggravated felonies, which as you heard, either had to be
aggravated or felonies, especially with drug crimes. And
then because of this 1996 - 1996 also made this increase in
the amount of crimes that became deportable offenses, it
also made it retroactive. So for those individuals who had
pled guilty, for instance, in 1970 to something that was not
deportable at the time, the 1996 laws went back, so now,
actually, even though they pled guilty in 1970, they now
became eligible for deportation based on the change in laws.
So things started really running amuck, and the Supreme
Court started taking notice of this. And you could tell in one
of their cases, LN.S. v. St. Cyr, that they were not exactly
happy about it.
So when they took Padilla, we decided to write the
amicus anyway. We were able to write it by - it was
supported by immigration professors, criminal law
professors, and two or three immigration organizations. And
then cert was granted, and that got the ball rolling. And I
must admit that, it is true, I got phone calls saying that that
was not a good idea, we shouldn't do it. I was really happy
that it came out sort of good because, if not, I probably
wouldn't have a career right now. But anyway, so the
hearing was in October of 2009, the decision was in March
of 2010. And Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
and he sort of split the baby. While they said that there was
a duty to advise as to the immigration consequences of a
criminal conviction, what he actually said or the Court said
was, if it was clear the immigration consequences were
clear, succinct, or explicit, that defense attorney had to give
specific advice as to what those consequences would be.
However, if it was not succinct and straightforward, defense
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counsel only needed to advise that this could have
immigration consequences if they pled guilty. But anything
more than that, you would have to go to an immigration
attorney and find out.
One of the biggest things during oral argument in
front of the Supreme Court was an interesting - as Mr.
Long said, Dreeben, who was the solicitor general under
Kagan at the time, actually had a question by Justice Alito,
and he said, "So in a hypothetical, if I am a defendant, and I
ask you as counsel, 'What are the immigration consequences
if I plead guilty?' And he said, "Well, I don't really know,
you'll have to go get an immigration attorney for that." But
I say, well, I was appointed to you. I don't have money to
go get an immigration attorney. And counsel will then just
say, well, that's just too bad. Is that how you want our
system to be? And it was interesting because, after I left
oral arguments, I really thought that Justice Alito was going
to go with the fact that there was just an automatic right to
be able to receive specific advice. He and Justice Chief
Roberts actually decided that that was enough advice, just to
say there may be immigration consequences, but if you want
anything more than that, you need to go get an immigration
attorney, which again, you have to pay for. And since the
majority of people that are in the criminal justice system are
poor and too poor to afford a criminal attorney, let alone an
immigration attorney, it really causes problems.
But anyway. So we have this splitting sort of the
baby. How can you determine whether immigration is so
complex that all I need to, as the defense counsel, is to
advise as to it may have immigration consequences, or I
have to give specific advice? Now, in the majority opinion,
Justice Stevens states, well, in the case of Mr. Padilla's case,
all they had to do was open up the immigration book, the
I.N.A., and see that drug crimes is a deportable offense.
What he didn't talk about specifically was that actually Mr.
Padilla's conviction as an aggravated felony was his kiss of
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death. Lawful permanent residents who are convicted of
aggravated felonies are denied the right for cancellation of
removal, which is the discretion to be able to say, "Look,
judge, I've been here so long," "I have family," "Please tell
me I don't have to leave." They can't do that. So aggravated
felony for the drug trafficking is a little more complex,
although if you look at the federal guidelines or you look at
the federal definition, it became a little bit clearer, and after
the Supreme Court decided a couple of drug cases on that, it
became even clearer than that. But how far do you have to
go? Do I have to go look at a practice manual? And the
Court says that, or at least Justice Stevens implied, yes, you
do. But do I have to do anything more than that?
In the immigration book, it says "a crime of moral
turpitude." Congress has never defined what a crime of
moral turpitude is. So is that enough? Since I really don't
know, I can just tell my client? Well, I actually think that
one thing that Padilla did that was beneficial was that they
talked about plea negotiations. That plea negotiations is
actually a critical stage of representation and, therefore,
protected under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla in that
respect has been expanded. Last year, in 2012, two plea
negotiation cases came down, Lafler v. Cooper, Missouri v.
Frye, both on the same day, which that supported the issue
that, under the Sixth Amendment, you have to be able to
negotiate, and that is part of your Sixth Amendment duty.
So I do think that, although Padilla sort of splits the baby in
terms of how much I have to counsel as defense, I do think
that Lafler and Missouri v. Frye actually answered that
question as to you need to figure it out. As a defense
attorney, you need to figure it out because you cannot
negotiate with the prosecutor if you don't know what the
heck you're negotiating for.
Missouri v. Frye was one where they didn't convey
the offer, and so that was a little bit easier because you can
argue, "Well, I can convey the offer to my client, but I don't
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necessarily have to know what that offer is." But Lafler v.
Cooper was where there was a plea offer, the defendant
wanted to take it. His counsel actually talked him out of it,
which was really a wrong decision, and at the plea it was
fifty-one to eighty-five months. He ended up rejecting the
plea, went to trial, lost, and was sentenced to a hundred and
eighty-five to three hundred and sixty months. And so what
the court said was that plea negotiations again is a critical
stage, that you have a duty - and mis-advice is ineffective
assistance of counsel. It goes back to Padilla. Padilla did
not - they decided that mis-advice versus non-advice is not
the issue because what happens if they were to split it. First,
it would create silence within defense counsel because they
wouldn't say anything because I would know, well, if I don't
say anything, I'm not ineffective. But if I try and I
misadvise, I am. And second, it would create defendants
who have the least ability to be able to represent themselves,
and that's what counsel is there for. So my argument,
especially after Lafler v. Cooper, is that you need to figure it
out. I do think there are ways. ABA has developed a three-
million-dollar project, which they're trying to get collateral
consequences across the country on one database. As you
heard, Mr. Arnold has already set up a chart. There's charts
across the country in each state that are developing.
Sometimes law school clinics are helping with that. It is
happening. The Bronx Defenders Association actually has a
collateral consequence unit. The I.L.R.C., which is out of
California, actually contracts with attorneys to be able to
give immigration advice. Private law firms and solo
practitioners are also contracting with public defender
organizations and solo practitioners, so it is something that
is here to stay. And as Mr. Arnold has said, it is our duty as
a criminal defense attorney to be able to help our clients
with their goals, and sometimes staying here is more
important than the criminal conviction itself.
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One of the issues that Mr. Long did discuss was this
increase. As we know, Padilla tried to keep it to
immigration, and they said that they would not address the
collateral versus direct consequences; however, across the
country you are seeing it. Sorry, Mr. Long. So it is
happening. Pension lost in Pennsylvania now has to be
advised to parole eligibility in Missouri and probably several
other states. Sexual offender registration in Michigan in
Eleventh Circuit and civil proceedings in Alaska are just a
couple of those that are expanding. Again, collateral
consequences are - there are many of them. But they
prevent our clients from being able to not only vote, to have
housing, to get themselves an education because they can't
get federal funding for it. It is very, very important to our
clients, and I don't think we can sort of play the victim and
just say, it's too complicated, because, if it's complicated for
us as attorneys, just imagine what it is like for our client.
Now, this Fifth Amendment versus Sixth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is the admonishment by
the court. Sixth Amendment is the right to counsel. Justice
Kennedy during oral arguments was really onto this. At the
point of Padilla, there were, I think, twenty-three states
which had plea admonishments done by the court.
However, there is a difference between a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and a Fifth Amendment duty of the court.
Florida has litigated it. They first said that, yes,
admonishment by the court cured any defect by the
attorney. It was later overruled. I do believe that across the
country, again, when the court and prosecutors worry about
finality of the plea, that's the tension that we see. We see in,
I think it's Arizona, that the prosecutors are demanding that
any potential future Padilla is waived. So even if you don't
know you have a future Padilla claim, you've waived it. So
it's interesting. We'll see how far that goes, if it ends up
going up to the Supreme Court. But again, our duty as
defense counsel is very different than the duty of the court.
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And as we know, our clients usually don't say much once
they're in that plea colloquy, even if what they're hearing is
different or what they're hearing is something for the first
time.
So these are some of the things that I think are
coming as a result of Padilla. Again, I think in the lower
courts, it is a hit or miss, but I think still our duty as defense
counsel is to try to help to figure it out so that we don't have
to worry. It's a lot cheaper if our clients don't have to
appeal. It's a lot cheaper if our clients are deported. As you
heard Jennifer state, it's costing billions of dollars for
detention on - and deportation. And if we can just redirect
those funds and to increase spending in the crippled defense
world, it would be a wonderful thing, even though maybe
not a popular thing.
But I think I'll close my remarks right now, and I
look forward to discussing this further with you.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I also want to say thanks to the
Journal of Law and Policy and also to the Journal of Race,
Gender, and Social Justice for supporting today's
symposium. When I was invited to speak on this important
case, of course, I jumped at the chance. And to do so on a
panel with Yolanda and Jennifer is a real treat. Thank you.
I would like to talk about and offer some
encouragement for pushing beyond Padilla. Padilla
certainly is a step forward in some ways. The recognition
that the consequence of deportation cannot be described as
collateral in the experience of the person facing it is a
significant recognition. And I also would like to share
Jennifer's optimism that this reflects a little bit of realism on
the Court's behalf about what the world actually looks like
in terms of the connection between criminal proceedings
and immigration proceedings. So I think that Padilla is
certainly a step forward and a cause for some celebration.
But I also think that it has its shortcomings and that we need
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to be thinking about how to go further in some different
directions.
I will proceed in three parts. First, I will discuss
briefly what I mean when I talk about Padilla - what it is I
am claiming we need to go beyond. What are the
substantive and procedural shortcomings with Padilla that
I am talking about? Second, I will talk about, specifically
with reference to substantive shortcomings, how we can
push beyond the limited right that the Padilla decision
recognizes - how we can pursue the logic of Padilla to
further reasonable conclusions appropriate to the
criminigration world that we live in and that Jennifer
Chac6n described. And then third, I will spend a very short
amount of time on Padilla's procedural shortcomings and
what we might do to overcome those and turn Padilla into
some truly enforceable constitutional norms.
So what is Padilla, and what are the substantive and
procedural limitations that I am claiming exist? What is it
that I'm saying that we need to move beyond?
Substantively, although a step forward, I think that Padilla
represents a limited articulation of a constitutional right. I
think that what the Court is saying the Constitution
guarantees here is, in fact, somewhat an impoverished view
of what the Constitution can provide. I say that because
Padilla focuses solely on the ultimate consequence, on the
end game of immigration proceedings, on what the Court
refers to as deportation consequences. And I say what the
Court refers to because the fact that such proceedings are no
longer called deportation proceedings is a point worth
noting. They are called "removal" proceedings, which is
significant in thinking about the world we live in because
for me, at least, "deport" is a verb that clearly applies to a
person, whereas "remove" might be something that you do
with any sort of thing that you don't want in its current
place. I think the language of our current immigration
system says a lot about where we are with respect to
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immigration. I think it is significant that the Padilla court
references it as "deportation consequences." We see a little
more humane terminology in Padilla.
The Court discusses the severity of deportation as a
consequence and the automatic connection between some
criminal convictions and these severe deportation
consequences. These factors, the Court finds, make it very
difficult to cabin off deportation as a so-called collateral
consequence. So I think the constitutional right recognized
in Padilla is expressed very narrowly in terms of a
deportation consequence that is thought to be extremely
severe.
I also think that Padilla is not just substantively
limited in its vision but is also procedurally limited. A lot
of this is because of the posture that the case came to the
Court in and the precise question that the Court was called
on to decide. But the rule of decision that we are talking
about in Padilla is the Strickland rule. Tim Arnold earlier
lamented the deficiencies of Strickland, and he is certainly
not alone. Scholars have raked the Strickland text over the
coals for its inability to make good on Gideon's promise of a
lawyer, an effective lawyer for indigent defendants.
The Strickland test has two prongs. People this
morning have discussed this a little bit. The first prong is
the deficient performance prong. You have to prove that
your lawyer operated outside a wide range of what
competent counsel might provide. Stephen Bright referred
to this as the mirror test. If you can hold a mirror up in front
of counsel and it fogs up a little bit, we might have
satisfactory, constitutionally sufficient performance.
The second prong is the prejudice prong. You have
to prove that things might have been different but for your
counsel's deficiencies. And then the cases that Padilla is
mostly talking about are guilty plea cases. We are talking
about a situation where somebody comes before the court
and says, "Yes, I know I stood up and said that I did all
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these things, but actually, I would like to take that back and
go to trial. And I would like to get a jury in here, and I
would like to have several days for a trial." You can
imagine that courts might be somewhat loathe to let people
pass this second prong of the Strickland test. Those are the
two limitations that I see with Padilla. A substantive
limitation in terms of what the right articulated is and a
procedural limitation in terms of how you vindicate that
right.
So, how do we go beyond the limited substantive
right? How do we get beyond just the idea of the
deportation consequences? Jennifer Chac6n talked a little
bit about the crimmigration world, and one way of thinking
about that is that there are all sorts of crimes which carry
over consequences into the immigration world. But there is
another way in which crimmigration has occurred over the
last twenty years. It is not just that the immigration world
bleeds over into criminal proceedings in important ways that
Padilla says we have to be aware of, but it is also that the
immigration proceedings themselves have become
criminalized. As a clinical fellow at Yale, I walked into
immigration court for the first time to figure out how I was
going to teach students how to practice in the immigration
courts. And I had been a criminal defense attorney up to
that point, and I was a little nervous about going to
immigration court for the first time. But when I got there, I
was completely put at ease by the familiarity of what I
found. There were people in jumpsuits in detention that
looked a lot like the criminal courts that I was used to.
There were people appearing via closed circuit television.
There were people without counsel. I was not prepared for
the absolute lack of procedural protections that people in
immigration proceedings were accustomed to. Since I was
used to practicing in the criminal world, I was used to the
idea of a constitutional right to counsel and other forms of
due process. As my colleague at the time, Michael Wishnie,
95
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 97
told me, "We have not had the due process revolution in
immigration court yet." So, immigration court does not look
that different from criminal court, and it shares, in fact, one
of the hallmark features of the criminal justice system,
particularly since 1996, which is pre-adjudication
detention. I would call it pretrial detention, except that you
do not get a trial in immigration court. You just get a
hearing.
Because immigration proceedings appear so
criminalized, many scholars have called for the importation
of criminal due process protections in immigration
proceedings. Once you start to realize how criminalized the
immigration proceedings look, it becomes easier to think
about the role of criminal defense counsel on the front end
of this. Think about two sets of proceedings: first, the
criminal proceeding in which a crime is charged and then, a
second proceeding, which is the immigration proceeding.
Although the Supreme Court tells us that the immigration
proceeding is civil, understanding it as highly criminalized
may help understand what the role of the criminal defense
lawyer on the front end might be. It seems quite logical that
a criminal defense lawyer representing somebody who
might be subject to a second criminal proceeding would take
steps, such as: (1) trying to avoid those additional charges
being placed at all, (2) improving the client's position with
respect to whether the client will be held in detention during
that second set of proceedings, and (3) improving the client's
position with respect to the ultimate outcome of those
proceedings. Once you realize that, you might say this
carries over pretty easily into the immigration world, and the
idea of what a criminal defense lawyer ought to be doing on
the front end goes beyond just the criminal issues.
Padilla, of course, recognizes only the third of those:
improving the client's position with respect to the ultimate
outcome. But I think that we ought to recognize all three,
and so here are some ways in which I think that we can push
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beyond Padilla to think about how the world ought to be,
and what the Constitution should guarantee, given the
realities that I have discussed.
First, we can expand the types of cases in which
criminal counsel actually must be appointed. For example,
misdemeanors that do not carry jail time, for which you
ordinarily would not get a lawyer under the Sixth
Amendment, can have immigration consequences. And a lot
of minor misdemeanor convictions result in people being
shuttled over to the immigration system to endure the
consequences of those convictions. There are a lot of cases
where there is no lawyer in criminal court followed by
serious consequences in immigration court. There are also
many misdemeanor prosecutions in criminal court where
you might not be afforded counsel because the prosecution
has indicated it will not seek jail time. For example, there
are many jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, where the
prosecution can waive jail time, and therefore the court
does not need to appoint criminal counsel in those cases.
But lots of those cases can have immigration consequences
other than deportation. Specifically, one that is quite serious
is mandatory immigration detention. Again, as a criminal
defense person walking into immigration court, this struck
me as something new. I am used to going into court and
having my clients always have a chance for some sort of bail
to be set. In immigration proceedings, if you have been
convicted of certain offenses, there is mandatory no-bond
detention, which means you will be in jail throughout the
pendency of the immigration proceedings. Since the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases is ordinarily
guaranteed for those facing jail time, it seems like a logical
extension, particularly after Padilla, to apply the Sixth
Amendment right to misdemeanors that might not carry jail
time in the criminal case but do qualify for mandatory no-
bond detention in immigration proceedings. I think there are
other instances where we could think about expanding the
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Sixth Amendment right to criminal counsel - any case in
which an immigration detainer is filed, for example.
Alternatively, perhaps the appointment of counsel should
persist through the handling of issues related to an
immigration detainer.
So in addition to expanding the types of cases in
which criminal counsel must be appointed, Padilla also
suggests that we re-visit the idea of the types of services that
criminal counsel must provide with respect to immigration
consequences. And again, I am talking about a more
expansive view of immigration consequences, not just the
ultimate deportation consequences.
Those expanded services should include
counseling. The client may need advice concerning not just
deportation consequences but also about immigration
detention issues. Is the client going to be subjected to
mandatory no-bond detention? Is the client going to be
subjected to a detainer? In appropriate cases, the client
probably needs some advice from counsel about whether to
discuss his or her place of birth or his or her citizenship
status with any other persons other than counsel, like law
enforcement or immigration officials who are visiting in the
jail. In appropriate cases, the lawyer should avoid making
any on-the-record references to immigration status. Courts
often sort of seek this information out during a plea
colloquy by asking, "Counsel, do I need to give a Padilla
advisement?" That might not be a question you want to
answer if your client is, in fact, going to be defending
immigration proceedings in the future. Here again, my
focus would be on improving outcomes for the criminal
client in this second set of proceedings, i.e. immigration
proceedings, not just with respect to the ultimate
consequence but with respect to every step along the way.
Additionally, in addition to counseling issues, we
could add some litigation to the criminal defense lawyer's
responsibilities, especially in regards to immigration
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detainers, which are incredibly important. An immigration
detainer is a piece of paper that federal immigration
authorities fax to a state jail or prison or a local jail saying
that they want the prisoner currently in criminal
proceedings for immigration proceedings. It tells the state or
local authorities that, when they are done with the current
criminal proceedings, they are to hold that person for a
period of forty-eight hours, not including weekends or
holidays, and then the federal authorities will come and get
the prisoner. In 2009, around 10,000 to 15,000 immigration
detainers were issued. Now it is a quarter of a million every
year. Immigration detainers are the way that the pipeline
has been set up to channel people from state and local
criminal proceedings directly into immigration proceedings.
And it happens that there are numerous legal issues
surrounding immigration detainers. Can your local officials
be obligated to hold someone pursuant to one of these
detainers? And if they cannot be required to hold
somebody, are they authorized to hold them? Does the
Fourth Amendment have to be satisfied? After Arizona v.
United States, we are told that state and local officials do not
have unlimited power to arrest people for suspected
immigration violations, but that is exactly what an
immigration detainer amounts to. It is a warrantless arrest
based on an alleged civil immigration violation. So there
are lots of legal questions surrounding detainers. The
criminal defense lawyer is authorized, and the Sixth
Amendment makes sure that this happens, to fight tooth and
nail to make sure that the client in a criminal case does not
get a two-day jail sentence at the end of the case. So why
would it be that a criminal defense lawyer would not be
similarly authorized to fight an immigration detainer? Or
why would the Constitution not require a criminal defense
lawyer to fight a two-day detention waiting at the end of the
criminal case just because it is pursuant to an immigration
detainer? So I think that there are questions about
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expanding the scope of defense counsel's obligation and
representation in those ways.
In regards to the procedural narrowness of Padilla,
of course we can continue to litigate these types of
claims the way Padilla did. We can bring a post hoc,
post-conviction petition and allege that counsel was
ineffective and that the ineffectiveness caused prejudice to
the client. But Strickland is a very hard test to meet. In fact,
it is probably the worst test that could have been put in place
to implement the rights that we are talking about. It really
has no relationship to Gideon's promise of having an
effective lawyer. So I would suggest that we need to think
about litigating Padilla on the front end as much as possible,
instead of coming to these issues from a post hoc position
where the courts are going to give strong consideration to
the finality that the court wants the pleas to have. We need
to litigate these issues up front. If public defenders are
overburdened by case load, they probably do not have the
time needed to meet the Padilla obligation. Overburdened
public defenders are not being given the resources or the time
to meet with their clients. For example, in New Orleans in
2009, the statistics indicated that the public defenders spent
about nine minutes with their clients per misdemeanor
case. If that is the situation, Padilla is probably best
litigated on the front end by motions to the court, which can
in many cases be made ex parte and under seal. Defense
counsel should ask for funding to consult with an
immigration attorney or to have an immigration attorney be
appointed to this case or for more time to consult with their
clients because this is an issue that they ordinarily do not
have time for. So, my emphasis on the procedural side is
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PAULA SCHAEFER: I want to thank all of you for being
here. It's been a great panel so far, and I think it might be
nice to start with asking you if anyone wants to follow up on
a comment that one of the co-panelists made. Was there
anything that someone else on the panel said that you want
to respond to? No? I'm going to ask one question then, and
then I'll open it to the audience and walk around with the
mic and ask some questions.
Obviously, Padilla is about effective assistance of
counsel. It's not about competence or best practices. I
would be interested in all of your thoughts about what
training law students and criminal defense lawyers should be
seeking if they want to achieve competence in this area.
JENNIFER CHACON: I guess I would start for the law
professors and for the law students who are kind of starting
their law career, if you are interested in criminal work, be
that prosecution or defense, take an immigration course.
You should have some fundamental awareness of the basic
collateral consequences that attach to criminal convictions.
And it's a pretty complicated, thorny area, and it's worth
having that overview.
I also would say - and I'll turn it over to you guys
to kind of offer more details. When I was preparing for this
panel and thinking about what I could talk about, I actually
had a research assistant go out, I said, give me a binder full
of kind of what the best practices are, what people are doing
to implement Padilla, what are the requirements but also
kind of how are people dealing with the requirements, how
are they setting up their own practices. And my research
assistant has done that. So I think, if it's possible, probably
through the conference organizers, I'm happy to provide sort
of my bibliography list of what these kind of resources are
so that, if you haven't accessed them or would like to access
them, you can find them. I found them - I could actually
kind of limit the list now, but I've read through most of them
101
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 103
and identified the best practices based on what I've read.
And I'm happy to provide a list of those things. But that
might be some useful reading for people who are looking for
something that's concise and clear about what the
obligations are.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I think one of the things that's
been great is when I went to UC - I actually teach
crimmigration. So I teach a seminar on the intersection
between immigration and criminal law, and those classes are
popping up across the country, which I think is great
because I think, for many students who want to be either
criminal or defense attorneys or prosecutors, that's definitely
a class that they should take, especially if there's - part of it
is just practice, what's an aggravated felony, what's a crime
of moral turpitude. I think there's places across the country
that students - ALA, I think it's free for students, which is
American Immigration Lawyers Association - becoming
involved in that. I think setting up your own groups -
There are resources, Norton Tooby has great practice guides
that are really helpful. I think finding a public defender
organization or prosecutor's office that deals with this issue
and being able to intern, even working with an immigration
attorney during school or in the summer, I think is probably
really good. I do think it's something that, as Jennifer said,
all people who want to go into criminal law should be a part
of at this point. It is not going away.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: And on top of that, I would
suggest going to imnuigration court and observing
proceedings for a lot of different reasons. The world that
you learn about in law school is very different from the
world that exists out there. And I think that is true across
the board no matter what substantive area of law we are
talking about. But as a criminal defense person, the practice
in the courts does not match up to what you would expect it
102
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 104
will be after reading about it. And the same is true for
immigration court but ten-fold. I think that you can also
realize the impact that detention has on immigration
proceedings by going and watching immigration
proceedings. It is just like the criminal world, where pretrial
detention is used as a mechanism to coerce "consented-to"
outcomes. That is true in the immigration law as well.
Going to court makes you appreciate the actual
consequences that are at stake.
It is very easy for criminal defense attorneys to think
in an abstract way that their job is to bring the criminal
case to a successful conclusion and whatever happens in the
immigration court happens in the immigration court. But
going and seeing what actually happens there helps you to
understand that things are not going to get better over in
immigration court if you do not do your job on the front end.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: As Jennifer said, and today others
have said, if you get a conviction in criminal court, once you
get transferred to immigration court, most of the time there's
no relief. It's that criminal conviction that really boxes a
client in, and so the only way you're going to save a client is
to make sure that he pleads to something that doesn't make
him deportable or at least you have some sort of relief. And
again, in immigration courts, since it's a civil proceeding,
you have a right to counsel but not at the government's
expense. And since the majority of the people in
immigration court are poor, just like in the criminal justice
system, their not going pro se in immigration court against
the government is pretty near impossible. And so we have
to also think of that as criminal defense attorneys. And
Chris talked about detention. Immigration detention
overshadows the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Federal
Bureau of Prisons holds approximately 200,000 detainees.
Immigration is approximately 400,000, twice as many. So
again, this is something that's really, really important when
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we're talking about a conviction and whether then your
client is subject to mandatory detention. And again, as Chris
said, if they're mandatorily detained, they just want to get
out, regardless of whether they have relief or not.
JENNIFER CHACON: And the other thing I'll say is we
have been pretty focused on, as Padilla is very focused on,
the obligations of the criminal defense attorney in this
context, but I think, obviously, if prosecutors are concerned
about the finality of a plea, then they too need to be sort of
aware that these discussions need to be happening. And
they can be sensitive to whether they're happening and to
the extent that there are genuine justice concerns about -
often the prosecutor enters into negotiation and thinks that
they are actually helping somebody who seems relatively
sympathetic to getting a good deal. And it is not a good
deal, and I think that's the kind of - it's not a good deal if it
winds up in life-long banishment for somebody - the
seriousness of standard applies here. So I think although
this kind of - Padilla definitely frames the obligation in
that way, and although much of our discussions really
focused on that -obligation, there is kind of a broader
obligation that runs to judge and prosecutor as well, just in
the terms of the administration of justice.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: And one thing, I guess I want to
add because I forgot, citizenship. As Jennifer said,
citizenship is much more complicated than we think. But if
you can prove your client is a U.S. citizen, they're not
supposed to get deported. They have been deported, but
that's what's not supposed to happen. And so again,
citizenship isn't just where you were born, it's what status
your parents have and where your parents were born. I
think that one of the biggest things that I saw when I used to
do outreach was that there was a new law that said, if your
parent naturalized before you turned eighteen and you were
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a lawful permanent resident, you were in the legal custody
of the parent that naturalized, that you automatically became
a U.S. citizen. And most people do not know that. We
always found at least one or two children who were U.S.
citizens and did not know it. And there's a case, Juan
Estatz, out of New York. He was deported on an aggravated
felony, he was then found again, people like to return. In
New York City, he was sentenced to five years in jail. His
deportation was supposed to come. Immigration came and
said, "We were actually going to deport you, but we realized
that you were a U.S. citizen and you were actually a U.S.
citizen before we deported you the first time." And so then
he had to litigate because he was subject to parole, and they
wanted to keep him on parole. But the judge was like, "He's
a U.S. citizen," "You got it wrong the first time," "You can't
keep him on supervised parole." But again, it happens, so
not only where he was born, what the status of his parents
were and sometimes even his grandparents.
JENNIFER CHACON: The other thing I would add just in
terms of kind of things that are important but may not
superficially seem important, the criminal record generally.
It's not just this crime and what are the consequences of this
crime, but are there other crimes in the past that are going to
give specific consequences to this crime, particularly if they
were crimes involving moral turpitudes or multiple crimes,
multiple criminal sentences, which takes something into the
realm of a particularly serious crime. Those kinds of
questions I think become important. To the extent possible,
knowing the full criminal record, knowing the full
immigration history, and then knowing any possible facts
that pertain to citizenship.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I want to open it to the audience. I
have a microphone that will help them pick it up on the
recording.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wanted to ask a question to
Chris, but anybody can answer it. What as a public
defender practicing in state court do I do to fight tooth and
nail to get rid of that detainer? Do I file a motion in state
court, do I call the federal public defender's office and ask
them to file my motion in federal court, as even a motion?
And do you have one that I could have?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Sadly, I do not have a motion
because that would be such a nice answer. But I am happy
to talk with you at great length about fighting detainers tooth
and nail. There have been three class action lawsuits
brought that I know of that litigated detainers. One in
Connecticut was settled pretty favorably with the
Connecticut Department of Corrections changing its entire
policy about what detainers it was going to honor. I think
that that lawsuit really shook the Connecticut officials. The
idea that they were legally allowed to hold people pursuant
to detainers in all circumstances has sort of been the routine
part of criminal law enforcement. Detainers are not a new
thing for jails and prisons. So, when jails and prisons
receive immigration detainers, their first response is that
they should just handle this like a criminal detainer, which is
all pretty routinized and straightforward. But there are real
questions about immigration detainers and the legality of it.
I can point you to some resources that will help identify the
legal arguments that can be made and to some of those class
action habeas petitions that have set forth the different
grounds for relief.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I think we have one in the middle.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. Two things, first,
Professor Chac6n, you said something about providing a
reference to somewhere where we could go to get forms or
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what have you. I get my responsibilities as a lawyer, but in
terms of the nuts and bolts -
JENNIFER CHACON: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Anything you could provide,
a list of questions, what do you ask somebody who you
suspect might not be a U.S. citizen in order to fulfill these
obligations. If you could provide that, that would be great.
My second question is: If you are someone who practices
doing appointed criminal defense work, either on the state
or federal level, have you all had experience with problems
getting compensated for immigration issues? Because, here
in the Eastern District of Tennessee, on both the state and
the federal level, we lawyers are hearing a lot about we're
spending too much money for CJA lawyers and things like
that and are looking at ways to cut back. If we are billing -
and this is sort of a practical matter - if we're billing for
things relating to, say, immigration issues, something that is
not strictly or necessarily related to the criminal case that
we're appointed on, do you have any thoughts about that, or
have you seen problems in getting those things sort of
kicked back at lawyers?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I was always the public defender,
so I didn't have to worry - I was salaried. But I do know
that there are people across the country that have been able
to get money arguing the fact that if they don't, under
Padilla - and now I think you probably could even under
Lafler - if you don't, you're basically ineffective, and
therefore, an appeal is going to come up, which is going to
cost more money. And then judges have actually started to
give money realizing that they can't - they want the finality
of the plea. So if you can articulate an argument that "I can
make this final, you just have to pay me up front, judges," at
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least some judges have been saying, okay, this is what
you're going to get.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But it's like Padilla in your
request for, you know -
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Definitely. Right. And I
probably would even start to push the envelope with Lafler
with the plea negotiations as well, yes.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I certainly appreciate the bind
that you could find yourself in if you are worried about
getting denied on the back end of a case and you do not
submit your billing usually until the case is concluded. So,
one alternative approach would be to seek funding for an
immigration attorney under the CJA.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is that available under the
CJA?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Well, I have definitely seen that
argument made that funding for an immigration attorney
should be within the set of services that an attorney can seek
funding for.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That would be helpful.
Thank you.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I've got a question here, and then
we'll go over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We maintain a website with
another organization called Defendinglmmigrants.org, and
we have all the nuts and bolts materials that the previous
questioner asked about in terms of what your obligations are
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in the scope of Padilla. So I would strongly suggest that
people go to Defendinghmmigrants.org.
Another thing I was going to ask was a question - I
heard a couple of people sort of talk about this second prong
of the standard for ineffective assistance in a plea case as "I
would have gone to trial." I understood that there would be
a probability of a different outcome, which could include -
a different plea would have been negotiated, which in the
Padilla post-conviction world, sometimes can just mean
instead of getting a theft conviction for 365 days, I would
have gotten that conviction for 364 days. And given the
probable willingness of most judges to have sentenced the
person to 364, especially if it was suspended, that might be
and I think some people have found that that kind of
outcome is more easy to secure on post-conviction rulings.
I'm pretty sure that that characterization is more accurate,
especially in light of Lafler and Frye, that there really is a
duty to negotiate an effective plea bargain; is that right?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I would argue yes. And just so
- Dan, saying the difference, 364 through 365, that's the
difference between an aggravated felony and not an
aggravated felony. So that one day makes all the difference
in the world.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I would add to that that the
second prong of Strickland speaks about a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. People tend to sort of
cut to the chase and talk about whether there would have
been a different outcome. But technically that is not the
standard you need to meet. Whether that gets you anywhere
in your particular forum may vary.
JENNIFER CHACON: I think some of the articulation gets
muddled because I think St. Cyr formulates it slightly
differently. I think you could ignore that and argue the way
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that you're arguing. I think that's how Strickland articulates
the test.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Although, there are still some
jurisdictions that say he would have gone to trial.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question about what
you guys think in terms of the way that the criminal and
immigration system is set up, as all of you have articulated
it, with folks having access to a lawyer in the criminal
system but then often not having access to an immigration
lawyer once they're in removal proceedings, in terms of how
that plays into the actual enforcement of Padilla. So folks
who were misadvised or not advised in the criminal system,
let's say that happens, which I anticipate will, unfortunately,
continue to happen, it happens every day, all day long after
Padilla was decided. But still, a lot of criminal defense
lawyers don't know and aren't able to provide the kinds of
immigration advisements that they should under Padilla.
But folks are then pleading badly without being advised and
then being shuttled to immigration court, they don't get a
lawyer, they get removed. What are the chances that they're
going to bring ineffective claims? That is a real concern for
me in terms of the court saying in Padilla, "Look at this
great system we're setting up, oh, we're supposed to do X, Y,
and Z." And every one being like, yea, yea, yea, Padilla.
But then realistically, our non-citizens who have already
been removed who were advised badly because they pled
badly in the criminal system, so they didn't get a Padilla
effective lawyer, are they really going to be able to bring
ineffective claims? What are your thoughts on that?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: Yes, there are huge barriers to
that. That is another reason why I think litigating everything
on the front end has become so important because the back
end is so ineffective to address this problem. But think
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about a case where you do not get a lawyer in criminal court
because you are charged with a misdemeanor that does not
carry any jail time. Then you go to immigration court, also
without a lawyer. I think we need to attack both of those
pieces. I think Turner v. Rogers offers some hope for
reinvigorating arguments about a right to counsel, at least in
some cases in immigration court, and it is the idea that there
are uncounseled criminal convictions that may be deficient.
This leads to another argument about why you need counsel
in immigration proceedings. You need counsel to raise that
kind of issue for immigration judges to take into account.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: And I completely agree. If you're
not getting enough to finance the back end, really even
worse. I do think, like Chris said, Turner v. Rogers, I think,
is a great case for there to be some policy litigation that you
do have a right to counsel in immigration because you're
against the government and the possibility of deportation,
the Supreme Court has already said, it is a harsh penalty. So
I think there has to be some kind of litigation. I know under
Obama's comprehensive or immigration reform, he talks
about the discretion of the judge being able to appoint
counsel for unaccompanied minors, the mentally ill, and
some detainees. And so we'll see if that stays. So the
administration recognizes this problem, and hopefully we'll
be able to get in at that end as well.
JENNIFER CHACON: But I think you're right. The
bottom line is, for significant numbers of people, there's the
practical effect. They will receive bad advice or mis-advice
on the criminal end, and they'll serve a sentence. They will
be put in deportation proceedings. There will be no one to
reexamine what's happened, and then they will be in
Thailand or El Salvador or Britain or wherever it may be.
And that's the end of the matter, which I think goes to kind
of the earlier point about as much as can be done on the
111
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 113
front end should be done on the back end. Really, it's not a
cure-all remedy that's going to get at every situation of bad
advice or no advice.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One of the panelists
talked about how advice applied to different areas of law
outside of immigration, as far as collateral effects - Do
you think that trend is likely to continue, and is the legal
community, the legal marketplace going to be able to fill
that void cost effectively? And is it likely that it
wouldn't?
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: I love the cost effectively. We
spend billions of dollars on detention. If we could just re -
the money is there, it's just spent differently. There are, I
think, what the Professor said - there's, approximately,
what, seventy thousand collateral consequences across the
country changing daily. And so do I think it's a trend that's
growing? Yes, I think it is something that is being litigated
because, again, it's the goal of the client, and if the client
needs to stay in his housing, if he wants financial aid for
school, those are all - I think the right to vote - they are
all very important things. I think, again, there has to be a
policy about doing something by curtailing the collateral
consequences that are attached versus sort of saying, well,
we're just - it's going to tie up our hands because we
shouldn't have to do this because it's too complicated and
just too much. So I do think one of the things about Padilla
is it reinvigorated, I think, defense counsel to be able to
really think that they could start litigating these things, and
it's starting to break through across the country. And I do
think that people will continue to do that, which I think is
good.
JENNIFER CHACON: I think what's tricky about it is it's
so patchwork. Depending on the jurisdiction you're in,
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which collateral consequences you're required to advise
someone about is going to be different, and I think that is
revealed by your list. And the collateral consequences are
perpetually shifting or changing in every jurisdiction. So I
think there is an effort on the part of - there's a working
group in the ABA that I think that Jack Chin is spearheading
that and trying to kind of get a handle on whether can we
create a database of what the collateral consequences are.
Can we make something accessible to attorneys that are
going to be in the position of having to give this advice? So
there is some work being done on that, but it's not done.
And it's not easy.
I think that to me kind of what I take out of this is that
perhaps one of the biggest favors that you can do any client
is try to figure out what their priorities are, what are their
priorities as a general sense, and to think about this. And
you're not going to be able to do that with regard to all of
the collateral consequences, given how many there are and
how varied they are. But I do think that to the extent that
you can at least very briefly get a sense of is the deportation
consequence more important than the criminal conviction -
Is the losing of the gun more important than the length of
the thing? To the extent that knowing you have some
general sense of what the client's priority is, that might help
to navigate, but it's not the answer.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: In a way I think your question
highlights a real drawback of Padilla, which is its focus on
the lawyer instead of on the client. A whole different way
of looking at this is not whether are lawyers allowed to give
bad advice, but what do we do when a person receives bad
advice? So, instead of bringing up the question in terms of
obligation of counsel, which makes courts very motivated to
curtail that, maybe bring up some collateral consequences
that lawyers would agree are so far outside the realm of
criminal services. The most important thing to the client
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might actually be that the client got bad information from a
lawyer or some other source.
JENNIFER CHACON: And avoiding removal, deportation
is not always the goal of the client either. So I think that
may be an automatic assumption that people make, and it's
not always the right assumption. And there may be some
clients that are happy to be deported sooner to avoid a
lengthy criminal sentence and/or lengthy immigration
detention, and it's worth assessing that out too. But it's
complicated.
PAULA SCHAEFER: There's a question in the back.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't know which one of
you did this, but you quoted or recited a case a second ago,
I.N.S. v. Saint something, and then you explained it. It
sounds like an interesting case. I didn't get the last part of
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: Oh, LN.S. v. St. Cyr?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ: S-t. C-y-r. And it was 2001, I
think.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.
PAULA SCHAEFER: We have a question over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would just like to follow
up on the first question in the back, which was, if you are
appointed to a client who does have an immigration hold,
the answer was a class action lawsuit. I'm not a class action
lawyer, I'm a criminal defense lawyer. Is there anything,
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any motion that can be filed to try to get that hold removed?
Just as an example, if someone has got a hold from another
state, well, that would fall under the Informed Extradition
Act, and in Tennessee there's actually a motion and a
procedure, a law to cite, to get that individual a bond. But
my judges say, "Well, that's a federal hold, I don't have
jurisdiction, and I don't know of anything even to file." So
if there were any ideas on that.
And the other is, recently ICE has been putting people
on probation. Maybe that is something that always existed
in the law, but it has only been utilized in my experience
here recently, meaning if they made their bond in state
court or if they were granted an OR bond after a period of
time where they were in custody only on the immigration
hold, they are being released on, for lack of a better
phrase, ICE probation, to see the disposition of that case.
Do you have any advice how to encourage ICE or to
petition for ICE probation?
CHRISTOPHER LASCH: I did not mean to suggest that
you need to file a class action lawsuit because I agree that
that would be really unhelpful advice. My point is that there
have been lawsuits filed, so you can get the pleadings in
those cases and maybe use those arguments as a starting
point for drafting up a motion or a pleading in a case that
you have. Whether state court judges are going to be the
best forum or not because of the problems you identified,
like this is federal law, is a question that will be answered
jurisdiction by jurisdiction. State courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a habeas petition, for example. You argue that the
criminal charges were dismissed, your client is being held
pursuant to this detainer, and there are the legal infirmities
with it so the client needs to be released. All state courts are
familiar with that kind of a habeas petition, somebody who
is being held unconstitutionally. Some criminal judges
might entertain a motion with respect to a detainer during
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the pendency of the criminal case. The criminal judge might
take the position that he/she has jurisdiction over the case,
and that includes telling the jail what to do with the detainer
or not. So, there are motions that you can think about filing,
whether they are going to be successful or not, of course, is
going to depend on your judges and their receptiveness to
the argument.
The other thing that people should be aware of is that, in
December of 2012, ICE completely revised its detainer form
and its detainer guidelines so that in theory they are meeting
a set of criteria before they issue these detainers. A good
starting point would be to get a hold of a physical copy of
the detainer that your client is being held pursuant to, and
check it to make sure what ICE says is true. For example,
maybe your client does not have three prior misdemeanor
convictions, which is what ICE is saying is true. That might
be an opportunity to negotiate with ICE directly about
removing the detainer or considering lifting the detainer.
PAULA SCHAEFER: Do you want to follow up?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I want to point out it's very
easy for ICE to move whatever you file because all they
have to do is go get them, and so that really complicates the
efforts to try to do something about the detainer. File and
serve everybody, you've gone through all this effort, and
ICE just comes up and picks them up. So that's one of the
big challenges with the detainer issue. And on a case-by-
case basis, and I think that's why the class action is so much
more helpful, although much more difficult, is because it is
so hard to do these case by case. It's on the front end
challenging them before they have been given a lot better
chance to get the case to actual adjudication.
Also I want to comment on this afternoon, Christina
Kleiser, who works in the public defender's office, that's
going to be on the last panel, and she's been pushing for the
116
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 118
public defender's office to start - and you guys probably
know this because you work with her - to find immigration
persons and answer these kinds of questions for public
defenders. So this afternoon when she comes, it's a great
time to talk to her about how you can support that effort and
help her in doing that.
And then one last point I wanted to make, and this is
something that the first speaker spoke about at the very
beginning, but it's real important from an immigration
practice a lot of times you have a hard time convincing
people whose relatives have been detained that they can be
deported just because they're in the country illegally,
regardless of whatever their crime is. But I think on the
criminal defense side of this, it's easy to sometimes
disregard a good defense on the criminal issues because you
think, well, they're going to be deported anyway, they have
no status. And Padilla was a permanent resident. So it's a
different set of rules. In my experience here in Knoxville in
this jurisdiction, most of the cases we see are not permanent
residents, people with legal status falling into criminal
proceedings. Most of the time, the vast majority of time, it's
persons with undocumented status. However, if
immigration reform happens, that is seriously going to turn
all that on its head because there's suddenly a vast number
of people who no longer previously had no options who
suddenly have some options. And to a small degree, that's
already happened because, over the past three or four years,
immigration has been directed by the Obama administration
to regain a little bit of the prosecutorial discretion that they
had foregone in the past, oh, ten or fifteen years. So even in
cases that someone is undocumented, there might still be
options if they're able to navigate successfully, navigate at a
criminal proceeding. So in a limited sense, even if they're
undocumented, it still matters, and especially if there's
immigration reform, it's really going to matter.
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JENNIFER CHACON: Yes, I would want to hammer that
home. I think, even if there's no immigration reform, you
might have someone who is eligible for asylum but might
not be eligible for asylum, say, if it's an aggravated felony.
You might have someone who is eligible for cancellation of
removal but might not be eligible for cancellation of
removal if it's the aggravated felony. So someone who is
unauthorized may well have serious status issues that are on
the line here. And then if comprehensive immigration
reform is enacted, things that people are pleading to now
may be the kind of decisive factor as to whether they're
eligible for that then. And so I think we need to be really
thoughtful about what it is that they're pleading to and what
the potential consequences are in the shadow of immigration
reform. And it's really difficult to know what that means for
particular people. And so you just have to kind of keep it in
mind as a broad source of information about what you're
doing.
PAULA SCHAEFER: I think we're out of time. I know
there's still some questions. I would invite people to come
up, and hopefully our panelists can talk for a couple of
minutes after we wrap up.
But I want to thank all of you. I appreciate you all
being here today. It's been a great panel.
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LUNCH KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
287(G) AND SECURED COMMUNITIES: SOME OF THE
DANGERS OF DELEGATING FEDERAL POWERS
Elliot Ozment
MR. HOWELL: Our next speaker is Elliott Ozment.
Elliott Ozment is the founder and managing attorney at
Ozment Law. He graduated from Vanderbilt Law School
in 1975. He's put together a successful career, countless
awards, panels, and boards, including the 2012 Tennessee
Bar Association's Public Service Harris A. Gilbert Pro
Bono Award, and I believe that was given to him for his
work in the now fairly infamous Villegas case. Mr.
Ozment is a frequent speaker and lecturer and is presently
working on a book on motions to suppress legally obtained
evidence in immigration court. Today he will be speaking
on Section 287(g) of the Immigration Nationality Act.
Without further ado, Mr. Elliott Ozment.
ELLIOT OZMENT: Well, good afternoon, folks. I'm glad
to be here in Knoxville today, and I appreciate the presence
of each and every one of you. I want to start out by
recognizing a man who has helped me more than any other
person since I started the practice of immigration law, and
that's Dan Kesselbrenner. I love that man; he knows it, and
I could not do - our entire office could not do half of what
we do if we had not had Dan's assistance through the
years. You're very lucky to have him here in Knoxville at
this conference, and I'm glad you invited him. His
presence alone is worth whatever you paid to get into this
thing, so I'm glad he's here, I'm glad you're listening to him,
and have the privilege of hearing him.
Well, my topic today is 287(g). There are lots of
ways that we could approach that topic, but I think what
I'm going to do, to make this as interesting and as personal
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as I can, is to tell you my story on how I connected up with
287(g) and what happened after that.
My story begins on October 6, 2006. I had gotten a
call from Sheriff Daron Hall, the sheriff of Nashville,
Davidson County, Tennessee, and he wanted to have lunch
with me. And so he and my wife and I joined him for
lunch at the Palm Restaurant. I think it's on Church Street
in Nashville. I think that's the first and only time I've ever
been there. We had a very pleasant lunch, and as we had
lunch, he told me about his plans to bring the 287(g)
program to Nashville, Tennessee.
Now, for those of you that might not know
what that is, let me just take a brief moment to describe
it generally. The 287(g) program, at one time at
least, existed in about eighty-two or eighty-five different
jurisdictions across the United States, and what it is is a
contractual arrangement that was provided by Congress
that enables ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
which is the enforcement arm of the Department of
Homeland Security, to contract with local law enforcement
authorities.
There are two different types of 287(g) programs.
One is called the Task Force Model. That's where you
contract with the sheriffs office or the police department in
a particular location. The other one is called the Jail
Model. And that was the model that Sheriff Hall wanted to
bring to Nashville. And what that contract provided for the
sheriff to do was that, when somebody was arrested, he had
the authority to have his deputies in his jail become 287(g)
deputies, and what they could do is interview that person
that was arrested soon after they were arrested and, through
a series of interview questions, determine whether
that person was legally present in the United States,
whether that person had committed a serious enough crime
to warrant issuing a notice to appear and to issue
a detainer.
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Now, a detainer has become very
controversial lately. A detainer is a piece of paper that is
signed that says that you are put on an ICE hold, is what
it's commonly referred to as, and what that means is
that, after you're finished in the local court, after your case
is disposed of, if you have a detainer on you, then you can
be kept for up to forty-eight hours after you are eligible for
release. So if you were sentenced to time served and you
come back to court, the jail keeps you for another forty-
eight hours, if there is a hold on you, even though you've
served your sentence or even if the charge has been
dismissed; it doesn't matter. When you are brought back to
the jail, you are not booked out at that point. If you have an
ICE detainer on you, then you are kept for forty-eight
hours.
Now, at that point, ICE can either come and get you
or let you go. Now, in Nashville's program, they were
never released because ICE was right there, and so they just
bring a truck in about two or three times a week, load them
up, and take them down to Alabama. And then from
Alabama, they would take them on to Oakdale, Louisiana,
which is a hellhole of a place. That's where all the ICE
detainees wind up.
So what happens is that that program is designed or
was designed by congressional statute to enable a more
efficient performance of capturing dangerous criminal
aliens. That's what its purpose was.
And so at the lunch at the Palm Restaurant, I asked
Sheriff Hall how he intended to design the program, "who
are you intending to go after with this program?" And the
reason I asked that question is because, just before our
lunch, Williamson County had arrested a person, a lady, for
having no driver's license, and then ICE in that case, ICE
issued the detainer because Williamson County did not
have a 287(g) program. And ICE came and picked up this
lady and put her in immigration court, and whatever
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happened to her after that was up to the federal authorities.
And all she had done was to drive without a license.
Now, those of you that know the background
of driver's licenses here in Tennessee know that,
in February of 2006, the State of Tennessee stopped
giving any driving certificates or driving licenses to
people who were undocumented. Now, we can debate the
pros and cons of that. Remember that these people had
already learned how to drive, they had had a driver's
license, they knew how to drive, they were not a threat to
the streets of the community, and yet the
legislature decides, in its wisdom, to stop issuing
driver's licenses to those people. That was in February of
'06.
Now, a few months later, in October of '06, is when
I was meeting with Sheriff Hall, and so I wanted to know,
"What are you going to do with the 287(g) program? Are
you going to go after those people?" He said, "Absolutely
not." And my wife was there, and she has a steel-trapped
mind; she remembered that. Usually that works to my
disadvantage that she has a steel-trapped mind but not this
time. She remembered every word the sheriff said. And so
he said, "I want you to be on my Advisory Committee.
We're just going to go after dangerous criminal aliens.
That's all we're going to do. And I want you to be on my
Advisory Committee."
Well, I'm as much in favor of getting rid
of dangerous criminals, whether they're aliens or not,
as anybody, as the sheriff. I don't want those people in the
United States. Get them out of here. They give immigrants
a bad name. Drug dealers, murderers, wife beaters, we
don't want those people up here. And so given the sheriffs
assurance that this is how the program was going to work, I
decided to agree to serve on the sheriffs Advisory
Conmmittee.
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Now, I didn't know Sheriff Hall all that well. He
seemed like a nice enough guy to me. He was soft- spoken,
very gentlemanly. I had no reason to doubt that he would
keep his word. And so he brought the 287(g) program to
Nashville, and it started operations I think in April 2007.
This was just a few months after our lunch. And it wasn't
too long until we began to see lots and lots of people being
arrested for no driver's license and then being put into
immigration court.
Now, in the sheriffs Advisory Committee meetings
- I attended every one of them, and I sat there. And at the
second meeting, I said, "Sheriff, we need to make some
changes to this program because you are putting a detainer
on each and every person that is arrested no matter how
minor the charge, and that was not the intent of this
program when it was created by Congress. And that's not
what you are entitled to do under the contract that you
signed with ICE." And I said, "You should work with the
Steering Committee to come up with some criteria to
determine who is a dangerous criminal alien that should be
detained and turned over to ICE. That's what you should
do." And he didn't respond at all. He just ignored my
suggestion. I made it at the next meeting and the next
meeting and the next meeting. Soon it became obvious to
me that he was not going to keep his word.
Here is what he later bragged about in a four-color
brochure that he made up to polish his political image. Let
me read it to you. He cited a statistic that is very important.
He said, "The percentage of foreign-born arrestees nearly
doubled" - now, this is him bragging - "nearly doubled
from 2001 to the inception of 287(g) in April 2007, when
the number reached an all-time high of twelve percent."
Then he said in 2006 - this was the year before his 287(g)
program started. Listen to how many were arrested and put
in the immigration court. "In 2006, the federal
government only identified 151 illegal aliens for removal."
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Now, that's back when ICE had control of who they
put into immigration court. That was before Hall took
control of the process. They had 151, and in the first year
that Hall operated the program, they had something like
3,000. It was pathetic.
Now, the reason the feds only had 151 is because
they only put aggravated felons into immigration court.
They only went after dangerous criminal aliens.
Hall said in a newspaper article, "It is too late to
deport an individual only after a serious crime has been
committed." Did you hear that? We can't wait until these
no-good immigrants commit a serious crime, we've got to
get rid of them now before they do it.
Now, do you understand the significance of
that statement? What Daron Hall was trying to do was
to rewrite U.S. Immigration Policy. That was not
the policy of ICE. That was not the policy of
the Immigration Enforcement. And yet he thought that was
a bad thing.
Let me quote you something from the OIG's office,
Office of Inspector General. They issued a big report in
March of 2010, and here's what they said in that report. It's
a big, thick report. You can google it and get it. But here's
what they said in one place: "According to ICE's July 2009
MOA template, the purpose of collaborations between ICE
and LEAs" - that's Local Enforcement Authorities - "in
the 287(g) program is to identify and process for removal
criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety or a
danger to the community." That's what the inspector
general said. That's the policy that was supposed to be
supporting the 287(g) program. But Daron Hall didn't
agree with that. Daron Hall decided, on his own account,
to change U.S. Federal Immigration Policy in Nashville,
Tennessee.
So you can imagine how outraged I was.
The events that topped the list for why people were
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arrested in Davidson County's 287(g) program every year
was no driver's license. Just exactly what I had feared.
"No driver's license arrests for Hispanics increased
from 23.6 percent pre-287(g) to 49.4 percent post-287(g) in
2007."
Now, it was just not no driver's license. People
were arrested and taken to jail for fishing without a license.
The park patrol would arrest somebody, some poor
Hispanic who was trying to catch a fish for dinner that
night in a metro park to feed his children, and they threw
him in jail. Hall put him into immigration court, and they
would be deported. It happened over and over and over
again. Trespassing, that was one of their favorites. That
means they were not where they were supposed to be.
They would be standing on a corner looking for work, and
the police would come along and arrest them. They weren't
hurting anybody. They were looking for work. It's been
going on in Nashville for decades, but all of a sudden
it became a deportable offense.
Well, let me tell you the case that took the cake, the
thing that really enraged me. One day a woman came into
the office, and she told me that her husband had been
arrested and was in jail. Come to find out that what had
happened was, early one morning he was sitting in a chair
in a laundromat drinking a cup of hot chocolate. A metro
cop came along and said, "What are you doing?" He said,
"I'm sitting here drinking a cup of hot chocolate waiting for
my boss to come and pick me up so I can go to work." And
then the cop said, "Let me see some ID." And so this man
took out his W-7 tax ID number card. He didn't have a
social security card. He didn't have a driver's license. So
he took out the only thing he had, which was a tax ID
number so that he could file taxes on the money he was
earning, and the cop took a look at it. This ignoramus cop
didn't know what it was. He said, "I'm going to arrest you
for criminal impersonation. This is a fake social security
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card." And so there it went, he took him in. This was
the father of a nine-year-old, autistic, U.S. citizen boy.
That's who he had at home.
And so they took him to jail, and they put him up
before the judge in general sessions court in Nashville.
And when he went into the court, the translator - this was
going on a lot back then - a translator would come in and
tell him, "Hey, listen, you need to plead guilty so you can
get out of jail quicker. The judge will let you go if you just
plead guilty. If you don't plead guilty, you're going to have
to stay in here no telling how long." Well, this man heard
another man talk to him in Spanish and said, "He wouldn't
lead me wrong." And so this poor man pled guilty to
criminal impersonation. Can you believe that? And then
Hall slapped a detainer on him.
Well, this woman didn't have a nickel, but she said,
"Can you please help?" And I said, "I will help." So the
first thing I did was to go into court and get his conviction
set aside, and then I took his case. We ultimately got him a
green card because he had been here ten years and he had
an autistic, U.S. citizen son. And I got the immigration
judge to give him a green card. It's called Cancellation of
Removal. And he didn't have any criminal record other
than this bogus criminal simulation charge. And I was so
outraged by that that I wrote an op-ed in the Tennessean,
and the Tennesseean printed it of all things. And let me
read you what I said at the tail end of that editorial.
I said, "Almost half of the approximately
4,000 287(g) detainees have been arrested for such
minor infractions as no driver's license, fishing without
a license, staying in a park after ten o'clock p.m., or
now possession of an IRS card while drinking hot
chocolate." I told them the story earlier in the editorial.
"Then held for civil immigration charges." And then
here's where I really started preaching. I said,
"Business Leaders, 287(g)'s assault on the foreign-born will
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make recruitment of new international business
more difficult." And the Nashville Chamber of Commerce
was trying to get international companies to come
to Nashville. "Religious Leaders, 287(g) is
inflaming hatred and intolerance and destroying family
values by splitting immigration families for as long as ten
years."
What would have happened with that ten-year-old if
that father had not gotten a green card? What would have
happened? Do you think Daron Hall cared? Not one whit.
"Civic Leaders, 287(g) is bringing international
infamy and shame to the city of Nashville, which has now
come to be identified around the world as a city whose jail
denies basic human rights and has engaged in terrorizing
pregnant women by shackling them during labor." That
was the Juana Villegas case that was still grabbing
headlines on the front of the New York Times. This is what
was happening. And then I said, "Nashville, we are better
than this."
Well, it wasn't long after that that I was fired from
the sheriffs Advisory Counsel. Imagine that. And so he
wrote me a hot letter, a two-letter. I felt obliged to write
him a two-letter back. And I'm not going to read you the
whole letter. I've got it here if you want to read it after
the presentation. But let me just read part of it.
I said, "Sheriff, you have transformed the Federal
287(g) Program, designed and intended by Congress to
catch dangerous criminal aliens in partnership with local
law enforcement, into a ruthlessly efficient, local, ethnic
cleansing machine designed to persecute the foreign-born
and purge Nashville of brown-skinned people unwanted by
the xenophobes and racists among us. This program
is causing entire sections of Nashville, especially
along Oliver Road (phonetically), to atrophy, and it will
take decades to rebuild them. No enforcement action
is more responsible for separating immigrants from
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their children and U.S. citizen spouses than your
287(g) program. How you and others of your ilk that
attend church on Sunday and espouse family values can
then operate through the week in a mindless campaign to
tear up families in the Buckle of the Bible Belt is
beyond me. It is your stubborn refusal to honor your word
and build a rational set of criteria for identifying dangerous
criminal aliens that has now led this community to the
Juana Villegas case. By your actions, you have brought
international infamy and shame to the city of Nashville,
which has now come to be identified around the world as a
city whose jail denies basic human rights and has engaged
in terrorizing pregnant women." I hope he read the letter. I
don't know whether he did or not.
Well, it was that night that I got down on my knees
and I asked God's forgiveness for adding any credibility for
enabling this sheriff to establish such a program, and I
made a promise to him that I would try to destroy that
program if I could. So I waited and I waited, and then in
September of 2011, into my office walked a young man
named Daniel Renteria. And Daniel was sitting out in my
waiting room with a plastic bag, and so he came into my
office. He paid the initial consult fee. I had never met the
guy. He was a young man in his early 20s. No, he was 19.
And I said, "Daniel, what have you got in your bag there?"
And he pulled out this bloody shirt. I said, "What
happened?" He said, "Well, I was in a little incident where
persons in another car shot some bullets, and the police
chased the car I was in and the other car. I got out of the
car and ran, and they set some dogs loose, who mauled
me." I said, "Well, what happened after that?" He said, "I
ran home, and they arrested me Sunday night."
Now, let me read you the time line of
what happened. Very interesting. He was booked into jail
on 8/22/2010. This was shortly before he came to
my office. It was 2010, not 2011. The ICE detainer
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was placed on him at 5:57 p.m., about an hour after he
was brought in. At 10:30 they conducted an interview.
That's about five hours after he had been booked in. And
they asked him, "Where were you born?" He said, "I was
born in the United States." He couldn't speak English, but
he said, "I was born in Portland, Oregon." They didn't
believe him, and so they accused him of lying. Then they
accused him of having a fake social security number. They
said, "What is your social security number?" And he told
them, and then they entered the correct social security
number. Oh, that matches, okay. He also had a Tennessee
ID card. Didn't have a driver's license, but he had an ID
card.
Now, 9/3, September the 3rd - remember, he
was arrested on August 22nd. He was kept in jail all
this time on an ICE detainer, couldn't make bail. At
that time they were denying bail to anybody that had
a detainer on them. We have since changed that. We
have gone to court and sued some sheriffs and now they
know better, but back then you couldn't get bond in
Sheriff Hall's jail. The charge was dismissed on 9/3/2010.
I even forgot what they arrested him for, but it
was dismissed. There was no criminal conviction. He
had been arrested August 22nd, in jail all this time.
Now, that's when the court dismissed the charge,
was one p.m. on that day. The ICE detainer
was deactivated by Deputy Ford on 9/3 at 9:56 p.m.,
almost ten o'clock that night. They had kept him in jail all
that time. They didn't believe he was a U.S. citizen. It took
his sister to bring a U.S. passport to the jail and show them
he's a U.S. citizen, and they still didn't turn him loose until
ten o'clock that night. The ICE detainer was not
deactivated until ten o'clock that night, and he still was not
released for another three hours. It was 9/2/2010 at 12:48
a.m., forty-five minutes past midnight. And here he was
sitting in my office, and he wanted to sue somebody. He
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was mad. What he was mad about was getting mauled by
those dogs, but I knew a dog-mauling case was going to be
a thicket. I didn't want to get into that.
But I said, here's what we will do. You are a U.S.
citizen. You see what had happened was, he was born in
Portland, Oregon, and his Mexican parents decided that
they didn't want to be in the U.S. anymore. And they went
back to Mexico back when he was one year old. He grew
up in Mexico, didn't know English, but he was a U.S.
citizen. And so he came back about a year before he came
to my office. And I said to him, "We're going to sue the
sheriff." And so that's exactly what we did. Renteria v.
Metro Government.
Now, here was our theory of the case: Our theory
of the case was that Sheriff Hall did not have the authority
to enter into that 287(g) agreement. He signed it, the feds
signed it. But it was null and void because he didn't have
the authority to sign that document because it gave him law
enforcement authority that he did not have the right to have
under the Metro Charter.
I had grown up in Nashville. I remember
Judge Beverly Briley. He had more sense when he was
drunk than most people do when they're sober. He was
a brilliant man. And he set up Metro Government, and
I remember when it was set up. All the law
enforcement authority was given to the Metro Nashville
Police Department, but they were stuck with the sheriff,
what are we going to do with this sheriff because it was
a constitutional office; they couldn't just eliminate it. And
so they told the sheriff, "We're going to give you
the authority to keep the jail." That's the only thing
you can do, is keep the jail, but you cannot exercise
law enforcement authority inside Davidson County.
And Sheriff Hall had signed the 287(g) agreement that
gave him all kinds of law enforcement authority,
including signing the detainers to keep people in jail
130
Summer 2013 1 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 132
beyond the time that they should have been released. So
we took it to chancery court first. Metro insisted on
naming the feds. After they came in as a defendant, they
moved it to federal court. Fine with us. And then Judge
Sharp referred it to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and there
we were.
I had to make a choice, what was I going to
do before the Tennessee Supreme Court. Well, I've
argued before the supreme court before. Years back I
was counsel in the case of Clinton v. Cain-Sloan. Those
of you that are students here, go look it up when you leave
here. That is the granddaddy of all retaliatory discharge
common law in Tennessee. Some of you might have heard
of the case. And the lawyer on the other side of that case
was Bill Harbison, and at that time we were arguing in
front of Bill Harbison's father, William Harbison, on the
supreme court. I'll let you go and look up the outcome of
the case. But that's when Bill Harbison and I began to
know each other.
Now, this is the same Bill Harbison that was just
elected as president of the Tennessee Bar Association just
this year. And so we made the decision that we were going
to ask Bill Harbison to argue this case before the Tennessee
Supreme Court. We had Dan Kesselbrenner of the
National Immigration Project helping us. And the reason
we made that decision is because all the justices on the
supreme court knew Bill Harbison, all of them. Some of
them might have known me, but the difference is, Bill was
famous and I was infamous. And so I thought they rather
hear somebody famous than somebody infamous.
So we made the presentation. I think we were right
on the law as it existed at that time. Bill Harbison did a
wonderful job, a remarkable job. He's one of the greatest
lawyers in this state. Then about two weeks before the
supreme court came out with its decision, guess what
happened? I opened up the Tennessean, and I fell back into
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my chair in shock. Two things: Number one, Daron Hall
announced, "I'm going to discontinue the 287(g) program."
This was after we had already argued the case to the
Tennessee Supreme Court. And then Saul Solomon, Metro
legal director, came out and said, "We're going to amend
the Metro Charter to make sure that there's no more
confusion about who can do what. We're going to let the
sheriff do a few law enforcement things, but he's going to
have to do it in collaboration with the police department."
And so they proposed the Metro Charter amendment that
was adopted last November. Two weeks later, the
Tennessee Supreme Court came out with its decision and
ruled against us.
I still think we were right on the law, and the only
way the supreme court was able to rule against us was, they
rewrote the law that had been the law for fifty years in a
case called Metro v. Poe, which said the sheriff cannot have
any law enforcement authority interpreting the Metro
Charter. Sheriff Robert Poe at the time. And that was their
prerogative to do that.
And I sat there in my chair and reflected on it, and I
said to myself, "Self, you lost the battle, but you won the
war. There is no more 287(g) in Nashville." One of the
proudest achievements of my life. So that's the story of
287(g) in Nashville, and that's why I don't recommend that
any community bring 287(g) because you have some
ambitious, local law enforcement officers that will use that
program to demigod against immigrants and try to ride it to
higher office.
Now, those of you that can, I want you to come to
Nashville. When you drive by my office on Murfreesboro
Road, in about three weeks you are going to see two big
statues. Each one of them is fifteen-feet-high. One is
going to be on the right side of the door, and the other one
is going to be on the left side of the door. One of the
statues is the Statue of Liberty holding up the torch, and the
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other statue is Lady Justice holding out the scales. I had a
person in my office one day ask me, "Why in the world are
you doing this?" I said, I want to remind every person,
whether they're an employee walking in our door or a
client walking in our door, I want to remind every
single person - or just driving by - that what is going on
in this office is a fulfillment of our Pledge of Allegiance to
the United States of America, Liberty. and Justice for All.
So thank you. It's been a pleasure.
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PANEL DISCUSSION II:
ANALYZING THE IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND How




MR. BOCK: We will go ahead and get started with our
Analyzing the Immigration Process panel. We will give
each panelist twenty minutes to speak, and then we will
have a forty-five minute Q- and A- period. Our
first panelist is Jeremy Jennings. Jeremy is the
principal attorney at Jennings Immigration Law Office here
in Knoxville. He graduated from Sturm College of Law
at the University of Denver in 1998. Since then
he's accrued a wide array of immigration
experience, appearing before immigration courts in
Memphis, Atlanta, Miami, and Oakdale, Louisiana.
Our second panelist will be Tricia Herzfeld. Tricia
is senior counsel at Ozment Law in Nashville. Ms.
Herzfeld focuses her practice on the criminal defense of
immigrants, counseling, and constitutional law.
Our third panelist will be Karla McKanders. Karla
is an associate professor here at the University of
Tennessee College of Law. I've had the privilege
of working with her this semester, and she's really
opened up my eyes to the power of imnmigration law and
the process of law to help immigrants coming from
some really difficult situations. So without further ado, I'll
turn it over to Jeremy and we'll get started.
JEREMY JENNINGS: A couple of caveats before I start.
Totally the other extreme after Elliott's presentation. Very
inspirational. Thanks to Elliott for sharing that story. We
are going to dig into a few nuts and bolts here. And if
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you're an immigration practitioner, I apologize, you can go
to sleep right now because this is before 101 in
immigration. Along with our topic, Analyzing the Process,
I wanted to give the criminal defense or the criminal law
attorneys out there an idea of what you're doing impacts
what we're doing. We've talked all about it today, but we
haven't talked about where does it actually happen and
when. So I wanted to give you a flavor of when that occurs
and when we see this.
And I use immigration broadly because
it encompasses the State Department, it
encompasses Homeland Security, all the different facets
of immigration, and so I just use immigration broadly.
Criminal convictions impact, in
immigration, basically four terms that we use, but they
really go to the heart and have everything to do with
immigration. The first is admissibility. Admissibility is
broadly who can come. Second, it impacts removability.
And removability is basically who can stay, or to
the corollary, who can we remove or deport. The third
thing that convictions impact is good moral character.
That's basically what it sounds like, who is essentially a
good person. And finally, in a relatively new
development, criminal convictions impact the ability to
petition for someone, and that's the process by which you're
trying to bring someone to the United States through
the immigration system.
So what is admissibility? Who can come.
And these are the grounds that the law is not to exclude
an individual from obtaining a visa or gaining admission
to the United States. So think about the very beginning
scenario. You're from Spain, and you want to get an
employment or a student or a visitor visa to come to the
United States. Well, the job of the U.S. Embassy or the
consulate in that country is to determine whether or not you
are admissible, whether or not you meet the criteria to be
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granted the visa to come to the United States. So that's
what we call a consular visa application. The person is in
the foreign country, and they are applying for the initial
grant, the actual visa that goes in the passport, the
permission to travel to the United States in a particular
status.
Now, that person gets their visa. They've passed the
admissibility determination from the U.S. Consulate, and
they get on the airplane. And they fly to the United States,
and if any of you travel, you know what happens: You get
in line, citizens go here, everybody else goes over there.
Well, what's happening, that's a port of entry - the
airports, land crossings, sea crossings. If you have ever
gone on a cruise, you've had to go back through
immigration as well. These are ports of entry, and the
officer at the port of entry makes the final determination
about whether or not someone is allowed to enter the
United States, not the state department who granted the visa
to you in the first instance, although that's the first step you
have to do. But at the port of entry, the officer there is
making essentially the determination of admissibility to
determine whether or not to allow you into the United
States.
A third scenario about admissibility is what we call
Adjustment of Status. An Adjustment of Status is the
process of obtaining lawful permanent resident status from
within the United States. So if someone is here typically in
some other type of temporary legal status and they have
become eligible to apply for lawful permanent resident
status or a green card without having to leave the country,
then that process is called Adjustment of Status.
This is where it gets a little bit confusing because,
although it's not technically an admission, Adjustment of
Status does require admissibility, and some of the language
uses the language of admission. So it's resulted in some
case law to clarify this, and that's really a lot more than I
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need to go into for you today, other than to tell you that
Adjustment of Status, the process of applying for a green
card in the United States, also reviews a person's
admissibility.
Now, I'm not going to go over this and
you probably can't read that anyway. Section 212 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act lays out the grounds
of inadmissibility. Only one section of that are
criminal grounds. There's many grounds of
inadmissibility. But when reviewing inadmissibility, we go
to Section 212. I think the next panel is probably going to
go into more detail about the specifics of these things. I'm
just going to throw out a few words that you've already
heard today. Moral turpitude, aggravated felonies,
controlled substances. Three big things that you are going
to deal with commonly in admissibility.
Removability - who can stay, the grounds
to remove or deport an individual who is already present
in the United States. Now, these are not the same as
the grounds of inadmissibility. They were located in
two different parts of the statute, 212 versus 237, and
they are not identical. So some things that make
you removable are not something that would make you
inadmissible. What are some common scenarios?
Well, obviously we're talking about removability, so the
person is already in the United States. Well, a lot of what
we talked about today, booking, especially now
with Secured Communities, and I don't know that we
have talked about Secured Communities yet, but basically
what it is - and I think it's nationwide now. I think it's
nationwide that, every person who is booked into the jail,
their fingerprints are automatically sent to the FBI, doesn't
matter who it is, every single person. As I understand it,
the FBI is now forwarding those fingerprints to the
Immigration Service for them to do an immigration
review. This program is called Secured Communities.
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And it's the result of that Secured Communities booking
that is resulting in the detainers these days that we see. I
think Tim Arnold showed the huge jump, the expediential
jump, and talked about the technology changes. A lot of
that is as a result of Secured Communities because, every
single person who is being booked, those prints are now
going to the Immigration Service and giving them
an opportunity to issue detainers.
It's not just booking. It's also convictions for
criminal activity. Well, you think it's not necessarily the
same thing. For an example, somebody came to me with a
case recently. The guy was booked a long time ago, but his
case is still coming up. And he did not go to jail at that
particular time, but he's running the risk of a sexual abuse
felony. Well, although they didn't catch him at booking,
one of two things can happen: They might catch him if
he's convicted at the time; they're going to get him when
he goes to jail, or if not, he's probably going to go on a sex
offender registry. And ICE commonly reviews
and controls things like sex offender registries and
things like this to determine who are people who are
removable from the United States, so these database checks
are resulting from criminal convictions.
Adjustment of Status we've already talked about,
but as part of the Adjustment of Status process, you've got
to go to what's called an Application Support Center and
give them what they call biometrics, which is your
fingerprints and your photograph and your signature. Well,
one of the reasons they take those things is to perform the
criminal background check to determine are you
admissible, are you removable from the United States?
Adjustment of Status - getting the green card
in the first instance. Then you've got to renew the
green card. It may be two years later, it may be ten years
later, but at some point you've got to renew that green
card. So again, they are going to require biometrics.
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They're going to review your criminal history, prior
to renewing the green card, to determine whether you
have done anything in the interim that makes you
removable from the United States.
Naturalization - the process of becoming a
U.S. citizen. Again, biometrics is required at
the Application Support Center to determine the same
kinds of things as we talked about. And basically
any process, any immigration process that
requires fingerprinting, is giving them the opportunity,
and really the responsibility, to determine whether or
not there's something in your background that makes
you removable. It could be an asylum application. It
could be TPS, which is Temporary Protected Status.
More recently it might be deferred action or the DACA
program that some of you might be familiar with. Brand
new, provisional hardship waivers are requiring
criminal background checks to determine whether or not
you meet the discretionary requirements for that. Anytime
that immigration is collecting - and they're increasing
the scenarios in which they're doing so - collecting
your biometrics, they're running those through the
database to determine whether or not somebody is
removable.
Removability, again, you can't see these, but's it's
Section 237(a). And I'm going to trust the next panel to
talk about those things in detail. But one of the big things
is aggravated felonies. You have heard a lot about this
today. Aggravated felony is a defined term. It's in Section
101 of the Immigration Nationality Act. And it lays out, it
enumerates what the aggravated felonies are. And it's one
of Congress's favorite things lately to expand and expand
and expand what falls under the definition of aggravated
felony, and not just that, the courts do it too. So,
for example, what constitutes - sexual abuse of a minor
is something that's commonly subject to case law. A
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crime of violence. What is a crime of violence? That
is subject to case law a lot. Good moral character.
Essentially the question is, Are you a good person?
Immigration law defines this in the negative. It doesn't say
who a person of good moral character is. It says who a
person of good moral character is not. And it does this also
in Section 101, and it lays out the statutory ineligibility. So
there's a whole list of things that, if you have done these,
then statutorily you are not a person of good moral
character.
And importantly, aggravated felony is
permanent bar to good moral character. So talking about
the permanence of the aggravated felony convictions, one
of them is permanent bar to good moral character.
Now, good moral character is not just statutory, it's
also discretionary. So just because you don't meet one
of the statutory ineligibilities there, they also have
the discretionary ability to look beyond that to
determine whether or not they think you meet good moral
character. Historically I think immigration uses this
discretionary power quite often, particularly in a
naturalization application, where if you have hardly any
criminal conviction at all within a five-year period with
good moral character required for naturalization, that
they will often times use that against you to deny
your application, make you wait five years from the time
of the incident, and then establish your five years from that
point.
But the important thing is, good moral character is
not limited to criminal convictions. So when do we see
good moral character, are you a good person? The most
common one is naturalization, when an individual is
applying to become a U.S. citizen.
Second is Cancellation of Removal, which is what Elliott
was able to obtain for - which one? I forget.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The guy drinking the
hot chocolate.
JEREMY JENNINGS: Yeah, the hot chocolate
drinker with the ITIN card. Cancellation of Removal
requires three things for non-lawful permanent
immigrants: Ten years of continuous residence in the
United States, good moral character, and then extreme and
unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident, spouse, parent, or child. So good moral character
in a Cancellation of Removal scenario. Voluntary
departure: Voluntary departure is an avenue of relief in
the immigration court where essentially they're going to go
home. There's just no way around it. They don't have any
form of relief other than leaving the country. They can do
it under an order of deportation, which carries an official
deportation against them in a bar of the re-entry, or they
can do it under voluntary departure in which they agree to
leave the country on their own, at their own expense,
and avoid deportation on their record and avoid penalty
of deportation. But it requires a showing of good
moral character, and the judge will listen to the factors
to determine whether or not they have met that
requirement.
Finally, probably the least common these days is
registry, and registry is a commission that allows somebody
who has been here, I think it's from 1972 - I think it's
January 1st, 1972 - and if a person has continuously
resided in the United States from that period of time up to
the present, then they can apply for registry;
essentially "we've been here so long, you can't kick us out"
kind of thing. But part of that requirement is again
showing of good moral character. That is Section 101,
good moral character.
The ability to petition. Can I bring someone to the
United States? Now, this is relatively new, and it's a twist.
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Everything else that we have talked about so far is looking
at the non-U.S. citizen and their ability to either come to
the United States or remain in the United States or apply
for some type of benefit in the United States. This one is
different because it looks at the U.S. citizen and also the
lawful permanent resident to determine whether their
behavior restricts them from being involved in the
immigration process. And the most common way that we
see this is through what we call an Alien Relative Petition,
which is a petition that someone files typically for their
spouse or their parent or maybe their child. It could also be
siblings, if you are a U.S. citizen. Their ability to file
an Alien Relative Petition or also a fiance petition -
One thing I want say. You never know when a U.S.
citizen is going to be interested in marrying someone from
another country, so don't write that off, but be especially
aware of a situation where you're advising a lawful
permanent resident about what's called a specified offense
against a minor because, just by nature of their coming
from another country, the likelihood that they might be
wanting to eventually marry someone from another country
or that they have got relatives from another country that
they're interested in bringing over is going to be impacted
by the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act. So just don't
write it off if your client is a U.S. citizen, but be
particularly aware of it if your client is a lawful
permanent resident.
Specified offense against a minor terminates the
ability to petition on behalf of the Foreign National, and I
will go into this one a little because it's something the other
panel may not. It enumerates them: solicitation to engage
in sexual conduct, child pornography, criminal sexual
conduct involving a minor or any conduct that by its nature
is a sex offense against a minor. So that's kind of the
catchall. And there is an avenue of relief if you can
demonstrate, at the sole discretion of the attorney general,
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that the person will not be a risk, but it's a huge hassle to go
through. So be especially careful when you're dealing with
offenses like this and giving advice about immigration
consequences there.
Two more notes before I pass on my turn.
Outstanding warrants. If an individual with an outstanding
warrant appears before DHS, including U.S. citizens, DHS
may alert the appropriate law officials for arrest during an
immigration appointment. Let's say your spouse and the
two of you go to the immigration office in Memphis, the
U.S. citizen and their alien spouse. The U.S. citizen has an
outstanding warrant. Well, immigration is not performing
biometrics yet, but they are checking the backgrounds by
name, social security number, whatever other means are
available to them, I guess, to determine whether or not the
U.S. citizen has the ability to petition, and it's something
you need to be aware of. Don't send your clients to
immigration if there are unresolved criminal issues.
And finally something that is very hot off the press,
immigration announced last week customer identity
verification. And again, it's just giving immigration one
more opportunity to collect your biometrics before they do
something with your immigration status, and this is after
you have submitted initially your biometrics to them for
review. When you go to the appointment, they're going to
take your biometrics again to confirm that you are the
person that you say that you are. So the person who is
appearing for the appointment is actually the person who
gave the fingerprints at the prior time. And this is going
to involve adjustment interviews, naturalization interviews
anytime that you go for a benefit to the local immigration
office for temporary travel or parole or lawful permanent
resident stamp. That's it for me.
TRICIA HERZFELD: I'm Tricia Herzfeld. I practice with
Elliott over in Nashville. How many public defenders or
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criminal practitioners do we have in here? How many
people think you might want to do that? I'm sorry I missed
this morning's panel; I had a horrible cold, so there may be
some overlap, and I'm terribly sorry if there is. I've been
doing criminal immigration law with Elliott now for just a
little bit under a year. I started out my career as a public
defender in Miami, and I will tell you I violated Padilla
probably a hundred thousand times in Miami. Padilla
wasn't law then; we didn't know. As a public defender, you
are busy, your case loads are extraordinary, you are
trying to get the best deal you can for your client,
minimize their time, and make sure that they are not
pleading to something they're not guilty of or they're
doing something in their best interest; however, I will
tell you that over and over and over again I would say to
my client, "It's okay," "You're Cuban," "They will just
send you over to (inaudible)," "You'll spend six months
there, and you'll go away," or "It's not a felony, so
that's fine," "Immigration is not deporting people who are
not convicted of felonies." Or in Florida we have a
thing called a Withhold of Adjudication, so you plead
guilty. There's technically a crime there, but they never
enter the formal adjudication of guilt. We were all
so brilliant. We just thought that meant you didn't have
a conviction and nobody would ever bust you on it.
We were wrong. All of us were wrong, and as a whole, as
a bar, we continued to tell immigrants over and over
and over again, "This won't affect you," "This won't
affect you," "Immigration is not deporting on this," "You're
fine," "You go ahead and take this plea," "Get your time
and get out."
Times have changed substantially since then. And
when I think about all that advice that I gave to all of my
immigrant clients over and over again, a little bit of it
makes me want to throw up because I'm just like, oh, my
God, I was absolutely ineffective, I absolutely did this over
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and over again, not because I had bad intent, not because I
wanted to hurt these people but because the law was
different and I didn't know.
Now, we are very fortunate that the bar in Miami,
the bench, has agreed almost uniformly that when there's an
immigration issue, they are just wiping the slate clean and
letting people re-plea if they need to, which has been
particularly helpful. But in places like Nashville or
Tennessee, that's not quite so easy. Miami's population is
primarily immigrant-based. You've got first- and second-
born, first- and second-generation Americans, but generally
the bar and the bench are very, very adept to dealing with
immigration issues. Tennessee, our population is not so
big, and the bar and the bench aren't quite as used to
dealing with that. So kind of getting into the specifics of
Tennessee law and how that affects things in immigration
court has been a particularly challenging thing.
Name that plea. So one of the things that I've been
working on since I've been with Elliott - and I should tell
you, I don't know if you have my bio or not, I was at the
American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee before I came
over to work with Elliott. And I think you can all see his
passion and his just incredible dedication to the work with
immigrants and this state, and that is the reason I left the
ACLU. This man just absolutely bowled me over with his
work and dedication and passion and got me to leave
ACLU and come to work with him, and I just could not be
happier. I really think that the immigrant population
in Tennessee is probably the one population, although
there are many, that really is under-represented and
doesn't have a voice and isn't really heard about or from,
and without his courageous work, I don't think half
the people would even be here knowing this stuff today.
So some specifics about when you're
advising Tennessee's immigrants in criminal court. How
many immigration status categories do you need to
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worry about? Like you're the public defender,
you're appointed on a case, or you're retained in my case.
What do you say? "Are you legal?" Is that your
first question? I don't know. "Do you have any U.S.
citizen relatives?" "What age were you when you got
here?" There's a million. And again, I didn't realize the
complications of this until many, many years later in my
practice. And the answer is, you have to worry about all of
them. There are a million and one different scenarios that
each client could be facing. You don't know if they are a
lawful permanent resident. Do they have derivative
citizenship in some way? Do they have temporary
protected status? Are they eligible for DREAM Act Light
as we call it, DACA, DREAM relief? Are they eligible for
a visa somewhere, Cancellation of Removal? All of those
things - and there are a million more - should all factor
into your decision of what plea you're allowing somebody
to take or not take.
In my own personal practice, I pled a guy to a third
very minor misdemeanor who had temporary
protected status, and anybody who knows anything about
that knows it's two or more and you're done. Actually I
think I pled him to a second. That's what I did. I pled him
to a second. I didn't know. I didn't know. It
was something I hadn't researched sufficiently, and I
will tell you, it's quite embarrassing to walk to a judge you
don't know very well and say, "I'm sorry, I was
just absolutely ineffective." And I did. I turned around,
I went and got the answer. Something kind of said to me, I
don't really know that I should be pleading this guy to this,
but I did it because everybody in the courtroom said, yes,
yes, yes. The public defender in the courtroom said, "No,
no, it's fine," "He should be fine," "It's an Under
Advisement Plea," which is something we have in
Nashville. And we can talk about it in a minute. "It doesn't
count. It doesn't count." I should have trusted my gut
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because, truthfully, it does count. But my gut at the time
told me I don't know. The public defender was like, "No,
no, everybody does this, everybody does this," and I went
along with it because we do this. It doesn't matter how
many years you've been practicing, you get nervous, you
think, "Okay, everybody else is doing it, I don't want to be
the cog in the wheel."
But I went out, I called Elliott, who was fantastic in
taking my call. And I said, "Hey, I think I might have done
something wrong here." I found out absolutely I had done
something wrong. And so for all the criminal practitioners
or people who want to be criminal practitioners, your job is
to claim yourself ineffective if you have been. I was
absolutely ineffective in what I did that day. I did not
properly advise my client. I am not embarrassed about
that. I am not ashamed. That is something that is your
job. If you mess up, you've got to go in and say it, and
you've got to go in and fix it because your client
doesn't know you messed up. He would probably have to
find four or five different lawyers before somebody is
going to realize the technicality of your mistake. I did,
okay. I knew it, and I knew it immediately.
So I walked right back into court and said to the
judge, "Guess what? I screwed up." It's called the practice
of law for a reason, and every now and then we mess up. "I
need to vacate this plea, please." Now, of course, the
district attorney gave me a problem. Blah, blah, blah, and I
said, "Look, you can do it one way or the other. I can find
an attorney that is going to go ahead and post-convict me
right now, we can go ahead and do that. And we can go
through the process in doing all that, or we can go up to the
judge while the file is still right and fresh right there. We
can move it to another date so I have a little bit more time
to research the immigration consequences." And guess
what they did? Nobody wanted to deal with post-
conviction petition. They knew I would, but I think they
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might have been a little bit shocked that I was willing
to post-convict myself.
And so I just want to make that point to all of you.
Don't be afraid to say, "I don't know." Don't be afraid to
ask questions, and don't be afraid to say, "I screwed up
because we all screw up." That's how it goes. I think the
important thing is to make sure that you identify it and you
take responsibility for it. Anyway, that was kind of an
aside.
So there's a million different immigration things
that you need to worry about. The DREAM Act is one that
is relatively new. They have to do with significant
misdemeanors and insignificant misdemeanors, and they
are not particularly well-defined. So those are things that
you want to watch out for: How old your client was when
they came, if they have derivative citizenship, if they have
any type of immigration relief that you pleading them
guilty to a particular crime could affect.
So here's where we are talking about diversion.
Was there already a panel on diversion this morning? Ok,
good. So let's talk specifically about diversion
in Tennessee. Everybody thinks, if you get a
diversion plea, that's great, it doesn't show up on your
record, awesome, total freebie, your one get-out-of-jail-free
card. Does diversion work for immigration court? Can
you tell by my voice? No, it does not work for immigration
court. And why is that? Tennessee has two technical types
of diversions but probably four or five in actual practice. It
took me quite a while to figure this out when I moved my
practice from Miami. Judicial diversion, the first one -
some counties, that's all they do. I practice in Nashville but
then all the surrounding counties. And in Nashville,
sometimes you can get judicial diversion.
In Cheatham County, for example, I asked for
judicial diversion on a case, and they're like, "Yeah,
we don't do that here." And I said, "But it's in the statute."
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"Yeah, we just don't do that here. The judge - oh, no,
that's pretrial, sorry, the judge only does judicial
diversion." That's what they said. If you look at the statute
here, judicial diversion requires you to plead guilty. So you
actually stand up, and you stand in front of the judge. Yes,
yes, I did it, and then the judge says, "Well, I will accept
your plea of guilty, but I'm going to withhold entering it."
Kind of the same thing I was talking to you about that we
used to do in Florida. The person says, "I'm guilty," but
then it's not actually put into the record as guilty.
Everybody thinks that therefore it's not a guilty plea
for immigration purposes, just like we thought in
Florida, but the truth of the matter is, it is. Most
people don't understand that. Most of the judges
don't understand that. Certainly the district attorneys
don't understand it, and I would say ninety-five percent of
the criminal defense bar does not understand this point.
So it's your job to educate them.
The good one: pretrial diversion. So
pretrial diversion is the good one, and if you are ever going
for diversion, that's the one you want to try to get. And
that's the one that all sorts of counties will say, "We don't
do that." Pretrial diversion stops the prosecution right
where it's at. So you have gone in for your day, whether it's
for arraignment or your first appearance or plea date, and
you say, "I want pretrial diversion." It's like the iron
curtain, bam, stops right there that day. No admission of
guilt, no adjudication. Everything is just put on hold.
You'll go do your pre-service hours, whatever it is they
want you to do. You come back, the case is dismissed, and
it's off your record, versus judicial diversion, the one that
we had before where you actually have to go in, plead
guilty, you go do your fifty community service hours, you
come back, they wipe it off your record. See the
difference? The deal is - and the reason that prosecutors
and the bench tend to like judicial diversion better is
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because, if you mess up, they already have a guilty plea
that they can hang over your head, versus pretrial diversion,
you've got to start that whole process again. But then
there's this funny thing in Davidson County called Under
Advisement Pleas. Go ahead and google it, you won't find
it. It doesn't exist in any of the books. It's not a statute. It's
not anywhere. It's just its own little animal that's been
made up in Davidson County, and probably you have them
in other counties. An Under Advisement Plea is very, very
similar to judicial diversion, but the district attorneys in
Nashville, whose heart is supposedly, some of them, in the
right place, thinks that it's basically judicial diversion
where you get up and you plead guilty and they withhold
everything. But you can only get one of those generally
throughout your life. You kind of get your one diversion
plea. So they'll do them all the time and not do them under
the statute because then they're not taking your one
free one. So you go in, and as a new practitioner
in Nashville, just like, "Okay, I know I want
pretrial diversion, I won't want judicial." You know that.
"I want pretrial, I don't want judicial. I want pretrial, I
don't want judicial." You've got it all in your head, and the
prosecutor says, like they did to me, "I'll give you Under
Advisement." What is Under Advisement? I'm googling
it, I'm looking. Does anyone know what
Under Advisement is? And, oh, yeah, yeah, it means they
don't enter anything, it's all good. It's really judicial.
They're just not keeping a record of it. So for any of you
who end up practicing in Nashville or any other counties,
that's what that is.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Do you know why they created
that animal in Davidson County?
TRICIA HERZFELD: I think because they wanted people
to get more than one. No, not really. That's the best
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answer anybody has been able to give me. So a bunch of
other lawyers will tell me, "Oh, it's all right," "I pled him to
a misdemeanor," "It's totally fine," "Immigration is not
going to get him," "It's not a felony," "I pled him to a
misdemeanor, all good." No, not necessarily all good. So
misdemeanor convictions can also be incredibly
problematic for immigrants regardless. Domestic assault,
for example, can be a killer for an immigrant. Domestic
cases are really, really hard. Drug cases, any sort of DUI,
child abuse - there's all sorts of things that can count.
We have talked about crimes of moral turpitude. There's
a million and one reasons that misdemeanors just
generally aren't safe. A lot of practitioners think that
they are, misdemeanors are safe. No, you need to be
careful.
You should expunge eligible convictions.
Everybody thinks yes. If you have got the opportunity to
expunge a conviction, you absolutely want to do that
because it's not on your record, goes away. The answer is
no, it never, ever, ever, ever goes away for immigration
purposes. And then what happens is, you have a
practitioner like Mr. Ozment who is trying to prove that
you didn't plead to this or you did your diversion or
whatever, but if the stuff has been expunged, it means
there's no court file left. So now you are stuck in a position
where you have to take the word of the government
because you don't have a court file to prove that it's not
what they're saying it is or that it was dismissed under
favorable terms. So everybody thinks just expunge it and
get it off your record and that'll be so much safer, but in
reality it's counter to your intuition here. You want to
make sure you can hold that because the government will
have those documents, and you want the benefit of
having those too.
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JEREMY JENNINGS: And another thing about this
is, your client often thinks they don't have to
tell immigration about it if it's been expunged, which
means when they go to show up for their appointment, they
get a misrepresentation charge against them because
they have said, "Have you ever been arrested or convicted"
and they say "no." They have to be disclosed to
immigration even if they have been expunged.
TRICIA HERZFELD: And when you're talking to
your client, ask about things that have been expunged,
ask about things that were just dismissed because
generally they don't understand that they were dismissed
under one of these diversion pleas that you need to know
about. And sometimes they'll say, "Have you ever been
convicted of a crime" and they tell me "no." Fifteen times
they'll tell me no. And then I'll say, well, have you
ever gotten busted for weed? Oh, yeah. Have you ever
gotten busted - oh, yeah, for driving, yeah, tons of
times, and, oh, and there was that one DUI. Sometimes
you need to go through very, very specifically with your
clients the types of cases that we see our immigrant
clients being arrested and convicted for all the time,
like driver's license cases, because sometimes they
just don't consider those to be crimes.
And my last point is, and this is probably a little bit
more complicated, but are probation sentences treated as
incarceration for immigration purposes? This is kind of
complicated when you start getting into aggravated felonies
and these types of things. And the answer is, it depends.
So you want to watch this. In order to get a probation
sentence in Tennessee, you have to be sentenced to a
suspended amount of incarceration. So when you look at
the plea agreement, the plea agreement will say, for
example, two years suspended, special condition
probation. Now, we all see that as they got a two-year
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probation sentence, and isn't that fantastic? However,
Tennessee law mandates that in order to be able to be given
a probation sentence, it has to go along with a suspended
sentence of incarceration. I have never seen that in any
other state that I practiced. Dan may know if it's a
more common thing. I personally haven't seen it before.
But the reason that this is a problem is because when
you start getting into calculating how much time
somebody was sentenced to for various purposes, for
aggravated felonies or whatever, suspended sentences
count for incarceration. So if you've got a three-year
suspended sentence and they're trying to determine if you're
an aggravated felon, that's about the same so far as they're
concerned. And in Tennessee even, if the judge is trying to
give you straight probation and they're trying to indicate
that "we don't think that what you did was that bad, so
we're going to give you straight probation," it doesn't
matter because, in order to have straight probation in
Tennessee, it has to correlate with the suspended sentence
of incarceration and suspended sentences count for
immigration purposes in certain contexts. So you want to
be very, very careful about that. We've had that come up
with our clients quite often, and it's a difficult thing to try
and get out of. So that's pretty much all I have. I could
talk for hours, so you all should shut me up. And we'll
let Karla go.
KARLA McKANDERS: Hello, everyone. I'm going to
switch gears significantly now and go from an explanation
of the criminal side and the implications on the
immigration system to talk about the actual
civil immigration process, how it works, and specifically
how there are many due process violations that occur in
the immigration civil context.
Before I get started, I definitely wanted to thank
Katie and the TJLP for this putting together. On our long
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drive over to Memphis, we talked about the conference in
October and then came back this semester, and I found out
it was all organized. So congratulations for putting
together such a wonderful seminar.
Since President Obama began his second term, top
priority for his administration has been of
course immigration reform - we hear it all over the news
- and wanting to fix the broken immigration system.
One of the top priorities or special attention has been given
to especially Latino voters who have been dissatisfied with
the lack of progress on immigration reform and the failure
to move forward on immigration reform during Obama's
first term in office.
So in my presentation, I want to focus specifically
on the constitutional due process violations that result from
a civil immigration removal system that is based on
Fundamental Fairness Standard under the Fifth
Amendment. I propose that considering immigration
reform, the lack of due process rights afforded to
immigrants during their removal proceedings has to be a
topic of primary concern when we think about immigration
reform.
The due process crisis has been documented
in circuit courts. The American Immigration
Council recently issued a report, which I have placed in
your materials, which is called Two Systems of Justice,
How the Immigration System Falls Short of the
American Ideals of Justice. The National Lawyers Guild
also has issued a report, and senators have been testifying
about how due process has to be brought back into
the immigration removal proceedings.
The lack of due process rights in the immigration
system range from lack of legal representation, as
immigrants in the system aren't guaranteed any form of
representation by an attorney; the lack or failure to provide
bond determination for immigrants who are detained; and
154
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 156
also, in some instances, the lack of the procedural
safeguards that come along with having protections of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in immigration proceedings.
So what I want to cover briefly is to first give you
an overview because I know a lot of you don't practice in
the area of immigration law, to give you an idea of how a
case progresses through the immigration system. Then I'll
talk about the Fifth Amendment, due process standard,
which, in my opinion, results in a watered-down protection
for immigrants and specifically poor immigrants and
immigrants of color. And then I will talk about how
Congress, over the years, has eroded the due process
standard, and specifically some of our co-presenters have
talked about 1996 congressional changes. So I will talk
about those. And then finally I'll talk about what reforms
are necessary in order to bring back a due process standard
to some civil immigration proceedings.
I want to start with an example first of how due
process violations result in removal proceedings. I have a
case that comes from the ACLU, which talks about an
immigrant, a 52-year-old grandmother was imprisoned for
seven months in New Jersey. She was a long-time Green
Card holder or lawful permanent resident with three U.S.
citizen children and two U.S. citizen grandchildren.
Immigration officers came to her home and arrested her in
the spring of 2011.
Under the mandatory custody provisions enacted in
1996, she could not be released from immigration prison
because she had a nine-year-old minor drug possession
offense. She had not been sentenced to any jail time for
that offense, and it was her only conviction during the
thirty years that she had been in the United States. The
Federal Government didn't permit her to ask the judge to
release her on bond because of this old conviction that she
had. And she had posed no danger to anyone and was not a
flight risk. So this is an example of how, mainly through
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the 1996 provisions that I will talk about in a second, how
immigrants may be detained for an old conviction and not
given bond pending their immigration court proceedings.
Just to give you an idea of what happens after the
case goes into an immigration court, the Department of
Homeland Security will issue what's called a Notice to
Appear, and the Notice to Appear is a complaint against the
immigrant saying that they are inadmissible or removable
from the United States. And it has the charges to which an
immigrant is to, say, admit the allegations, admit that
they're removable or inadmissible into the United States,
and then assert that they have a defense to remain in the
country or take what's called Voluntary Departure in
some instances.
An immigrant, like I indicated before, does not have
the right or access to counsel when they come into
immigration court proceedings. If you went to immigration
court in Memphis, you would be provided a list of
attorneys that possibly can provide their services at a
reduced rate or a list to the community legal center, which
would refer you to attorneys that can help you with your
case for no cost.
Once you are in the immigration system, you have
what is called a Master Calendar Hearing. And at that
Master Calendar Hearing, you have to go before the judge
and admit or deny the allegations and assert that you have a
defense to removal or no defense to be removed from the
country.
If you have a defense to removal, you are
then moved ahead and given a date for an individual
hearing. And at this hearing you can present evidence to
why "I can't be removed from the country." You can
assert asylum, you can assert what is called Cancellation
of Removal, which means I've been in the country for
a certain period of time, I have a U.S. citizen child
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or spouse that would be detrimentally affected by
my removal from the system.
In immigration court, when you have that individual
hearing, you don't necessarily have to - all immigration
courts do not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, but you
are allowed to present evidence and present witnesses
in support of your claim.
So when we look at the constitutional protections
that are offered to immigrants in removal proceedings,
there is the basic Fifth Amendment Due Process Right. We
all know that due process derives from the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
There is substantive protection, and there is also procedural
protection.
The procedural component imposes restraints
on arbitrary action by the government guaranteeing
fair procedures when the government seeks to deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property.
The Supreme Court has stated that due process of
law is the primary and indispensable foundation
of individual freedom that defines the individual
and delimits the power of the government. So it's
important that, when looking at our system, our
immigration system, and the hearings that's given to
immigrants, that we provide due process protection to
immigrants in removal proceedings. But immigrants are
only entitled to the protection under the Fifth Amendment,
and the due process protection under the Fifth Amendment
says that immigrants are guaranteed to a Fundamental
Fairness Standard. And what this means is that, if an
immigrant wants to challenge their proceedings for a
violation of their due process rights, they have to show that
the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that
the immigrant was reasonably prevented from presenting
their case, and secondly, they have to demonstrate
prejudice, which means that the outcome of the
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proceedings may have been affected by the alleged
violation.
So what I argue is that the standard has, and other
immigration scholars have argued, that this standard creates
a deportation, a different standard, where we have a certain
set of rules that apply to non-citizens when they are faced
with the possible deprivation of liberty, interest, such as
separation from family members, removal to a country
where they have no significant contacts, or in some
instances, the inability to ever return to the United States.
So by classifying deportation as a civil penalty, the
Supreme Court has held that immigrants facing removal are
not entitled to the same constitutional rights that are
provided to the defendants in facing criminal punishment,
and it is for this reason that immigrants facing deportation
today are not read their rights after being arrested for
an immigration violation, they're not provided an
attorney if they can't afford one, and they were not allowed
to do things, such as challenge an order of removal
for being cruel and unusual punishment.
Congressional erosion of due process rights. I want
to just talk a little bit about some of the 1996 changes that
resulted in the rollback of due process rights. I think one of
the panelists, Yolando Vdizquez, spoke about this morning
how there can be no statute of limitations on misconduct
that can make you removable from the United States. For
example, Katie actually had a case, a cancellation of
removal case, where her client in the immigration clinic
had committed check fraud numerous years ago and her
client had been in the country for approximately thirty
years and who was a lawful permanent resident and went to
visit her mother in the United Kingdom, came back into the
country, and placed into removal proceedings because of
conduct she had committed probably about twenty years
prior to being placed into removal proceedings.
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So what the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, which is called AEDPA, and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act,
which is called IIRIRA, both did was they expanded
the categories of aggravated felonies. It also added certain
crimes, such as gambling and passport fraud, to the crimes
that can make you removable from the country. So what
happens is - I think Yolando mentioned - that if you had
committed a crime prior to 1996, that didn't make you
removable from the country. If you left the country, like
our client, come back in, and you can find out that your
previous criminal acts or criminal conduct would make you
inadmissible to the country. So this is one of the examples
of how the government may seek to deport immigrants
based on old criminal convictions that have been
designated by the 1996 laws as aggravated felonies or
crimes that make you removable from the country.
As I mentioned at the beginning, another
due process violation that needs to be addressed
by immigration reform are the mandatory
detention provisions without an opportunity to have a
bond hearing. Under IIRIRA and AEDPA, detention
without a bond is mandatory for nearly all non-citizens
with criminal convictions, including, in some
instances, nonviolent misdemeanors.
The Supreme Court has upheld this pre-
removal mandatory detention law based on the
understanding that removal proceedings are generally
completed within a short amount of time. In reality,
though, many immigrants spend years in detention while
they are waiting for their hearings to be resolved. So what
AEDPA and IIRIRA have done is they have increased
the amount of immigrants who are in detention, and in
1996, when the laws were passed, there were
approximately 8,500 immigrants in detention. And in
1998, right after the law was passed, there were about
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16,000 immigrants in detention, so that number doubled.
And we know that the process of detaining immigrants kind
of backfired against the U.S. Government when - at the
end of March of this year, the U.S. Government ended up
releasing approximately 2,000 detained immigrants because
of funding cutbacks and the inability to detain
immigrants without a bond hearing.
Another due process violation that occurs
in immigration proceedings is, many immigrants who
go before an immigration judge or aren't given
the opportunity to go before an immigration judge and
agree to be removed without appearing before the judge -
this process is called expedited removal procedures, and
it provides low-level DHS employees broad discretion
to deny admission to immigrants summarily. And
sometimes people that get caught in the system may be
asylum seekers or people that may have access to some
form of immigration relief.
So this process works by - if an immigrant comes
into the country, arrives at the border, and doesn't have
proper documentation to enter, under expedited removal, an
immigrant can be removed from the country without having
a hearing, without having a chance to present evidence or
no assistance to legal counsel. It also impacts asylum
seekers, who are people who are forced to flee their
countries because they are afraid of being persecuted.
When they arrive at the border and they
are questioned by a low-level immigration official,
they will be granted an interview, and the person at
the border has discretion to decide whether the
immigrant will be forwarded on to have a credible fear
interview, if they have asylum, or whether or not they can
lawfully enter the country. So the lack of due
process protections that are provided or not provided in
the expedited removal proceedings are really as
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problematic when we look at the way our immigration
system is set up.
And finally, another issue that we have with - or I
have with - the immigration system is the lack of right to
a speedy trial. There is a large backlog in immigration
courts. When my clinic was in Memphis this past March,
the judge went through a long speech about how many
cases she has and that she has to hear cases not only in her
jurisdiction but also in Kentucky, and this results in a
backlog of approximately a year to a year and a half from
that time that you have your first Master Calendar Hearing
to having your individual hearing before a judge. It can
take a long time to proceed through the immigration
system.
So in conclusion, there have been many suggestions
for how to reform the immigration system to guarantee due
process rights to immigrants. One proposal has been to
create Article III courts for immigration courts, and the
American Bar Association has wrote a large report and
recommendation on creating a separate immigration court
system that would be akin to the federal courts that
decides tax cases.
We know that in immigration court we
have approximately 231 immigration judges across the
country and they hear over 300,000 cases, and
that's approximately 1,200 cases for each judge. And that
is about three times the amount of cases that a
federal district judge hears. Taking and creating Article
III courts is an idea that has been criticized
because Congress has the ability to create immigration
courts and there's a concern that taking this
responsibility and making an Article III court would take
away some of Congress's power and their ability to create a
uniform rule of naturalization.
Other solutions to the due process violations that
occur in immigration court have been access to counsel for
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those cases that specifically involve minor children or
people with mental disabilities to give them the ability to
have somebody to advocate on behalf of them and to also
effectively present their cases before immigration judges.
Also, another solution would be to provide
bond hearings and revoke the mandatory detention
for nonviolent criminal offenses. So the case I described at
the beginning, we would offer the immigrant, who has an
old conviction, to be able to argue that she is not a flight
risk, that she should be released on bond pending her
deportation hearing.
Also, another proposed solution would be limiting
the ability for lawful permanent residents to be deported
under the 1996 laws where the Department of Homeland
Security can go back and institute removal proceedings for
old conduct or placing a statute of limitations on the
conduct that you can be placed into removal proceedings.
Of course, I think Jennifer Chac6n mentioned that, when
we look at immigration reform, that it's probably not
possible to achieve all of these goals in one fell swoop, but
I think that, if we look at our system and we say that we
want to provide a system that guarantees just basic rights
for people that come before an immigration judge and have
to defend and know the INA in order to remain in the
country, that it's imperative that we assure just basic due
process rights for immigrants that become before the court
system. Thank you.
MR. BOCK: It looks like we have about forty minutes for
question and answers. Really quick before we jump in, I
would like the panelists to briefly restate their name for the
court reporter so they can attach a name to a transcript.
And then secondly, if you guys, the panelists, have any
questions for each other, anything jumps out at you before
we open it up to the floor, I would like to give you guys the
opportunity to respond or perhaps ask a question. Do you
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guys have anything that stood out? Well, are there any
questions? Yes, sir, gentleman over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Tricia, good to see
you again.
TRICIA HERZFELD: Good to see you.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know we had done
some work once upon a time here. You were talking about
I guess the things that you look at before you have a client
enter into a plea agreement. Again, I'm looking at it from
the perspective of a practitioner. Checklists are great, little
things I can look at. What do you have or what is available
to you that you would recommend to a practitioner so that,
when you meet with a client before pleading, you have
some sort of idea of what to actually ask them about so you
can sort of determine if they are going to have
immigration consequences?
TRICIA HERZFELD: I have a practical answer to that,
and then I have a totally impractical answer because
sometimes I think you just have to reach for the stars, or
you are never going to get them. The practical answer is,
I'm trying to put something together just based on my
experience and stuff that I've gathered from the Nashville
public defender's office. Mike Holley, I don't know if he
ended up being a speaker or not, has put together a fantastic
kind of list from 2008 that we are trying to update of what
Tennessee crimes tend to be considered, crimes of moral
turpitude or aggravated felonies to -
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think that's part of the
materials here.
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TRICIA HERZFELD: It's really, really fantastic. I rely on
it all the time. It needs a little bit of updating. I personally,
just from a practitioner's standpoint dealing - my client
base is entirely immigrant-based, so all of my criminal
cases are only on behalf of immigrants or those people who
could have immigration status issues. So I see certain
things come up all the time, so you have the criminal
simulation, forgeries, kind of the fake ID stuff. As
a practitioner, I always try to get the second-
degree misdemeanor out of that, which is
criminal impersonation, and generally the second-
degree misdemeanor puts your client in much better shape.
The other thing I can say is - I don't know
ifanybody talked about the crimes of moral
turpitude before. If I have to plead my client to something
that I think could be considered a crime of moral turpitude
- which, again, it's difficult because your client wants to
stay out of jail, they want to try and maintain their
immigration status, they want to try to get out of jail, so
you have a lot of competing interests. There's a thing
called the Petty Offense Exception, and I don't know if that
was discussed at all. But there's a way to lessen the impact
of a crime of moral turpitude, so if you have to plead my
client to something that I think might be, I try to get that
plea to where it's under a year. So it's 11/29, with a
sentence that is actually less than six months. And this I've
learned a ton from NIP, and there's a gentleman by the
name of Norton Tooby. So if there's any criminal
practitioners in here, you need to join NIP, and you need to
buy all of the Norton Tooby books because I now have
them all dog-eared and highlighted like a million times.
There's a lot of charts and stuff that are in there.
My bigger world solution, like how to change the
system from an ACLU case, I think the criminal bar needs
to be reformed somewhat. My true belief is that, if you
have a client who is an immigrant, you cannot really, truly
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provide effective assistance of counsel if you do not also
have an immigration practice that's going alongside of it or
somebody that you can call. My personal belief is that
every public defender's office should have an immigration
specialist on staff, and for those people who are taking
appointed work or taking criminal cases, I think just like
you can get money for a mental health evaluation or
competency evaluation from the AOC, the Administrative
Office of the Courts, I truly believe if you have a client
who may have immigration issues, you should also be
given money like that to go consult an immigration
specialist because it is so incredibly complicated that, even
when I think I've got a handle on it, I'll come back - I'm
fortunate enough to have an office full of immigration
lawyers, and I come back and "oh, no, but you forget about
this, or there's also this issue." So those are my kind
of long-winded, real-term answers in the interim, but really
I think - and it's going to be kind of one of my goals - to
try and really reform the way Tennessee is doing that to
make sure that immigrants are getting adequate
representation.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me ask a follow-
up question then. In terms of your practice, how much of it
is in state court criminal proceedings, how much of it is in
federal court criminal proceedings, and what sort of
differences have you noticed there in Nashville, the middle
district?
TRICIA HERZFELD: I would say most of it is state court
proceedings, and I would say that the majority of it is
Nashville, though I'm getting very busy in the donut
counties. Kind of once you get out as the person who is
doing this and - by the way, my Spanish is only marginal.
It only passes just barely. But once I've kind of gotten out
there - and I'm kind of bragging just a tiny bit, and I don't
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mean to do that. But the judges and district attorneys and
even the other lawyers in the courtrooms are so grateful to
have somebody say, "Hey, I realize you are taking these
pleas every day, you're actually screwing all
these immigrants. You think you're helping them, but
you're not." I've had judges say, "Oh, my gosh, we
had absolutely no idea, we thought we were helping them."
So it's been a lot of state court stuff, and I find that, the
more people that are out there and the more they
ask questions, the more they're learning. The federal
court stuff we do less of, and that's all of our civil
rights practice. We also do civil rights cases, so I'm
in federal court on federal civil rights cases. But the federal
criminal stuff, they generally are the clients that either can't
afford us or the charges are so rock solid because they have
gotten busted on biometrics or whatever it is that they end
up opting for the public defender, which, in the middle
district, we have fantastic federal public defenders.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In federal court, I
was wondering, a lot of times there are
cooperation agreements where the people end up
cooperating, and I had one a couple years ago where they
got a U visa out of that cooperation. And actually it was
an identity card situation. They got to stay, and
they'll eventually probably become citizens. And I just
didn't know if you had anything about U visas that you
would like to add.
JEREMY JENNINGS: It's out there. If you've got a client
who has been participating in the prosecution of an
investigation, a criminal investigation, and the
law enforcement agencies are willing to certify
their participation, then you can apply to the
immigration service on their behalf or participate in
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assisting the government in the same and move them into a
legal status, eventually a permanent resolution.
TRICIA HERZFELD: We do a lot of U visa work,
so that's one of the screening questions we have kind
of added. The way kind of my practice works, just so you
know, is, generally an immigrant will come into the office
and say, "My brother or my father, whoever, is in jail" -
we're getting less of that because ICE has gotten a little bit
more flexible with the detainers, but for the vast majority of
time, it was "so and so is in jail," "they've got an ICE
hold," "I can't post a bond," "oh, my God, oh, my God, oh,
my God, what do I do?" So you go in, you interview the
client, you figure out their immigration relief, if they have
any, and then you figure out where they are in their
criminal case as well. And we generally come back to my
office, we synthesize both of those things. So do they
have immigration relief, what is it that we think they have?
And then, okay, based on that, what can we do to creatively
plea bargain in order to maintain that?
One of the questions we've added to our screening
list is have you ever participated in assisting in the
prosecution of a crime, or have you ever been the victim of
a crime? And there's a whole list of things that if you are a
victim of a crime and you try to prosecute that person, you
can get a U visa. Mr. Ozment was also successful - I
think it's the only case in the country - of obtaining a
judicially-signed U visa certification from a federal judge
in the Juana Villegas case, and that was a really, really
huge deal because that was based on the civil rights case of
Herby Chuckle Sabed (phonetically) and the judge went
ahead and signed the Supplement B for the U
visa certification.
The other thing that I should mention, and
I'm probably talking too much, so just stop me if I am,
but what I do sometimes with my clients is we do
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what's called charge bargaining or time bargaining. And I
will bargain time, and a lot of the district attorneys look at
me like I have lost my mind. Some of the older criminal
defense lawyers who have been around for a long time are
like, "That woman is crazy," "She looks like she's 12,"
"We have never seen her before," "Clearly she just
graduated from law school and is committing malpractice
all over the courthouse."
Like if I had a client who was eligible for DREAM
Act relief, which has happened, and he got busted for DUI,
and bad facts, they blow - you can beat them sometimes,
but mostly you can't. He blew at point one two. Crap
case, awful, but I managed to go to the district attorney
and say, "Look, this kid is eligible for what everybody
knows as the DREAM Act, and if he pleads to this DUI,
he's done." He's toast. That's it, game over. If you would
be considerate enough to allow me to get him a reckless
driving conviction, for example, which is not certain it
won't count but is much better than where we were, I
agreed with the district attorney to let him spend more time
in jail. I've pled guys to more time in jail to get it as a
simple assault as opposed to a domestic assault because a
simple assault is going to be easier for them to work
through in immigration court than a domestic assault,
which can kill them. So sometimes I'll say, "Yeah, you
know what, we will give you eighty-nine days in jail," and
they're like, "This woman is nuts, pleading all of her clients
to eighty-nine," "What is wrong with her?" Well, no
because, in that case, my client's goal was really to remain
in this country and still be eligible for whatever
immigration relief it was, so the eighty-nine days, which
he'll probably only do half of, he was going to do that time
if we bound the case over anyway.
So I think a lot of it is just client counseling and
trying to figure out what it is that their end goal is, where
their priorities are, and then sitting down with one of the
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million Tooby books or all these practice advisories that
NIP has done and trying to figure out how to fit all these
square pegs in a round hole. It's like chess.
JEREMY JENNINGS: Just to draw the connection,
the eighty-nine-days Petty Offense Exception - that's what
they're shooting for there. Has the misdemeanor been less
than six months of imprisonment? Also, think about it.
Sometimes you might have a client that doesn't really want
to plea or is not interested in doing a plea, and you can use
the immigration consequences to help convince them that
"this is really something you should reconsider because we
have some control over a plea situation." If we do it right,
versus if we go to trial, then, as everybody knows, anything
can happen.
TRICIA HERZFELD: Which brings me to one
other point. Some of the other things that I have
learned from attending CLEs and practicing and reading all
this stuff is, what you say in a plea agreement also makes a
huge difference. So depending on a county, a lot of times
they will want to recite the facts that were alleged in the
indictment or the affidavit or whatever, and if I pled
something much lower, sometimes I'll just go in. And I'll
be very, very specific about my language and say we will
stipulate that there is sufficient facts to support simple
assault, but we will not stipulate to any facts outside of
that. Now, whether that works at the end of the day, I don't
know, but what you want to try to do is keep the record of
conviction and kind of all the documents that out are there
as tight and clean as you can.
I have a gentleman right now who is charged with
sexual assault of a child, and one of our goals is going to be
to try to keep out anything having to do with a child in
order to be able to maintain a plea that maybe might help
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him immigration-wise later. But it's never a hundred
percent.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The wording made me think
of a question. You said the wording of how you enter the
plea is very helpful. Would it be helpful to convince the
DAs to let you enter best interest pleas because, in my little
experience, DAs tend to not really care if you enter a best
interest plea or not?
TRICIA HERZFELD: So far as I understand, immigration
doesn't really care if it's a best interest plea or not. You can
maybe get a little bit of wiggle room out of that, but you
probably have more experience in it than I do. I think they
consider them to be the same.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, dang.
TRICIA HERZFELD: You try, you try.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess my question will be
for Tricia too. Have you represented any clients on post-
convictions with Padilla yet, and if so, how are you going
to satisfy the prejudice call? We talked a little bit today
about deficiency, but how do you show prejudice, other
than your client just flat-out saying, "But for counsel not
telling me or giving me misadvice, I wouldn't have pled
guilty?"
TRICIA HERZFELD: The cases we've had have been kind
of stark, which has been good, where somebody has pled to
something that is literally one day more than what they
needed. They pled to a year, and they needed less than a
year. Or they pled a day over what would have been the
Petty Offense Exception or whatever. So the cases we've
had have been pretty clear that, had the lawyer known
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the immigration consequences, they could have easily
gotten that from the district attorney, and that's kind of the
argument that we have made. But it is a little
bit complicated in having to show affirmative
misadvice versus nonadvice, which is - when I was in
Miami, like I said, I misadvised everybody, but I don't
know that that was always affirmative misadvice.
Sometimes it just could have been nonadvice. So I think
that's a little bit complicated.
And I think knowing exactly what the issue is -
whether the person can apply for affirmative relief or is
removable, does affirmative relief count, does it count that
your person is now not eligible for the DREAM Act
because of advice they received from their lawyer a year
before the DREAM Act was even a sparkle in anybody's
eye? I think those questions, a lot of those are still
unresolved, but we continue to make them.
It's extra-complicated how I advise my criminal
clients because they say, "Is this going to hurt me in
immigration court?" And I say, "Well, based on the law as
it is today, this is what we know. Things could change
tomorrow, things could change the day after, things could
change a million times after, and I can't promise that it
never will. I can say, based on what we know today, that
this is where we are at." It makes you very nervous in
advising a client, and I have to say, a lot of my criminal
defense lawyers now say, "Gosh, Tricia, I represented
immigrants all the time and thought I was doing just fine,
and now that I've talked to you, I realize, 'Oh, my gosh, I
don't want to touch that in a million years, I'm going to
send them over to your office,"' which has been great for
my business but also terrifying as a criminal practitioner
that there's so much out there. And it's so incredibly
specified and difficult that it can take a really long time to
get a handle on it, and I don't even profess to have a handle
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on all of it. I'm again lucky that I have immigration
practitioners in my office.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Karla, you mentioned that
the Federal Rules of Evidence don't govern immigration
proceedings. Is there something else, any other kind of
rules of evidence that regulate what can and cannot be done
in regulation proceedings?
KARLA McKANDERS: So basically you go back
to Fundamental Fairness Standard when you are
litigating cases in immigration court, and so you can
make arguments based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence
that something is not admissible. And the immigration
judge will hear your arguments. That's what I advise
my students to do in the immigration clinic. But ultimately,
if evidence is let in that you feel should not be let in, then
you can go back to making an argument that it was
fundamentally unfair for that evidence to come in and that
you were prejudiced by letting that evidence in.
There have been a whole line of cases - I believe
the Yale clinic has challenged different criminal evidence
that comes in, that's allowed to come in that violate people's
Fourth Amendment rights because different standard
applies in immigration court than it does in criminal
proceedings in terms of the types of evidence that is let in,
and courts have evaluated, whether or not if somebody's
rights are violated in terms of the way a search was
conducted, whether or not that evidence should be let in.
But again, it goes back to whether or not the admission
of that evidence was fundamentally fair and how
it prejudiced the immigrant in letting in the
particular evidence.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kind of a follow-up to that
sort of. In criminal proceedings when they are talking
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about pleading and having dispositions and all that kind of
stuff, is there anything in particular that should be either
excluded from the record that cannot be brought into court
or specifically included in the record to make sure that
those facts are brought up in the immigration proceedings?
KARLA McKANDERS: You can probably answer that
in terms of when you are pleading your clients.
TRICIA HERZFELD: It's very, very fact specific, and a
lot of times I kind of say that there's kind of the gold
standard for what you want, like I really want my client not
to be charged with sexual assault of a minor. It would
really be better immigration-wise if he wasn't. Truthfully
we're not going to be able to plead anything that's really
going to make just that entire thing go away. Your goal is
to just kind of do the best you can with what you have.
There's some old saying about - I don't know -
making something out of mud. Anyway, I don't know it.
But my point is, you can sit there, and it's easy to second
guess anybody and say, "Well, you should have gotten
this," "You should have gotten that." I think you just have
to really look at the strength of the prosecution's case, if
your person is appropriately charged, the facts that are in
the indictment. There are certain things you can do in
Tennessee where - most people, at least in Nashville, are
charged by indictment, if you get that far, to criminal
court. Sometimes your clients can have more of a benefit
in staying in general sessions where there's not as clear of a
record. If the facts are going to be included in the
indictment, maybe you would rather see if you can work
this out in general sessions so you can control your record a
little bit.
You can also negotiate a plea from time to
time with your district attorney that may allow you to
avoid an indictment by the grand jury and instead plead to
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a count that's been brought by information. And if you can
negotiate with your district attorney - again, it depends on
the district attorney that you're dealing with, but if you are
pleading to something by information, you can a lot of
times control the information that's in there and then,
therefore, control what's in the record. But I try to be very
specific. There's been a million books written on it, and I
don't profess to be an expert by any stretch of
the imagination. But there are things you can do to try
to lessen the impact in immigration court. The way
it works in our office is, we go to the jail, we figure all this
out, they retain me to be their criminal lawyer, I go, I do all
the criminal stuff, and then I literally come back and take
the file. And I hand it to one of the immigration lawyers in
our office and say, "Okay, I did the best I can," "Here you
go," and then they kind of take it off on the next process.
JEREMY JENNINGS: Really we have the national expert
in this sitting right back there - Mr. Kesselbrenner - and
hopefully they'll spend some time talking about categorical
approach and modifying categorical approach and the
record of conviction and how you can control some of that.
As Elliott said, we are really pleased to have Mr.
Kesselbrenner here to talk to us about that this afternoon.
And just another plug, I don't know about Tricia, I know
Elliott - are you doing the TVA CLE?
TRICIA HERZFELD: I am.
JEREMY JENNINGS: Tricia and Elliott are doing
the CLE with the TVA in Nashville in a couple weeks, and
I think, as I understand it - correct me if I'm wrong - but
if you're really inspired about the civil rights kind of things
that Elliott was talking about today, then that's what they're
going to be doing at that CLE.
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TRICIA HERZFELD: Seven and a half hours of
civil rights, detainers, criminal immigration, kind of
the whole kit and caboodle, so if you just can't get
enough, seven and a half hours. It will be available
online too. They've got the webinar.
MR. BOCK: Do we have other questions? Well, I have a
question perhaps possibly for Jeremy or Tricia. I know the
new immigration policy espoused by President Obama
encourages the use of prosecutorial discretion, and I
wondered if you guys had any experience with that and, if
so, what effect criminal convictions had on those, if that
was just like an outright bar to them granting it or how they
have dealt with that.
JEREMY JENNINGS: I have had some experience
with prosecutorial discretion cases. Obviously, it's
much better to have a clean record than any record.
The worst record you have, the worst case you're going
to have for prosecutorial discretion. It doesn't have to be a
hundred percent clean, but it's got to be pretty clean for
them to - they're stingy with prosecutorial discretion. So
if there is anything there on the record, you really need to
outweigh it on the other side with all the pros, all the
positive factors about the individual, to outweigh the effect
of whatever criminal conviction they've got.
TRICIA HERZFELD: Our experience in that has
been absolutely the same. The only time that we've
gotten maybe a little bit more leniency is when we file a
civil rights lawsuit on behalf of the client because
the reasons that they got into the system were so bad
to begin with. But other than that, yeah, they've been pretty
stingy.
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JEREMY JENNINGS: They've gone from no discretion at
all to just a little bit of discretion, but it has not been a
huge, transformative change in the way that Immigration
Enforcement acts.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kind of along those lines,
when you're dealing with a DA and you're trying to work
out a plea and you have an immigrant client, how more
likely is the assistant DA or DA to be when you've got the
immigration issue coming into play? Are they more
sympathetic and more likely to work with you, or it just
depends on the crime and -
TRICIA HERZFELD: I think it actually depends on the
prosecutor. I've had people who have been incredibly
sympathetic, and they'll say things like, "Oh, my gosh, you
mean he can get status, and he's here on something so
awful. Let me help you." I also had a prosecutor in a
donut county say - as I was trying to get my client pretrial
diversion, which is not something they did there, so I was
coming up with different ways they could do it - well, just
continue it for a year; well, she does all this community
service. You have to be very, very creative in these. So in
that plea negotiation, he said to me, "Well, where does she
work?" Which is always kind of a complicated question
when they start asking you questions. You don't want
to answer them. You don't want to say, "Oh, my client,
who is here undocumented, is working, and I don't know
if she's paying taxes." You don't really want to get into it,
but it's a judgment call with your DA at that moment. So I
told him that she works at a local Mexican restaurant, and
he said to me, "Well, gosh, I wish I would have known that,
I sure love their tacos." And I said, "I'm sorry?" And he
said, "Well, I didn't really want to work with you, but I sure
love their tacos. And if I deport her, who is going to make
my tacos if she gets deported? I need somebody to make
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my tacos." Now, to me, that was just one of the most
horrible things somebody could have said. I was just ready
to fall over. I cannot believe I actually may get this plea
deal because you think somebody needs to make your
tacos. But it worked, and I got the plea deal. Now, Client
doesn't need to know why. I don't think it probably
benefits her to know why. But sometimes you have to play
those games.
I've also had some prosecutors who have just said
straight-out, "Now, I treat them just the same as I treat
everybody else, and so it's the same for them, two days in
jail for whatever this offense is. And that's what I give to
every non-immigrant, every immigrant. It's the same for
everybody." Then you try to explain to them, yes, but the
consequences for the immigrant are very different. If I
were to go to jail for two days, I'm not going to lose my
family and be sent to a country I haven't lived in in twenty
years, that's not going to happen. But for my client, I am
telling you those are the consequences of this plea. And
sometimes they are just like, "Well, they shouldn't be here
anyway, so I don't really care. We're trying to get them out
of this county." It just depends. I try to get a lot more flies
with honey, and then when that doesn't work, if I've got a
basis to file a civil rights lawsuit, I do.
KARLA McKANDERS: I have a question. Can you tell
us about some of the civil rights lawsuits that you have
filed?
TRICIA HERZFELD: Sure. How long have we got?
I think one of our favorite - what does that mean? One of
the bigger lawsuits we filed was in coalition with the
ACLU. Elliott was the cooperating attorney in the ACLU's
Immigrants' Rights Project in New York. We had a
massive immigration raid outside of Nashville where
twenty people were picked up by - and I'm not speaking
177
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 179
out of term because the case is still going, but you can find
all this in the complaint - where the allegations are that
local law enforcement works with ICE to come and do a
coordinated raid where twenty people were picked up and
put into removal proceedings. There were no criminal
warrants. There were no administrative warrants. There
were no warrants at all. Our allegations are that people
busted in doors, drug people out by a gun to their head,
called them all sorts of really nasty, horrible things in front
of their children, and then put them into removal
proceedings. The good news is, the case is still going. We
have been litigating it for about two years. We just got past
the first motion to dismiss and are in the middle
of discovery that is probably going to last forever, but that's
probably one of the bigger cases we've done.
Mr. Ozment, of course, has talked to you about the
Renteria case, which is 287(g). There was also
the pregnant, shackled woman, Juana Villegas, and
there's been a series of much smaller lawsuits where,
instead of twenty people in an apartment complex, it's been
two, where people have come in without a warrant and
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment is kind of really key when you've got some of
these immigration agents that kind of maybe are a little
bit full of their authority or lack of it and decided they're
going to go in and they're going to get these guys. It seems
to have calmed down a little bit, which is good. I think
there's probably been some policy changes from D.C. that
have changed things, and we felt that. But we've had quite
a few, and they are always very interesting. Horrible for
our clients but good to be able to vindicate that and to be
able to say to law enforcement, yeah, the Fourth
Amendment actually applies to everybody. Not just
whether you are a citizen or not, it absolutely applies to
everybody. And being able to vindicate those rights for our
clients, who feel really mistreated - one of them said to
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me, "I came here because I needed to and I was told that
this is such a great country and they would treat me and
my family so well. I don't understand what's happening."
And when I feel like I'm in a position that I have
to apologize to my clients - "I'm sorry," "This isn't
really who we are," "This isn't a country that we're meant
to be, and we are doing the best we can to vindicate
those rights for you" - puts you in an awful position.
You don't want to feel badly about the way other people
have treated them when they're just trying to come here for
a new life.
So anyway, that's my soapbox. But it's
very rewarding work. Anybody who is considering doing
it, I can tell you, it's incredibly complicated.
The landmines of 1983 make it very, very difficult to
get past even your initial pleadings. So if anybody has
any more questions about that, just give us a call at the
office; we're happy to talk to anybody at any time.
JEREMY JENNINGS: Have those cases settled, gone to
court? What is the typical resolution of the smaller cases
that you're talking about?
TRICIA HERZFELD: I think we've settled most of the
smaller ones. The bigger ones are probably going to be
litigated forever. The Juana Villegas case, if anybody is
following it, was just remanded from the 6th Circuit, so we
will be re-trying that case is how it appears, which is
interesting because it was a trial just on damages the first
time around. But now it will be liability and damages, at
least part of it. So that case is going to go on for a while.
The Renteria case went to the Tennessee Supreme Court
and back and forth. And the immigration race case that we
have right now, it looks like it's just going to keep going.
Probably be litigating it for ten years or so.
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MR. BOCK: I have another question. What happens when
a non-citizen is convicted of an offense that falls under the
statutory grounds for deportation? Are they entitled to the
same appeals process that citizens are, or are they put on a
plane and flown out of the country?
TRICIA HERZFELD: Criminal appeal or
immigration appeal?
MR. BOCK: Either or both.
TRICIA HERZFELD: From the criminal perspective, if
you can get the appeal and everything filed early enough -
there's a lot of landmines with times and time bars,
conviction time bars, and there is some exceptions for
fundamental due process issues. But you've got to get that
stuff in. We have a couple clients right now that I'm
appealing their criminal convictions, and in the meantime,
they've been charged with aggravated felonies. They're
being mandatorily detained, so they're sitting in for a long
time while we're trying to get their criminal appeal through
the system.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kind of following up to that,
if your client is convicted to crimes that count, are they
immediately - ICE immediately might come in, detain
them, deport them, or do they have to go through the whole
immigration proceeding? What immediately happens to
them, or does ICE have the discretion to do that or not?
What immediately happens to them?
KARLA McKANDERS: Most of the time, especially
in Knox County, depending on the crime, there will be
an ICE detainer that is placed on the immigrant while
they are in criminal proceedings, if it's a certain type
of offense, so you have the ICE hold placed on them. A
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lot from Knoxville, depending on the crime, they will be
placed in detention in Oakdale, Louisiana, which
poses problems from a representation counsel
standpoint because you might have an immigrant that is
in Knoxville, can retain counsel here, immigration
counsel here, but then is shipped off to Oakdale or
another detention facility and has to find representation
there, and some people get lost in the system. I've had
many phone calls where someone will say they do not
know where their family member is. They were in
criminal proceedings, and ICE hold was placed on them.
They couldn't find them. So that can be an issue. And
then once you have an ICE hold placed on you, depending
on the crime, you're placed in proceedings, and then you
have a scheduling hearing and then an individual hearing
before the immigration judge.
TRICIA HERZFELD: The ICE hold perspective of it is
actually what makes things really challenging, and from a
criminal perspective, a lot of your clients can be charged
with something relatively minor. But the ability to post
bond is significantly affected by the ICE hold. So I think
Elliott was alluding to this earlier. It used to be that you
couldn't even get a bondsman to write a bond on somebody
with an ICE hold. It just couldn't happen. Functionally it
depends. And I've learned this through working with
Elliott that it is possible to pay your criminal bond and then
go all the way down to Oakdale, get an immigration bond,
and then have your client out, which is always a much,
much better scenario to have your client fighting
the criminal and immigration charges from being out
of custody versus in. But sometimes your client will
be charged with something that you know is not really
going to be an easy sale for an immigration bond,
something relatively serious, and you will have a little bit
of a conflict with your client because they're like, "Well,
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I want to get out," "I have a bond," "I want to get out,"
"I have a bond." And as a federal judge said to my
client the other day, she said, "Look, in reality you're
not going to get out. Based on the charges that you are
charged with, even I were to give you a bond in criminal
court, ICE is not going to give you a bond for these types of
charges, so you are not going to get out. And the question
is, Do you want to be here in Nashville where you can see
your lawyer all the time, or do you want to be in Oakdale,
Louisiana, where it's going to be much more difficult for
you to see your client and, quite frankly, he may not be
accruing any time towards any plea that he might get? So
explaining that to your client, why they can't get out or the
difficulties in that happening, is generally your number one
thing for a client in custody.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This is kind of related.
When they are transferred from Louisiana, then are
they subject to (inaudible) -
JEREMY JENNINGS: Absolutely. And the issue with the
bond is pretty tricky. As criminal attorneys, if the bond -
let's say it's a minor crime, and there's a $500 bond. And
they could pay it tomorrow, but if the court date - the
payment of the bond ends the state custody and that starts
the immigration forty-eight-hour period under the
detainer to come and pick up the individual. It's not the end
of the criminal process anymore, it's the payment of
the bond. So a lot of times what will happen
is, immigration will pay the criminal bond, immigration
will come and take the person and send him to Oakdale,
Louisiana, and he will not be here for what would have
been a dismissal of charges or time served or something,
and now he's got a missed court date and complicated
issues because immigration has whisked him away - by
the way, they don't stay in Knoxville. The day that
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immigration gets them, by that night, they are going to be
in Alabama on their way to Oakdale, Louisiana. So once
immigration gets them, they're going to be gone. So as a
practical matter - that's why I was curious about fighting
the issue about being able to pay the bond, which
is absolutely their right legally, functionally it's not often,
in my opinion, a very smart thing to do because your client
is going whisked away to Louisiana and then you've got to
deal with working with your client from this area. And
they have missed their court hearing, and then it snowballs.
And it's very difficult to manage.
TRICIA HERZFELD: I agree with that a hundred percent.
Our clients always want to pay the criminal bond, and we're
always like, no, no, no, wait. And the only time that we do
is under very, very specific circumstances where we know
what the person is charged with, we know when the net
court dates are going to be in court, we know that the
person has been whisked away to ICE, but I know I'm
going to have an immigration bond for them. Or at least
I'm strongly suspecting it. So if we could just set this court
date off for two, three weeks or whatever - it's only
under very controlled circumstances that we ever
advise anybody to post the criminal bond. We have
been fortunate enough that we found some bondsmen that
are willing to work with us on that, and it took a lot
of sweet-talking, a lot of "come on in" to get those
criminal bondsmen to understand that they're not going to
lose everything because the person has been brought
into immigration custody. It's really an education thing.
MR. BOCK: I believe we have reached our time. I would
like to thank the panelists for coming today and speaking
and sharing with us. We will now take a ten-minute break
before the next session.
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PANEL DISCUSSION III:
RECOGNIZING AND ADDRESSING IMMIGRATION




MR. ELKINS: Welcome. Before I send it over to them, I
would like to introduce each one of them. In the middle
here, we have Dan Kesselbrenner. Mr. Kesselbrenner is the
executive director of the National Immigration Project of
the National Lawyers Guild and has been in that position
since 1986. Mr. Kesselbrenner is an expert on the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions and
contesting deportability in immigration proceedings. He's
the co-author of Immigration Law and Crimes, which was
cited in Padilla v. Kentucky. As a former member of
the Clinton-Gore Department of Justice Immigrant
Transition Team, Mr. Kesselbrenner's work defending
immigrants has earned him numerous awards, including the
American Immigration Lawyers Association Jack
Wasserman Litigation Award.
Second to my right here, we have Violeta Chapin.
Violeta Chapin is a 2002 graduate of New York
University Law School, and Professor Chapin now teaches
at the University of Colorado Law School in Boulder in
the Criminal Defense Clinic. She's been recently
published in the Michigan Journal of Race and Law in
2011 about the plight of undocumented immigrant
witnesses in criminal trials. Before joining Colorado
University's faculty, Professor Chapin was a trial attorney
at the Public Defender's Service in Washington, D.C., for
seven years where she represented indigent defendants
charged with serious felonies at all stages of trial.
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Last and to my far right, we have Christina Kleiser.
Ms. Kleiser is a 1997 graduate of DePaul University
College of Law, who has worked for various public
interests and organizations in Florida and
Ohio, specializing in child advocacy, criminal and
immigrant defense. She joined Knox County Public
Defender's Community Law Office in March of 2006, and
she's been representing the public defender's clients in
juvenile court since June of 2006 and counsels the
Community Law Office's non-citizen clients about
immigration consequences of their criminal charges
pursuant to Padilla. Christina also teaches iminigration
law as an adjunct faculty member at the University of
Tennessee School of Law. Thank you very much, and we
will turn it over to you all.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Hi, everyone. My part of the
talk today is to talk to criminal defense lawyers who
are representing non-citizen clients in state court and
to give you an idea about the kinds of questions that
you need to be asking them so that you can
effectively represent them and advise them when it's fairly
certain that they're going to be transferred to
immigration court after their criminal case is disposed of.
So I'll give you a little bit more background in terms
of where I'm coming from on this. I joined the University
of Colorado's faculty in 2009 to teach the Criminal Defense
Clinic, and what was happening was that we represent poor
people charged with misdemeanors in Boulder County.
That was a lot different from doing homicides in
Washington, D.C., I'll tell that you. What we were seeing
was a ton of people coming through with what were called
ICE holds. And when I first saw one, I was like, What on
earth is that? I had actually seen them when I was a felony
trial attorney in D.C., but they weren't executing them
necessarily when I left there, which I left the public
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defender in 2009. And so in Boulder, we were seeing all
these non-citizen clients coming through on really low-
level misdemeanors, mostly traffic offenses, coming
through with ICE holds, and we didn't really know what
that meant. The judges had no idea what that meant. The
DAs had less of an idea what that meant. And so we were
all sort of floundering around trying to ask some
immigration lawyers that we knew what it meant, and then
we were probably giving them misadvice like Tricia was
about how to resolve their criminal case and then try to sort
of muddle their way through the immigration courts. We
got a little bit better at it, thankfully, as we went along, and
then in 20111 added an immigration piece.
So now what we do in the clinic is we represent
non-citizen clients charged with crimes, and students in the
clinic learn how to interview these clients so that they don't
screw them over in immigration court later on. What we've
learned, what I've learned, students have all learned, and
what we have been trying to teach the public defenders and
the private criminal defense bar in Colorado is that non-
citizen clients are different in very real, tangible ways -
and advise and educate the defense bar about how to
effectively represent them. That's essentially what I'm
going to talk about.
We're talking about figuring out what your client
wants to do, determining specific criminal defense goals
based on the client's immigration status, and then Chris and
Dan are going to talk about those last ones, talking more
specifically about what's going on in Tennessee.
So like I said, we learned very quickly that non-
citizen clients are different and that they're going to have to
be negotiating both systems at once really right from the
start. By the time we meet our clients in Boulder, it's the
day after they have been arrested on criminal misdemeanor
charges. We already know if they have an ICE hold. Is
that true here in Tennessee by the time you meet your client
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in misdemeanor court? Yeah. So you already know that
they have got an ICE hold, and that tends to be the case in
sort of smaller jurisdictions, where the jails quickly put
people on a list to ICE and say to these people,
"Check them out for us." And then ICE calls back and says
whether or not you're going to stamp it with the ICE hold.
So by the time we meet our clients, which
is literally less than twenty-four hours after they've
been arrested, we already know that they have an ICE hold,
so does the judge, so does the prosecutor. Big, red
stamp on their intake jacket. The students have a
little handy worksheet. The first place that I'll send you to
- and I know Dan mentioned this earlier -
www.defendingimmigrants.org. There is a Padilla
intake worksheet. Print it out, take it with you to the
jail, keep it anywhere you want, but those are all essentially
the questions you need to ask the non-citizen clients. And
we'll go through those.
As you've heard several times today, what happens
in a criminal case is often fairly crucial to what happens
later in the immigration case. So the first stuff, like I said,
is the Padilla worksheet. There it is. Keep copies
everywhere you can. My students have to keep it in their
glove compartment, they have to keep it anywhere they're
going to have to find it and access it quickly, and you are
going to have to fill it out when meeting with your client
who is a non-citizen who has been charged with a crime.
So how do you know that your client might be
a non-citizen? So the first question I found is to ask where
your client was born. Don't be like the jail, which is what
the Boulder jail sort of slightly shame-facedly told me
when I said, "Well, how do you decide who to put on the
list and call up ICE and ask them to check?" They're like,
"Well, if they're Mexican." I'm like, "What do you mean if
they're Mexican? How do you tell if they're Mexican? Do
you ask them if they're Mexican?" "Well, they look
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Mexican, and they don't speak English." I said, "That is a
huge problem. You're racially profiling people all day
long." They were like, "Why are you asking all these
questions again, Ms. Chapin?" So they are racially
profiling clients. Try to be careful not to be racially
profiling your clients. You would be surprised at who
might be a non-citizen and who might actually be a citizen,
but you want to be getting to that question sort of right
away by asking - one of the ways to do that is ask if your
client was foreign-born. What they do also in Boulder is, if
you report that you were foreign-born, they put you on
a list to ICE.
That was also made complicated by the fact that I
was foreign-born. I was born in Costa Rica, but I'm a U.S.
citizen. I've always been a U.S. citizen because my parents
were U.S. citizens and they took me right over to the
consulate and got me a passport. But if I were to get
arrested in Boulder County, they would put me on a list to
ICE, and one problem with that is that ICE doesn't have
any record of me because I've never naturalized. My mom
naturalized when I was twelve. My mom is from El
Salvador, she married my dad. But she became a U.S.
citizen when I was twelve, so she has an A number,
an alien registration number. I don't have an
alien registration number because I've never
naturalized ever. I've always been a U.S. citizen, even
from when I was in Costa Rica.
But that's one of the many ways that you get
citizens into sort of the immigration pipeline because ICE
doesn't have a record of them; they assume that
I'm somebody who just recently entered and they just
haven't found me yet, and so they might put a detainer on
me. And there you are, a citizen with an
immigration detainer. So you want to be figuring out what
your client's situation is by asking questions about
where they were born and then following up with that, or
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ask about immigration status. Sometimes they don't know,
and you're going to have to do a little bit more research.
But you certainly want to be asking your client right from
the beginning.
The existence of an immigration detainer can be one
wink to the fact that your client might not be a non-citizen.
So there's a couple myths floating out and around, certainly
here in Tennessee and I'm sure in Colorado as well, which
is that clients who have been issued an immigration
detainer by ICE is undocumented. As you've heard, it's not
necessarily true. People who have visas, people who are
lawful permanent residents, sometimes even people who
are citizens can be issued immigration detainers. We have
a lot of judges in Colorado who have said the following to
us, which is: Well, your client has an ICE hold, they're just
going to be deported. Who cares? Also not true at all, and
we will talk about that in a little bit about why that's not
true.
So step one, and you will see this in the Padilla
intake worksheet, is ask your client's immigration status,
and they have a number of different potential statuses that
they have. Just ask the status, and write it down.
Hopefully, once you filled out this entire worksheet, if you
have someone in-house like they do here in Knox County
with Chris or if you have an immigration lawyer that you
can call up, then you'll be able to go through this entire
worksheet with them. So that's step one.
The last one is undocumented -but potential future
status. I'll tell you that in the clinic when we started in
2011 - this was before Obama issued the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrival - we had a few clients who I
thought were completely screwed. They were totally
undocumented. They didn't appear to have any avenue of
relief. All of them - there were three clients right in a row
- were seniors at Boulder High School. They were these
young kids who had been brought over here by their
189
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 191
parents. They were all undocumented, their parents were
all undocumented, so they didn't seem to have any obvious
avenues for relief. Sometimes you can be undocumented
but have some potential for future status, and now with
immigration reform pending, that's also true.
Why are you asking about immigration status?
Because then you will know whether they are subject
to particular grounds of inadmissibility or deportability.
Certain criminal dispositions will have adverse immigration
consequences for your clients, just depending on their
status, so you have to figure out sort of where they are in
that realm.
Step two: What is your client's criminal history?
These are a lot of the same questions that we just ask our
regular citizen clients as well too, but you will see that the
checklist gets a little bit longer. I like what Jennifer
Chac6n said earlier, which is that this is not rocket science.
It's really not. It is quite complicated once you really get
into the weave, but a lot of cases you can sort of figure it
out on the front end. And that's what I'm trying to get the
public defenders to realize. A lot of the public defenders
are like, "It's so hard," "We don't know anything
about immigration law," "It's so complicated." It's not
super complicated. There's just a few extra questions
that you need to make sure that you ask, and this
worksheet gets you literally ninety percent of the way
there.
So what's your client's criminal history, and get all
of it. Again, traffic offenses, petty
offenses, misdemeanors. You would not believe how many
clients - "Do you have any convictions," and they're like,
no, no, no. They're like, except that weed thing before or
all the traffic offenses. So I tend to ask a variety
of questions, like have the police ever stopped you,
have you ever spoken to a police officer before, since you
have been in the United states, have you actually gotten
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handcuffed, did they ever make you sit on the side of the
road? Sort of a wide variety of questions to really get to
the answer that I need, which is everything. Yes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you have issues
with clients who are afraid to talk to you because they
don't understand the meaning of an adversarial process
and that it may not exist in the country where they
come from?
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Yes. So one of the things that
we have a lot of conversation with in the clinic is how
do you get the client to have a little bit of trust right at the
beginning, and it's especially difficult, I think, with non-
citizen clients when you come in there and you start asking
them about their status. That is something that they have
been taught to essentially hide from people. They know
that that's not something that's good for them, if they are
here undocumented. So certainly I talk to my students -
and, obviously, this is something that all defense lawyers
need to do - especially in time-constrained environments
about explaining fairly quickly that "I'm here for you,"
"I don't work with the judge," "I don't work with the
prosecutor," "I don't work with immigration at all," "I need
to ask you these questions," and "I promise you that
nothing you tell me will come out of my mouth unless you
give me permission to do so" and try to explain why it is
that you're asking them that question.
One fairly problematic question that we have
is when we say, So were you born here in the United
States? A lot of clients want to know why you're asking
them that question, and it's important to answer
that question, is that because, "If you are not a citizen, then
there can be some problems in the criminal case, and by the
way, they've issued a detainer." So we have the students
explain to the client what a detainer is and the fact that
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there's something holding them here and that, even if they
pay their bond or their criminal case gets resolved, they're
not going to get relief, they're going to get transferred. So
we do do a fair bit of explanation, and that is sort of part
and parcel of why non-citizen clients are different from
citizen clients and how I think that really what needs to
happen is that public defenders need to learn the language
of speaking to non-citizen clients as opposed to speaking
to citizen clients in answering questions like that.
You also want to know what sentence was received
for each and every conviction, so add that into your little
worksheet. So how much time exactly did you get? Now,
lots of people have absolutely no idea. They don't know.
They did it. I know that every single client who's in front
of a judge and they're talking to them about pleas, they
get sentenced, and they don't hear any of it because I
think all they are hearing is jail, jail, jail. That's in their
head, and so they're not listening. The judge is telling them
all this information, and they're like, jail, jail, jail. So they
don't hear it, and I have to then explain to them once again
everything that happened once we leave. So a lot of clients
don't know. To the extent that you can ask them, get that
information, but you can also go back through your state
and county records and figure out what the sentence was.
And why are we asking? Because this is what sort
of determines clients' bond in immigration court. I had no
idea about any of this at first. I didn't realize. My thought
was that, if someone was undocumented, they were going
to go to immigration court and definitely not get a bond
because why would they get a bond if they didn't have
any papers? That's not true at all. So asking about criminal
history is important because that helps you figure out in
your head and starts the wheels turning about whether or
not the person is going to get a bond in immigration court
and then how high that bond is. That's another reason, so
you will know if the person has a certain prior - like if the
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person is like, "I just got arrested." We had a client who
got arrested on a DV - no, it wasn't even a DV, it was a
stupid bar fight in Colorado. But he had a homicide
conviction from New Mexico, and I was like, "That's a
problem for you, sir." So there are some problems that you
know that you have that prior, and the assault is the least of
your problems here. The fact that you have a
homicide conviction out of Mexico is going to be
problematic for you in immigration court. And so there we
were. And then I could talk to them sort of more about
whether or not to post a bond in the criminal court.
So if your client has lawful status, these are some of
your defender goals: So your primary concern wants to be
avoiding a conviction that will trigger certain grounds of
deportation, including the aggravated felony that I
mentioned. We've heard about that because that will leave
your client with no avenue for relief. It literally is the death
star in immigration, aggravated felonies, just avoid at all
costs to the extent you can. Then your secondary concern
is to see if your client can get back in the United States sort
of while proceedings are pending or afterwards.
Your client has no lawful immigration status. That
tends to be the vast majority of the clients that we get in
Boulder, is clients who are completely and a hundred
percent undocumented and are now in the United States.
Very quickly, in case this wasn't said before, there
are clients that are called EWIs. This was another term that
I had no idea when I was in criminal court. Entry without
inspection is what that means. EWI. Those are your
undocumented guys. Those are the people who entered the
United States without stopping through a port of inspection
essentially. They are going to be subject to the grounds of
inadmissibility because they're going to be treated as if they
never came in, so they're going to do this whole legal -
even though your guy has been there for thirty years,
fifteen years, a long time undocumented, they're going to
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be subject to the grounds of inadmissibility. They're going
to treat them like they never entered and as if they're
still physically outside the United States even though
they're here. So that's who they're going to be. There it is.
If they never had any status, they'll be charged
with inadmissibility even though they're here.
If a non-citizen had a temporary status that expired,
the government will charge them with grounds
of deportability, don't they have to charge them with both?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: If you have been admitted, it's
deportability.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Okay. All right. I'll go back to that.
Temporary status that expired.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: A temporary status
that involved being inspected.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Okay, they'll charge them only with
deportability. So for these undocumented guys, these are
your goals of the criminal defense lawyer: You know that
you're focusing on the grounds of inadmissibility, and
avoid sort of the crime-related grounds that prevent
possible future avenues of relief, again, aggravated felony
convictions, things that are going to prevent them from
hopping over the good moral character bar.
Maintain eligibility for Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals. This was a huge thing for us.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals is what's
called DREAM Act Light. DACA is what we have here.
It's relatively new. What I would encourage all
criminal defense lawyers do is just literally google
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. It will take you to
the USCIS web site, and they will tell you sort of the
prongs that your clients need to meet in order to be eligible
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for that. There's age requirements, there's time of entry
requirements, and then there's certain criminal convictions
that make you ineligible for that, so you want to be very
careful to try to avoid those as much as possible because
those are going to be your young people that you're
getting that are either in school, in high school, or
college, that have been here in the United States almost
their whole life, probably only speak English, lots of them
do. And so you want to be careful about those.
Step three: interviewing your client, what is
your client's immigration history. So asking sort of
these sorts of questions so that you figure out where
your client might be over in the immigration realm. We
have had some clients who have been deported
before, unfortunately, and have re-entered, and so by the
time you meet them, they've gotten re-arrested. If the
person has been deported before, sometimes what's going
to happen is called expedited removal, which we
heard before, where they're not even going to get a hearing
in immigration court. The immigration authorities are just
going to reinstate this prior order of removal, which is still
valid. It says you have been deported and you can't come
back. They'll just reinstate it and send them right out, and
then you have to have a really hard and difficult
conversation about what your client wants to do. It can
sometimes be attacked, but lots of times they just reinstate
it. So does your client - that's how you figure out sort
of what your client's goals are, and that's where we
are going with this.
Again, what are your client's family ties
and equities? These are sort of the same kinds of
questions you would ask of your citizen clients anyway
because these are the arguments that you typically make
for bond. My client has family here, he has a lot
of community support, he has kids, he works full time,
he's worked at these different places, and you can talk
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to them about these sorts of things. These
specific questions are helpful for immigrants who are non-
citizen clients in order to determine whether or not they
have any immigration relief, and they can matter later on
for an immigration lawyer who is either going to be
helping you dispose of the criminal case in a way that's
not problematic with the immigration case. Or they can
be helpful if the client is able to retain an
immigration lawyer and can get this information fairly
soon.
Then figure out what your client's goals are. Does
the client want to stay in the United States? We typically
get a lot of clients who do want to stay in the United
States. They have kids here. People do what people do;
they move somewhere and put down roots. That's what
human beings do. They get married, they have children,
they have jobs, they do have a very real interest in
remaining in the United States. That has resulted
sometimes in our clinic just going to trial more often
because we can't get immigration-safe pleas, and so we end
up taking the case to trial in the criminal case. But then we
have to have hard conversations with our client about
whether or not "you can remain in detention pending trial"
because, if the client has an ICE hold, then it doesn't make
sense to post their bond in the criminal case because
then they're going to be whisked off to immigration court
and then we can't get them back to criminal court. So
we've had clients stay in criminal court for four or
five months waiting for their misdemeanor trial. They get
their misdemeanor trial, and once it's done, then they get
sent over to immigration court. And then
those proceedings start going as well, but it's going
to require you to have conversations with your client.
If the client's goal is to stay again, sometimes we
negotiate for longer jail time; it happens all the time, or we
negotiate for a plea that usually for a citizen client would
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be terrible. We get a lot of cases because we live in
Boulder, where people are driving and they've got weed in
the car. So people have weed in the car all the time. So
what happens is, the client gets arrested for reckless driving
and for possession of drug paraphernalia typically
because there's a pipe laying in the passenger seat. For
a citizen client, the typical plea is to plea to the PDP, to the
possession of drug paraphernalia, but it's a petty offense.
And it doesn't carry any jail time, and if you plea to
reckless driving, it gets you points on your driver's license.
Most citizens don't want points on their driver's license if
they can just get a stupid PDP petty offense charge. Non-
citizen clients don't want that at all. They don't want
anything drug-related. So we're in the position of going
back to the DA and saying, "Okay, so we don't want the
PDP charge," "We want to plea to the reckless driving,"
"We don't care about points on our license," "We just want
to avoid it." And the prosecutors, because I'm
with students, they're like, "Oh, you stupid student,"
"You don't know anything," "Let me tell you what the right
plea is for this," and then we have to go back and tell
the prosecutor, "Actually we do know exactly what we're
doing, and we don't want the PDP charge."
So that's why, once again, sort of this brain shift
when you've got a non-citizen client, drugs bad, bad drugs,
don't go anywhere down that road. And so be negotiating
for a plea offer that is going to be a little dissonant for the
prosecutors or be asking for jail time in a way that is a little
bit dissonant for the judge and for the prosecutors. And
sometimes the client wants to be deported as quickly as
possible, to get out of there, "I'm done." So figure out what
those are sort of fairly early on and that will inform how it
is how you advise your client later on as well.
Immigration detainers. So there was
some questions earlier about how to go in and really sort
of fight these immigration detainers and what it is that you
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can say and do in immigration courts. It's the form 1-247. I
couldn't figure out how to get it in - I'm not the most
computer-savvy - a picture of an immigration detainer
because you can google it and you can see it, and you can
see the language has changed. And it is a request from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement asking them to
advise them when a particular inmate who is in custody is
due to be released in the criminal matter. It's a request.
So my first thing that I do now in the clinic with the
students is, when we have a client with an ICE hold, we go
and get a copy of the detainer, and the jail has been super
nice and very willing to give that to us. And I don't see
why they wouldn't give it to you; it's part of your client's
file. Ask for a copy of the detainer, and then make a copy
for the prosecutor and for the judge. And take it with you
into court, and say, judge, this is just a request. All they're
doing is requesting - we don't necessarily have to
honor these at all. Now, the answer that we've gotten
in criminal court from the judge is, "Ms. Chapin or Mr.
Student, that's not my issue, talk to the jail about whether or
not they're going to do it." So we did, and we went and
talked to the jail. And we talked to the sheriff, and there
has been some movement on this. There have been some
jurisdictions that are now refusing to honor detainers in
misdemeanor cases, in large part because it's very
expensive for the jail; you have to pay the extra money for
the forty-eight hours, so we've done that specifically. So
they asked for the forty-eight hours.
And immigration detainers will say - usually the
box checked is if ICE has - "We're issuing a detainer
because we are initiating an investigation into whether or
not your client is removable from the country." What does
that mean? We are initiating an investigation into whether
or not your client is removable from the country. What is
ICE conceding that they don't know? They don't know
whether your client is removable. They haven't met any
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standard of proof to issue a detainer. ICE doesn't have to
meet any burden of proof to show that your client is
actually removable from the country before they issue a
detainer. So I've had some students walk in there and say,
they clearly don't know. They haven't met any burden of
proof, and I think now this is an unlawful seizure. And
we're going to make a Fourth Amendment argument about
this. Some judges are delighted to have this conversation
in the midst of a very otherwise humdrum day. Other
judges are like, move on, they don't want hear to it.
But there are arguments that you can make,
and Chris Lasch has pointed to some of the - Mike
Wishney filed this out in Connecticut, and he made the
Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Violation. I would
highly recommend you go and read the brief and make
these arguments in court. The students are doing it.
They're scared []less, but they're making the arguments
in court. And the judges sometimes are engaging us on
these things and really wanting to see what's going on
with the detainer.
We also see that in some cases where judges
are either refusing to issue the client a bond because of the
detainer or they are not giving them a
personal recognizance bond only because of the existence
of a detainer - otherwise they would have given it to
them because no prior and they have been here for twenty
years and they work and do all these things, so but for
the existence of a detainer, the person would have gotten
a personal recognizance bond. We have made
these arguments as well. There's actually no proof that
the person is actually going to be removed, so it
shouldn't make a difference at all.
The existence of a detainer means your client will
not be released once they've either pled guilty or paid
bond. They will be transferred to immigration detention,
and once in immigration detention, they may or may not
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get a bond. One thing that our attorney worksheet helps
you figure out is whether or not your client is going to get a
bond based on their prior convictions and about how high
that bond is going to be, so you can have a discussion with
your client about whether or not they can also pay the
immigration bond. And in certain cases we've talked to the
judge in the criminal court about the fact that this client
should get a PR bond because a) they're almost
definitely going to get a bond in immigration court and
they're going to be able to pay it.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: There are also a
certain number of cases in which, especially where it was
done for investigation purposes only where - and it's
a permanent resident - where until there's a
conviction, they're not going to be able to pick up the
person. So that's why you need to look at the particulars of
each situation to see is this going to be the kind of bond -
Tricia talked about in the last session that sometimes it
doesn't make sense to pay the state bond and get whisked
away somewhere else to another jurisdiction, but you also
need to check, if it is an investigation-only-type situation,
your client won't be - and is a permanent resident and
they are expecting the charge to result in a conviction, until
that charge becomes a conviction, they can't do anything.
So they'll basically on their own either pick the person up
and then release the person and not issue charges and
not pick the person up once they realize it's investigation-
only. So it's just a nuance, but it's like for every rule, there
is this sort of exception. That's one that really applies here
I would say.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: And in Colorado we're a little
bit different from Tennessee in that we have an
immigration court in Denver, so they just go take it to
Denver, which is just thirty minutes away. So I don't care.
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We frequently tell clients that maybe in this case, it makes
sense to pay your criminal bond and not plead to anything
at all, don't go over to immigration court with a conviction.
We're fairly certain that you're going to get an immigration
bond. If you can afford to pay the immigration bond, then
you're out, and then we're golden. We're much better if you
can get out. But we are just logistically different from
Tennessee in that our client stays right there. Chris?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The current version of the
detainer form also has a box that can be checked that says,
consider this detainer active only upon conviction. I have
no anecdotal evidence whatsoever about how often that
bond would (inaudible) because that would also be a
situation where you want to go ahead and pay the bond
because that's not an active detainer yet in theory.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Right. Another reason why the first
thing to do is get the copy of the detainer and look at it so
that you know exactly what it is that ICE is alleging, where
you are, and you can show it to the judge in the criminal
court and show it to prosecutors, and I think it's a good idea
for everybody to just start getting used to them. You're
going to see a lot of them, and so it's good that people are
used to them and you can talk about them in a way that
gives you something else to say. I always like saying
more.
So again, getting an immigration bond
depends largely on your client's criminal history, not
his immigration status, and the existence of a detainer
only means if he's going to be transferred. Chris
Lasch gave a lecture in my class where he just said, the
ICE detainer - it's just a piece of paper. He said it earlier,
I love it. It's just a piece of paper, judge. That's all it is.
It's just a piece of paper.
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Again, no standard of proof, and that means that
your client could potentially get a bond. As I said, judges
are largely unused to it, and it shouldn't make a difference
in the court's bond determination or in the granting of
alternatives to jail as a sentence. Request a copy of the I-
247 detainer from the jail is sort of the first starting point,
and then fill out your worksheet from there. And then if
you need to, go talk to an immigration lawyer about who
your client is, what's going on with him, and what you
should do next. I'm a huge fan of the Defending
Immigrants Partnership website. I use the Padilla intake
sheet. There's also some awesome things like this.
That's awesome. Thank you, Dan Kesselbrenner.
Practice advisory - lots of practice advisory for
criminal defense lawyers who are representing non-citizen
clients, so there's tons of really good stuff.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So if we've got a judge to
say, no, this detainer is unlawful, what do we do? Get the
judge to sign the order and take it over to the jail? Is that
how you get the person actually out of jail?
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Well, we have been
wholly unsuccessful in it. I wish I could get the ball
rolling, and we should be doing something in criminal court
to fight these detainers. What we have told the judge to do
is that "you have the jurisdiction, judge, to tell this jail to
release my client."
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But even though
they're excited about that argument, they still say no?
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Yeah. They are willing to
engage us, and we talk about it. And the students have
drafted certain pleadings about why they think it's a
problem, and they'll read it and be like, what an
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interesting exercise. But I think that it's something that
really could have some teeth. It has some teeth. It
certainly scared the bejesus out of the folks in Connecticut
in terms of this Fourth Amendment argument that it's
an unlawful search and seizure, especially since there
has been no - do you see how it's different from a
regular warrant that a judge signed, for example, in New
Mexico for your client and they want you to transfer?
There was no judicial proceeding in the ICE detainer
world. It's literally Department of Homeland Security
initiating an investigation, and that's why it's an unlawful
search and seizure because there's no reasonable suspicion.
They haven't met any standard to say that your client
should be held, and "Now you are participating in the
violation of my client's rights, and I want you to release
him, judge, and tell the jail to release him as well." But I
think what's also possible is to go and talk to the jail
specifically, the guys with the keys, and say, "You guys
shouldn't be honoring them for these reasons."
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's the only way
I've been ever successful in getting somebody released, is
to explain to them that financially you hold them for forty-
eight hours and the feds pay you. After forty-eight hours,
the county has to pay for that, and on very rare occasions,
I've had the jail agree to release somebody just for financial
reasons. But I would speak with the attorney for the local
sheriffs department and explain to them, send them a copy
of the statute, and on two or three occasions, I've been able
to convince them - this is only when ICE did not pick
them up within the forty-eight hours. Forty-eight hours
will run, somebody has already paid bond, and on occasion,
just for financial reasons, they will release them.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: They got scared in Colorado.
They had to pay an immigrant a whole lot of money for
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holding them, I think it was, twenty-seven days over. They
were like forty-eight hours, twenty-seven days. So the
ACLU came in - I love the ACLU. They do all sorts of
things like this. And they came in, and they sued the
county, I think it was Jefferson County in Colorado, for
holding him over the forty-eight hours. So you can scare
them with the money thing because they'll have to pay up if
they do it, otherwise they're having to pay as well, and they
shouldn't, especially on low-level misdemeanors.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Chris and I are going to share
- we're going to be like a tag-team-back-and-forth kind of
thing so we - that's why she's up there with the slides and
I'm down here with the microphone for now. I wanted to
start off by just talking about what Tim Arnold started up
this morning, the slide showing the change of the war or the
collision of worlds. There are some things that criminal
defense practitioners and immigration practitioners can do
to help make peace with each other.
I was once at a session of the Defending Immigrants
Partnership, and we asked people who were the criminal
defense practitioners in the room, "What are the three most
annoying things that immigration practitioners do that
make it hard for you to work with immigration
practitioners?" And they said, people talk in jargon, they
talk about 1-130 this, 1-589 that, EWI, people don't cite to
readily available materials, so people cite the Immigration
Nationality Act, which is a parallel citation system, instead
of the more generally available and understandable 8 U.S.
code. Now, this was a while ago, and maybe now they're
equally available but still maybe part of the same jargon
idea.
And the third thing complaint was, they asked for
the moon. You have a client who is found charged with
first-degree murder, and they say, "Do you think you can
plead this down to disorderly? That would be great."
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There's only one thing I remember that
the immigration lawyers complained about at the
criminal defense bar, and that was this sort of call from
the courthouse bathroom during a break. It's like, "Oh,
I've got five minutes between the sessions here," "I've
got this client who did this, this, and this," "Would a plea
to Tennessee 51-12-36 make him deportable?" Basically
how long do you have for me to answer the question?
Although I still take those calls, there are some people who
said they wouldn't take those calls at all because it was
really an affront, and that's why we try to get - but those
kinds of mutual give-and-take, again, we can make things a
little bit more peaceful between the two groups.
Having said that - what does our first slide say?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Some of this is repetitive. We've
had a couple of panels where we certainly have said some
similar things over and over again, but I think some of
these - and the three of us have been revising our slide
show all day, so we have been trying to eliminate some of
the more repetitive stuff. But some things are really worth
repeating, and this is one of those. And that's that, in our
office, there is a real misconception that if I have my -
and the majority of the clients who come through our office
who are non-citizens appear to be undocumented, and that
is the category that is very often the lowest priority on my
caseload of maybe consulting or researching whether this
person has something worthy of trying to find a safe plea
for or trying to help. And I'm so happy you told your
personal story because there are so many ways that that can
happen, where you go visit your client and they actually
don't know that they're a citizen but it turns out they are or
you go visit your client - and one of our misdemeanor
clients referred a - and this is not somebody who's
currently in our office, so I don't want you to think it's you
up there in the back row - referred a no driver's
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license case because he wanted to talk to me about the case,
and it turned out he had a very, very strong claim to be
a citizen. So, even the cases where you feel like there's
probably nothing you can do, you need to do that research,
your clients need to have that individual assessment. So
they have significant interest in avoiding consequences if
they have potential future relief.
And like Tricia said at the prior panel, you've just
got to go with what we know today. We were talking a
little bit about, Well, is there anything in the legislation that
might be passed as the comprehensive immigration reform
that we can at least be thinking about? And as defenders in
trying to give the best advice, you have to just advise your
clients that you have really no idea what, if anything, is
going to get passed.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: The other thing that I don't
think has been said today, but it's been implied when
people talk about the civil/criminal distinction, is that the
prohibition against ex post facto laws doesn't apply in
immigration proceedings, so that you could give state-of-
the-art advice today. And if Congress will happen to pass a
law tomorrow that says that littering is an aggravated
felony and "we want this statute to apply to convictions on
or before or after the effective date of this amendment,"
that would probably pass constitutional muster, at
least insofar as if the question was, Would it be barred
by the prohibition against ex post facto laws because
the Supreme Court decided that several times?
The upshot of this is not that immigration advice -
we can't get the right answer anyway, why try? But it is
important to let your client know, because your client is
giving up significant rights, the right to a jury trial, jury
trial charge, right to go to trial, and other things in
exchange for your adequate representation.
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Now, obviously, none of us can see into the future,
so it wouldn't be a breach of your ethical obligation and
certainly wouldn't violate Padilla. But it does seem to me
the best practice is to sort of at least incorporate into your
advice with your client that "this is the best advice I can
give at the moment."
There was another thing in Padilla that I also didn't
hear - although I wasn't in the room all day and that's the
sort of - part of this decision talks about clear versus
unclear, and it says, you have to advise when the
consequences are clear. But if the consequences are not
clear - and people did allude to - you just have to give
this sort of generalized warning that this may create a
problem. You can't know whether the consequence is clear
unless you investigate the facts, find out what the law is,
and try to apply the law to the facts.
Now, after doing that, you can give advice that's
specific, but in the specificity, you're saying no one can tell
- there's a chance this argument would work, something
like that, but I guess the clear versus unclear doesn't - like
distinction in the opinion doesn't eliminate your obligation
to do an investigation because, until you do the
investigation as a citizenship status, as to prior criminal
history, as to the charge, investigate whether alternate
charges are available, you won't be able to make an
assessment as to whether it's clear or not. So there's work
that has to happen in every case.
One of the things that was discussed in the prior
session about negotiating with district attorneys who will
say something like, "I like to treat everyone in this court
equally - I don't care if it's non-citizen, citizen, everyone
gets treated the same." Well, if that were true - and in the
Padilla decision, one of the things the Court talked about
was that sometimes prosecutors would want to consider
immigration consequences in the interest of both sides to
negotiate these pleas, and moreover, that creative
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charge bargaining was part of what was alluded to in a list
of things that an adequate counsel might do. It was dicta, it
wasn't the holding of the case, since it didn't happen. But
you could certainly point to things in the opinion itself,
which if the Supreme Court thought that fashioning specific
dispositions for non-citizen defendants was something that
was a failure to do, it would be a Sixth Amendment
violation. Then it's hard to see how there could be an equal
protection problem with offering a different plea to a
citizen or a non-citizen.
In other words, the notion that the Court reached its
decision about the special importance of advising about
immigration consequences is at odds with this notion that
oh, I have to give the same disposition to everybody. Now,
that might not work with every district attorney because
some of the district attorneys may actually be doing it out
of etiological reasons, they're being xenophobic or racist,
rather than believing that argument, but there may be some
people who, in good faith, believe that argument and
haven't put the connection between the inconsistency
with holding that view and the reasoning of Padilla itself.
So it might be something you can do for those prosecutors.
Just wanted to get that point out.
I know it's basically four or five months since the
election, but at this point, I just want to take one or two
more polls and get people involved just so we can get some
participation going a little bit. And my first poll question:
So we've heard about crimes involving moral turpitude, but
I don't think we really heard an attempt to define it. So
I'm going to throw out the name of a crime, and then there's
three possible responses. It's a little bit of a rigid poll, but
indulge me. One choice is that the offense always involves
moral turpitude, the second choice is the offense never
involves moral turpitude, and the third choice is, it
sometimes involves moral turpitude. So the first crime is
murder, which is the intentional taking of a life with malice
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aforethought. So who thinks that a conviction for murder
always involves moral turpitude? Who thinks a conviction
for murder never involves moral turpitude? Who thinks a
conviction for intentional taking of a life with
malice aforethought sometimes defines moral turptitude?
Okay. Will a person who thought it always involves moral
turpitude volunteer, just explain their reasoning briefly for
a second?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How about by its
own definition, with malice aforethought, a violent act.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: So violent act with
malice aforethought, that that definition itself creates the -
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Turpitude misconduct.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Turpitude misconduct. Okay.
I didn't see any hands for never. Will someone who said
sometimes choose to explain why they thought sometimes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I can't think of every
possible circumstance, so I don't want to rule anything out.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Okay. So the next crime
is incest. Who thinks incest always involves
moral turpitude? Who thinks incest never involves
moral turpitude? Who thinks incest sometimes involves
moral turpitude? Chris, do you want to volunteer why you
said it always involves moral turpitude?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just so clearly depraved and
degrading of the human spirit.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: He says, incest
involves degradation of the human spirit, and that is
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necessarily turpitudinous. It's not an unreasonable answer.
Will someone who said sometimes care to give their -
yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, I think a lot of times
it's probably defined, and sometimes people may not even
know that they're having sex with a second cousin or
something.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And then there are different
laws in different states for incest, so you have a moral
turpitude attitude or you don't. And from one state to the
next, you can't change that attitude.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: But did you notice - and this
is sort of the presenter's trick - I explained to you the
elements of murder, but I didn't explain to you the elements
of incest? So I think the lesson, the takeaway from this is
that, if you don't know the elements of the offense, you
can't possibly know whether it's morally turpitudinous or
not because that's really what the inquiry is about at
bottom, is what the person is convicted for. So the people
who said, marrying a second cousin or different states
define it differently, in fact, if - and now I'll get into what
the definition is, murky as it may be, and that is that moral
turpitude is defined as an offense that has some degree of
scienter, at least reckless - so reckless, intentional, and
involves reprehensible conduct.
So right away there are certain rules that sort of -
through that analysis, murder would always involve moral
turpitude, and so for that one, I would say murder defined
as the way I defined it, intentional taking of a life with
malice aforethought, would be always a crime involving
moral turpitude under the test I gave you, for the reason
that the person in the third row back there mentioned, that
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basically elements itself make it - you have to be bad to
do that.
Now, obviously we could have
philosophical discussions about what's bad and what's
reprehensible, but they at least think that there's a certain
degree of settledness in what's considered bad. And in fact,
if you look at the thing about thou shalt not steal, thou shalt
not kill, there is some either literary or historical reference
for those particular crimes, although those weren't defined
in the Ten Commandments either. That would be an
answer you could give back. Now, that said, do you want
to turn to the Tennessee statute on -
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Which one?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Do we have one on joyriding
and theft?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Yes.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: One of the case laws, just to
give some practical approaches, how to help give you not
the answer but sort of a start to an answer, is that there are
certain rules that have been defined based on the elements,
that certain elements make something reprehensible or non-
reprehensible.
The differentiating factor between when
a conviction involving a taking is a crime involving
moral turpitude and when it's not is whether the taking
is permanent or transitory. So if you have a crime that has
only a transitory requirement to deprive the rightful owner
of their property, that's not really going to be stealing,
regardless of what the state calls it, involving moral
turpitude. If the state can call it stealing, it will be stealing
for purposes of the state law, but in terms of moral
turpitude inquiry, talking about the Ten Commandments,
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thou shalt not steal, what the Board of Immigration Appeals
cases suggest is, when it says steal, it really means
take with intent to deprive the rightful owner of
the property. So you have a statute like -joyriding I think
was the next line.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: It is. Actually, though, Dan,
if you don't mind, I think it would be another poll. I would
like to know if folks think that our Tennessee Theft Statute
meets the definition you're talking about. This is our
Tennessee Theft Statute in Tennessee, and part of this is
what Dan was saying earlier, is don't judge the crime by the
title. You have to look at the elements to decide whether or
not something could be arguably moral turpitude. So our
Tennessee Theft Statute is a person commits theft of
property, it was intent to deprive the owner of the property,
the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the
property without effective consent.
You're the immigration adjudicator and/or
the defense counsel or ICE counsel. Who wants to argue
for this not being a crime of moral turpitude, if anyone out
there thinks that?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: To the extent you think that
it requires an intent to permanently deprive and that
permanent depravation is (inaudible) immigration offense,
then Tennessee statute is broader than that, the
circumstances where there is no intent (inaudible).
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Does anybody want to counter
that argument? So theft, if you just heard the word
theft, would your gut say that it's a crime of moral
turpitude? Mostly yes. But it's extremely important that
you look at the elements. Yes, sir?
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The word exercising control
would imply that that could be less than a permanent
taking; therefore, not a crime of moral turpitude.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: I think our theft statute has a lot
of good arguments in it, frankly. Now, when
I'm counseling defenders in our office, I don't say that theft
is a safe plea, by any stretch, because we certainly have
adjudicators and judges out there who can get that wrong or
maybe they go pro se and don't have counsel to sit in, and I
think it's awesome that these offices have both immigration
and criminal defense counsel in their same offices. We
certainly don't have that in our office. So once we enter the
plea, they're going out to their immigration lawyer,
whoever they decide to hire, but they certainly have a good
argument. If it's the best plea in the hierarchy of things
that you can get from the prosecutor, you need to
certainly think that it's not exactly the most unsafe thing
you can find, although that's not our first task.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Although I think we don't have
enough information at this point, if I were to answer
Professor Chac6n - I got a call from Jenny Roberts,
whose name I only mentioned so I could refer people to her
terrific article on proving prejudice post-Padilla, which
really lays out what prejudice means in this era, but
anyway, Jenny works at a law school clinic, professor
there. And she said, "Well, my client is charged with this
Maryland Theft Statute," and it was remarkably similar to
the Tennessee statute. And so I said, well, you get to look
at the statute, but if the highest court in the state has put a
gloss on the elements, then it would be a problem. And one
thing that they would look at is jury instructions, so
she pulled up the Maryland jury instructions for
the Maryland theft. And even though the language in
the statute said deprive - although, I don't know whether
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it had exercise control over because that would be helpful if
it ever went to an immigration court. But the jury
instructions said deprive means permanently deprive, and it
could be that those jury instructions weren't backed by a
Maryland Court of Appeals, who is the highest court in
Maryland, case to support it. But at a minimum, I said, stay
away from that because a DHS prosecutor can make -
often times they might not have worked hard on the
defense side, but it isn't that hard to find the
jury instructions. And the jury instructions pretty
much resolve that question. The point of this is only
that you need to also look at the case law interpreting
the statute to see if there is a judicial gloss on the elements.
Yes, sir, over here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Would it make
any difference what was stolen or why, if I'm
stealing formula to feed my starving baby?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: No. It should make
a difference. If I were the one with the moral - but I'm
not, and that's why - the person who said, "I don't know
every circumstance that murder could be convicted," in this
case, that's true, but it doesn't - you know that if a person
got a conviction, they don't re-litigate whether there was a
conviction or not. And so they don't re-litigate, whether in
fact it was malice aforethought. Presumably if there was
some mitigating factor, the person would have
gotten second-degree. If it was self-defense, then it was
an affirmative defense, and they would have gotten
acquitted. And they proved it up. So it's really the fact of
the conviction.
Now, it could make a difference in terms of -
some states have theft over 500 is a felony, theft under 500
is a misdemeanor, or theft under 500 may be punished by
only six months. And so you think you have to look at the
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grounds of deportability. So we're not going to this sort of
micro-level. But at the micro-level, you would find out. If
you look at the grounds of deportability for moral turpitude,
it says a single conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude within five years of admission where the crime is
punishable by a year, at least a year, so, basically all
of those things need to be there for the person to
be deportable for that offense. So it turns out it was theft.
It was moral turpitude. It wasn't permanent deprivation. It
wasn't in five years, but it's only a six-month max. Then
for that ground, they wouldn't be deportable. Why? You
look on the one side of the ledger of what do they need -
this is one good way to do this. This is sort of borrowing
this from Mary Holt or Roger Williams. One side of the
piece of paper, you put the elements of the grounds of
deportability. Another side, you put the elements of the
criminal offense or the client situation. So if each of
the things match up - and someone said - I think
Jennifer said this - that there's no way that you could be
- the statute of conviction is broader than the definition.
Then in a situation where it's the government's burden -
where there's a burden, they won't able to meet the burden.
Should we do the drugs, do the marijuana possession?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Yes. We need to go back and
talk about exactly what the record is that the
immigration fact finder can look at, but another way that
you can make a big difference for your client, under
our Misdemeanor Marijuana Statute, is - our
Misdemeanor Marijuana Statute, 39-17-418, an offense
where a person knowingly possess or casually exchange a
controlled substance. And under the immigration laws, you
can be deportable, any alien could, any time after
admission, have been convicted of a violation of any law
relating to a controlled substance other than a single
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offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty
grams or less of marijuana.
In trying to keep folks awake during the last panel,
let's hear from defense counsel as to the safest plea if your
client is charged with misdemeanor marijuana, forty-eight
grams of marijuana. What might you be able to negotiate
with your prosecutor to help your client?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Below thirty grams, right?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: And specifically state in
your agreement a less-than-thirty-gram possession. Even
though they may be possessing forty-eight, they still are
possessing less than thirty also. So it's not false that they
were possessing less than thirty. You can get a prosecutor
to agree to that. They're still going to get their conviction,
but you are safely pleading them to that.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: I'll say real briefly, with a couple of
these things - and I think you're about to talk about it now
- in terms of what it is that the immigration adjudicator
can look at - the record of convictions is I guess what
you're going to talk about?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Yes.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: So one thing that we do now
in Colorado is, for certain misdemeanors, such as
weed charges that we can't get out from under, we have
a trespass statute, which has a number of different
things that qualifies as trespass, we prefer the trespass
on agricultural land. It doesn't usually make a difference to
the prosecutors, but we actually have it written out onto the
Rules of 35, under the plea form, which is something that
they normally don't do for citizen clients. It's odd and
unusual for them to do, but again, on the whole non-citizen
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clients are different type. We now write it out very clearly
as to what specific part of the statute we are pleading to
and exactly what the client is admitting guilt to so that it's
very clear in immigration court so that they don't get to go
look behind ugly things, like the police report, which is
never helpful for your client. So that's another thing that
we do, typically with those sort of broader statutes, is write
it out very specifically on the top of the Rule 35 plea form.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Basically you can make
a difference because the prosecutor shouldn't care because
the prosecutor is getting the conviction in the identical
statute whether it's twenty-eight grams or whatever was on
the original ticket. That statute also referenced that it has to
be a federally-controlled substance. So there's a statute 21
U.S.C. 802 and schedules that are promulgated by the
Federal Government that lists what are federally-controlled
substances. If there is one offense more under the
Tennessee schedules than under the federal schedules -
it's better living through creative chemistry. There are all
sorts of steroids being developed, and until they get
basically put on the list, they and other kinds of substances
are not federally-controlled substances.
It may be that Tennessee has particular interest in
getting one of those on its list earlier. If you can plead to a
violation of the Tennessee statute without naming the
substance, so how does this work? I don't know that this is
where Chris will fill in the gaps. I don't know what you
can actually do in a Tennessee criminal court, but the
idea would be something like, "We admit to a facie
violation of the statute." So you're not admitting to all
the allegations - let's say the charging document
mentions marijuana, and marijuana is on the federal list,
or cocaine. If you just plead to the charging documents, the
records indicate that the conviction was for cocaine,
cocaine is on the list, it's a deportable offense. And I've
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seen these over the years; sometimes the charging
documents don't mention the to wit. It says possession of
controlled substance, to wit: cocaine. Sometimes they
leave off the to wit in some jurisdictions. If they do that,
you don't want to fill in the blank.
Assuming your client is charged with the
right schedule, that is, that they are charged with
something that they are not getting more time or that their
client doesn't want that additional time, the absence
of anything on the record as to the identity of the
drug actually would inure to your client's benefit
in immigration proceedings.
This is sort of consistent with my view, when
I started off talking about not asking for the world, in terms
of going down from murder to disorderly conduct. It's the
hierarchy of outcomes. You really want to get the best
possible outcome you can based on the facts and what your
client wants to do. So obviously the best choice is no
conviction at all. A slightly less good choice would be a
conviction for something that is not deportable. Then
going up the hierarchy, it will be a conviction for
something that is deportable but preserves your client's
eligibility for relief. And lastly would be something that -
unless this is what your client wants - makes your
client deportable and bars her or him from getting any
relief. Specifying a facie violation of the statute but
not admitting to the indictment, to the charging
document, or pleading to - without asking for a statement
of particulars - Now, in most cases, if you wanted to get
the person - because it didn't mention a drug, it's not a
violation, you can move to dismiss. If it was a jury case,
once a jury was impaneled, you might be able to beat the
charge. But doing that, they might realize their mistake and
add the drug long before that, and then your client is both
guilty and deportable.
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Again, you have to sort of be creative. You don't
have to memorize, and no one will, these grounds of
deportability, but you want to look to, like I said, what will
the government have to prove in immigration reform, what
elements necessarily in here, in this offense, by virtue of
any conviction. And if there's a match, then the person is
in trouble. That is sort of a tool you can use to sort of begin
your analysis.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Do you want to talk about
the categorical approach?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Yes. I have been sort of doing
it in a way that I think is actually easier to understand than
sort of talking about it, is the categorical approach. That is,
the immigration fact finder is not going to look at what you
did. This was that what-if-you-stole-milk-to-feed-your-
starving-child-instead-of-for-greed-or-gain. At least in the
moral turpitude inquiry, the general rule is that you want to
keep the record as you - you want to affirmatively get the
most benign version of the crime possible. In an example
where it's intentional or temporary taking of property, you
don't want - unless the charging document just says
intentional or temporary, and often times that's what
happens - the prosecutor just tracks the statute. The
person just pleads guilty to the charging document. You
can't tell whether it was temporary or permanent. In the old
days, you would win. Now there's a little bit of
creed looking at what the person did. And if
there's continuing ambiguity in some context, then they
can sneak in the stuff that you let them mention that
we want to keep out, like the police report. The way
to avoid that is to allocate affirmatively to the most benign
way to violate the statute possible. So pick your crime.
We've talked about temporary and permanent
taking; plead to the temporary taking. Another place this
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comes up is - if you remember when I said the definition
of moral turpitude - and the same analysis applies in other
grounds of deportability - I said, it has to be a scienter of
at least recklessness or be for reprehensible conduct. That's
what it has to be. If it's less than negligence, it's not
reckless. It's not moral turpitude. Negligence is less than
reckless. If you have any statute that has - I shouldn't say
any because I mentioned when I talked to the
public defenders yesterday, generally speaking, statutory
rape is a strict liability crime, but that's like a thing unto
itself almost because, under this analysis, stat rape
shouldn't be a crime involving moral turpitude. I think the
9th Circuit has held that it isn't, but that's the result-oriented
decision. And that's just sort of a specific warning.
But if you've got something that is like negligent
assault, go for it. If it's even something like negligent
homicide where a tragedy causes an accident and
someone's life gets lost - if a person was just sort of an
inattentive driver, which we've all probably had those
moments where we're daydreaming and then quickly
realize where we were and avoided an accident - I think
the person who hasn't avoided that accident, it doesn't make
them a bad person. And so under that kind of analysis, they
have been recognized; negligent wouldn't be a crime
involving moral turpitude.
In statutes that list elements or define different
crimes, temporary, permanent takings, negligent, reckless,
intentional, or there are things like possession of various
amounts, you want to look to what the disqualifying
element would be, and see if you can come away to get out
from under it. If you affirmatively plead to the temporary
taking, they don't get to look at the police report. The case
law has eroded now so that if there's ambiguity after they
look at the - first they look at the crime itself - this is the
categorical approach - they look at the crime itself. They
say, Does this always or never trigger the consequence?
220
Summer 2013 Volume 9 Special Edition
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 222
The next step is, they look at the record of conviction,
which is the plea, the charging document, the judgment,
and the sentence. So then if that doesn't tell you whether
it's, in this case, temporary or permanent taking, they then
get to look to the things that are outside the record of
conviction, like the police report.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: Which is never good for your client.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: You can preclude them getting
from that step by pleading to the temporary taking. There
are great victories in this. Florida has a thing, taking or
conversion. This went to the 11th Circuit. Unfortunately,
the people who are deported previously under the
conversion - 11th Circuit said, hey, Florida legislature put
two different words there: conversion, taking. This
conversion isn't the taking because, if it were, they wouldn't
need two words for it.
Now, that's the kind of argument that you've got
good lawyers from the place Chris used to work arguing at
the 11th Circuit, and you have got someone who has the
both wherewithal and is out of custody to be able to present
that claim. You then make good law for everybody else in
the 11th Circuit then to just know, hey, it's theft,
conversion. We converted this property. It's like, Who
knows what that means? And there probably wasn't even a
case in Florida because no one was ever - basically they
probably did just mean for it to mean that they were just
trying to cover their bases. But the rules of statutory
construction can be weapons for people who do appellate
litigation and, as a result of their efforts, can create rules
which you then can reasonably infer will apply, again, with
that caveat I mentioned before about the ex post facto law
doesn't apply. Congress could pass a law that would be -
Marco Rubio could say, "I'll go for comprehensive
immigration reform if you just make sure that you define
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theft to include conversion," and Congress goes
along because they want comprehensive immigration
reform. And this applies on, before, or after. Well, then all
those people who pled would be now deportable. I don't
think that's going to happen, but I just use it as
an illustration to try to pull together the points about what
you can really draw from the lessons.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: I'll jump in real quick just to say that
one of the ways that this really came out for us in the clinic
on the criminal defense side was to go and watch
proceedings in immigration court, as Chris Lasch said
before. If you have the opportunity - and we went to the
detention center, and I know it's far here. But if you get the
opportunity to go to a detention center and see how this
works sort of on a daily basis, it's pretty shocking. We took
some bond hearings for people who were in detention that
were either trying to convince the judge - because the
first person who makes the bond determination in
immigration court is the Department of Homeland Security,
which is bizarre; it's the cops who are setting bond first, not
a judge. But then everybody has the right to request
what is called a Custody Redetermination Hearing in front
of an immigration judge and then hear arguments about
why the person actually does qualify for a bond or that
the bond that was initially set by DHS should be lowered.
And one of our first cases was a guy who was
from Nigeria, and he had come on a tourist visa with
his parents when he was underage. And his parents had
then just stayed past the time that they were allowed on
the visa, so the kids obviously stayed with the parents. He
had been arrested in Colorado several years before on
a possession of cocaine charge. His public defender pled it
possession of marijuana, straight possession of marijuana,
but it didn't say an amount. It just said possession of
marijuana. So we are going in, DHS says this guy is
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ineligible for bond, can't get a bond because he pled guilty
to possession of marijuana. They didn't yet know that he
had been arrested initially for possession of cocaine, which
would have been really bad, because they hadn't gone and
looked, and they just knew that the conviction was for
possession of marijuana. We couldn't get him a bond to get
out of immigration court because it simply just didn't say
on the plea form that it was possession of marijuana
less than thirty grams. That's all we needed it to say, and
it didn't say.
So then the judge said, well, it's your burden - it
gets complicated from here, but the judge says, it's your
burden to show it was less than thirty grams. The student
very diligently goes out and gets the police report and sees
that he was initially arrested for possession of cocaine. So
we don't want to tell the judge that. But at this point it's our
burden, and we just didn't have any way to prove it.
We couldn't show it. So that really brought home for us the
necessity, in criminal court, how easy it is to help your
client. Really, if you had just gotten the less-than-thirty-
grams language written on there, it would have made a
huge difference in this person's life. And the criminal
defense lawyer probably had all the best intentions but just
didn't know. There we were with a vague record, Rule 11
- I said Rule 35 earlier - Rule 11 plea that said just
possession of marijuana, didn't help us, and we couldn't get
him out of detention. And it was a disaster. Picking
the least problematic plea but also being very specific about
it and writing it out was really important on the criminal
defense side.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: We just wanted to throw up
an example of the misdemeanor statute where you
have potential for affirmatively helping your client
in Tennessee. Now, I get a lot of calls from
Felony Sessions saying, "The charge is aggravated assault,
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I have an Offer 2 misdemeanor assault. Is that safe?" And
my personal opinion on that is that there's a whole bunch of
other stuff I need to know, and so we try not to answer
those phone calls, even though I will take them. We try to
get them to set that off so we can analyze it. But here's a
misdemeanor assault statute in Tennessee where we have
three separate sections with very different potential
immigration consequences.
Dan, is the Tennessee Assault Statute - would that
make someone be - if you just pled them to
Al, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing
bodily injury to another, if I pled my person to potentially
a crime of moral turpitude -
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Does it include de
minimis injury, slight touching?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: It's intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly causing bodily injury to another.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: DHS would think so.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Why?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Because it's
intentionally causing injury - anyone who has knowingly
or recklessly - they would say that the scienters all are
higher than reckless, and causing injury is reprehensible.
So the two factors in the test of scienter, plus
reprehensibility, are both met. The reason I hesitated,
there is some dispute as to whether that language is
sufficiently reprehensible to be a conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude, is why I said DHS would
probably think so.
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CHRISTINA KLEISER: DHS might argue yes. What
might be a safer plea if you can get it - now,
obviously, again the big "if," from going from an
aggravated assault to an offense of touching might be a big
"if' for the criminal defender. But if you are able to get
three, intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact
with another person is offensive, so no injury but still have
intentional scienter. Now, in Tennessee, the first two are a
Class A misdemeanor, and the third is a B misdemeanor.
So for a prosecutor, sometimes that's a significant drop.
But you are just being much safer for your defendant if you
are able to get it lower. And then arguably they will have
problems in the state of Tennessee even if you just have
a misdemeanor assault for crimes of moral turpitude, if that
is part of your analysis.
Our panel only has about twenty minutes, and
I wondered if we wanted to leave the rest of the time
for questions.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Could you put the
Venn diagram up?
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Sure.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: We have been focusing
on moral turpitude just because we wanted to give
some practical examples of how you can avoid a
certain consequence, but avoiding one consequence isn't
enough because I gave you the definition - we had
some discussion about moral turpitude, but there's also
grounds of deportability for guns. Unlawful possession of
a firearm might be a strict liability offense. Certainly no
one would say it's morally reprehensible. Someone might,
but it's not the conventional view. So it wouldn't involve
moral turpitude. But you need to go through the list
of possible grounds of deportability, and you'd have
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your grounds for deportability for a firearm that would
say carrying, possessing, using a fireman as defined in 18
U.S.C. 921(a) or something like. Then you would look at it
and say, "I avoided moral turpitude, but possession of a
fireman wouldn't be good for my client because it fits under
this other ground of deportability."
So the takeaway from this is, you need to not just
focus on one of the grounds listed in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) of
criminal grounds of deportability, but look at all of them.
And then from that you can get your - do the hierarchy we
talked about. I just didn't want people to think they had
scored a victory by pleading to something which avoided
one consequence but then fell under one of the other
grounds.
MR. ELKINS: We have about fifteen minutes left that we
will open up for questions, and if you do have a question,
please let us use the microphone so we can get it on the
record.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It sounds to me like lawyers
are confused about what crimes are going to trigger
immigration consequences. They're calling you, and
they're calling you. And they're calling Tricia. Why can't
there be a database where you can go and click on your
state and someone has figured out which crimes trigger
immigration consequences, whether they definitely do or
they may, and if so, what you should strive to plead for
your client?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: The answer is yes, and I think
in your materials, there's a thing that Michael Holley did
from the Federal Defender of the Middle District of
Tennessee. So the short answer is it's been done, but the
ones I've done, I don't always have time to update every
time there's a new decision. There's a nuance, and
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something would have to move. And it really doesn't give
your client an individualized assessment that we think you
really need to do. So the answer to your question is, it's not
a database, it's not - well, it's online, but you can't plug -
it's not interactive. That's a resource to begin your
research, and if it says always, there's a good chance that
that will always - the category, like you said, always,
never, maybe. If it says always, chances are it's not good.
But I did want to answer - I think it was
your question from an earlier session about proving
the prejudice, mentioned Jenny Roberts's terrific article.
Now, it isn't just that I would have gone to trial, but the
prejudice would have been - there's a reasonable
possibility with a different outcome, and the different
outcome could have been I could have gotten a lower
sentence. One of the things we didn't show here is that
there's a theft aggravated felony, that if it's a theft and you
get a year sentence, it's in that killer category of aggravated
felonies.
Let's say your client has been a long-term resident.
They would have gotten this thing called Cancellation of
Removal for Permanent Resident but for this conviction.
Where there's a reason for the outcome that it mattered to
the person and it was something like, it would have been
foreseeable that someone could have gotten a 364-day-
suspended-sentence-probation kind of thing instead of a
365-day and that one day would have meant the difference
between automatic deportability and the chance to go in
front of an immigration judge to qualify for relief, many
post-conviction fact finders in many jurisdictions are
going along with that. So I just wanted to - for
those people who do post-convictions, I don't want the
takeaway to be Strickland and it's too hard to meet when it's
progeny because now - and this was what the Supreme
Court decided last term, I think it was in LaFleur and in
Frye, that part of the right to counsel includes the right to
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an effective plea bargain. Just to be clear, you don't have a
right to say, "I had a right to 364 days," but you had a right
to have someone negotiate an effective plea bargain.
Also, historically, there's been a duty to mitigate,
and the duty to mitigate includes seeking this sentence that
would be lower. And it would also avoid immigration
consequences. So there are resources out there. It's not the
magic formula. Kevin talked about when Padilla was
announced. I worked for part of the National Lawyers
Guild, which is a very, very, very, very progressive
organization, and I heard - we had that march in Nashville
that Elliott mentioned, the Renteria hearing. There was a
march to the courthouse, and the community in Nashville
came. And there were Lawyers Guild members with
their characteristic green hats being legal observers. So it's
the kind of thing in the organization that represents people
in struggle or movements in struggle. And then I see this
was cited by Justice Alito in its concurrence of Padilla.
Oh, oh. All these years I've tried to live the good life and
be respectful, and then what could I have said that Justice
Alito was citing basically a National Lawyers Guild book,
being one of the most conservative members of the Justices
of the Supreme Court.
As it turned out, it was the things that I had written
about how complicated immigration law is
which dovetailed with his analysis that it was too
complicated for lawyers to do. Fortunately, it wasn't
too complicated because I have faith in you out there -
and I did want to give a shout out, since we are reaching the
end of our time, to people who are doing this work. It isn't
very difficult. It's very, very hard to have a limited amount
of time, to have someone pressuring you to do more cases
than you can reasonably do in the amount of time that
exists in the day, and still have a life and still go in front of
the judge and say, "Sorry, I need that continuance." So
I really applaud - because a lot of what I do is sit in my
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office and spit out ideas and write stuff and read stuff that
other people do and talk to people on the phone. I have an
easy job compared to the jobs you have who actually go
into court and represent people on a day-to-day basis,
having the stress and pressure of an individual whose life is
really going to be affected dramatically by the amount of
work you put into it. So I just wanted to not let this session
end without sort of at least saluting the people who do that
difficult work every day because I certainly would not want
to do it.
MR. ELKINS: In reference to the list that he was saying is
in your materials on the Tennessee statutes and how they're
interpreted, Mr. Holley did, some of the students have tried
to update that as best we could, but if you are going to rely
on it, obviously check on your own. Any more questions?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just have a real short,
quick question. Is there a website we could go to find out if
someone has been deported?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Does the 800 number list -
JEREMY JENNINGS: If you've been ordered deported.
CHRISTINA KLEISER: Yeah, if you've been
ordered deported by immigration.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ordered deported, snatched
up, gone, whatever.
JEREMY JENNINGS: That doesn't mean
physically deported. That just means the court has ordered
you to be deported.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: I don't know of one.
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CHRISTINA KLEISER: Not a website. Very minutia
right now, but if you have the alien registration number,
which is a number issued to them when they are issued
their first immigration documents basically, the Executive
Office for Immigration Review has a 1-800 number. It's 1-
800-898-7180, and if you call it, it's an automated system,
you put in the A number, and it will tell you if the judge
has ordered a prior deportation. Yes. Always helpful to
get an A number. I don't care what your client tells you.
DAN KESSELBRENNER: It's not reliable. It will give
you information to check further because, the last time I
called, it happened to be someone whose case was reversed
twice by the 9th Circuit, and he was actually pending
somewhere in the administrative proceedings. I believe
this person was pro se, got reversed twice by the 9th
Circuit, and the thing listed him as having a deportation
order, and that was the last entry. So, it can help be a
starting place to further research. There is no way to avoid
doing the work. These things can save, like the charts and
the 800 number, can save time and give you a heads-up to
do further factual and legal investigation, but
the information isn't sufficiently - even the stuff I do -
isn't sufficiently reliable, especially the things I do,
sufficiently reliable for your client to decide without an
individualized, particularized assessment of how this law
applies to her in the case.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.
MR. ELKINS: We have about five minutes left. Does
anyone else have anything else? I've got one here that I
would like to ask you. If you are advising a client on
pleading and they could either plead to a crime that they
may not have committed that has no immigration
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consequences or go to trial and face conviction to a crime
that does have immigration consequences, how would you
advise them?
DAN KESSELBRENNER: Well, the ethical issues that I
see are, there is some - you have to be honest - you can't
perpetrate a fraud on the court, but you have an obligation
to represent your client zealously. It's possible I think to
fulfill both. If you ask the prosecutor to write up the
safe charge and then enter something like an Alford plea
or no contest, you are not saying that you did it. You
are just saying you have - Alford is a case where your
plea is something like, "I have reasons to plead guilty
other than my actual guilt." Alford takes a death penalty
in North Carolina. He pled to something else because he
didn't want to die because he didn't think he could get a fair
trial in the North Carolina system that existed at the time,
especially segregated juries. An Alford plea I think is a
way that you can both maintain your honesty and integrity
and your bar license and still help your client.
VIOLETA CHAPIN: It happens in other
circumstances too. So with regular citizen clients,
sometimes this prosecutor will give you a charge which has
nothing to do with what you actually did in order to avoid
points on your license, for example, and the judge will
ask them ask a question, "Are you pleading to this in
order to take the benefit of the plea, and that's the
reason why you're doing this?" Yes. And that's perfectly
fine to do that. We've had certainly cases where the
client's alleged conduct, according to the police report, isn't
what he's pleading to, but we're doing it in order to take
advantage of an immigration-safe plea. The judge can say
it if he wants to say it, but it doesn't matter to us. We're
more concerned for the immigration-safe plea if we can get
out from under something that's problematic.
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MR. ELKINS: If there are no other questions, we will have
our closing from our editor in chief of the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy. Is there anything else in
closing? All right. Amy.
AMY WILLIAMS: First of all, I just want to thank Katie
for putting all this together. Of course, Professor White is
conveniently not in here because she probably knew we got
her something. Mickey wants me to remind you all to
please turn in your CLE forms, which I'm sure you are
already aware of, to be sure you get your credits. Thank
you.
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